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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The Kansas Industrial Court Act has the distinction of being
the only one of its kirrl ever passed. The things it attempted to do
had never been done before in just the same way, nor have they ever
since been imitated. But, to many people, there had been previous
experiments closely resembling the Kansas act of 1920. They pointed
to various acts passed in the latter part of the 19th. century, and
the early part of the 20:Ji}.,in such places as New Zealand, Australia,
Canada, and even in parts of the United States as being forerunners
of the Kansas Industrial Court Law. These laws were passed to provide for the compulsory arbitration of industrial disputes. The Kansas Court of Industrial Relations, also, has many times been referred
to as an attempt at the compulso y arbitration of industrial disputes.
The men who drew up the Kansas act of 1920, however, always claimed
that compulsory arbitration was not the underlying principle of the
experiment. Instead, they called their plan compulsory adjudication
of disputes occurring between labor and capital.
It is not a court of arbitration or conciliation; it is
a court of justice, arrl in the personnel of that court
there is no man who represents labor from a professional
standpoint, or employing capital from a professional standpoint -- they all three represent government, with its
pledge of impartial justice.l

1. Henry J. Allen, "Increased Production as a Remedy for Inflation:
The Kansas Industrial Relations Court Plan," Proceedings of the Academy of
Political Science, IX (June, 1920), p. 71.
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As far as this study is concerned it makes no difference which of the
tenns is applied to the Kansas act. Both it and the other acts mentioned above had one thing in conunon, they were at tempts to prevent
industrial warfare by governmental interference. So, before going into
the history of the Kansas Court of Industrial Relations, we shall
briefly describe how these other governments attempted to solve the
problem of preventing industrial disturbances. A comprehensive history
of the acts will not be given, merely the main characteristics of each
act. Keeping in mind, the~,the main points of these laws the reader
will be able later on to see how the problem was approached differently
by the Kansas act, yet will see that there were many points of similarity.
Previous Attempts at Compulsory Arbitration
A look at these early attempts at compulsory arbitration will
show that Kansas was not the fir st governmental unit to step in and use
its power to prevent labor and capital from carrying on industrial warfare. All of these laws are similar in principle and aim, that of finding some way to do awa:y with industrial warfare. Their main differences
are in scope and method. One thing will be noticed throughout, and th at

is that every one of these attempts at compelling both labor and
capital to come together in an attempt to iron out their difficulties
grew out of a serious strike, one that threatened the nation with widespread suffering and possible economic ruin. These crises seemed to
point out to these peoples that unless government stepped in and required at least an attempt at peaceful settlement of these disputes
the country ~uld totter on the. brink of eventual civil war. Then, we

3
find that during times of relatively peaceful industrial relations,
there is little or no agitation from the erection of such a system
which in some ways compels the industrial antagonists to peacefully
settle their controv~rsies.
One of the early outstanding examples of compulsory arbitration
was the Industrial Conciliati·on and Arbitration Act of New Zealand
passed in 1894. In 1890 New Zealand had had a terrible maritime strike
which devastated the whole of Australasia. It soon spread from the
shipping world, where it began, into a great circle of related industries. "Merchants and their clerks drove drays and loaded and unloaded merchandise; shipowners and their sons and friends took the place
of sailors and stokers; the country want to the edge of civil war. 112
The maritime strike was eventually over, but other labor disputes were
looming over the horizon. It was at this time that Mr.

w.

P. Reeves,

the Minister of Labor for the Colony, set himself ·t o find a remedy to
prevent the recurrence of such terrible struggles as the maritime
strike had bem. Eventually Mr. Reeves hit upon the idea of compulsory
arbitration. He was treading on new ground here as there had been no
previous attempt at this in New Zealand. However, he had come upon
this solution and decided to try it, because in looking over the
experiences of the other countries of the world whose experience
had been confined to voluntary arbitration and conciliation, he saw

2. Henry D. Lloyd, A Country Without Strikes (New York, Doubleday, Page, and Company, 1900), P• 5.
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only a record of failure. Success had been achieved mostly when ther~
was very little at stake, never when a great strike had either been
threatened or called.
The following are the main points of the Industrial Conciliation
ani Arbitration Act as finally amended in 1898. 3

(1) It was recognized that it ~uld be difficult to apply
the principle of compulsory arbitration to individual
and irresponsible workingmen, so the law first of all
provided f or the organization of industrial workers into
associations or unions, and then provided that the
principle of compulsory arbitration could be invoked by
such organization. Workingmen who f¥led to organize
themselves in such unions could in no way invoke the
benefits of the law. It also made it easy for employees
to organize into recognized unions, any five persons or
more, by confonning to a few provisions could organize
and be recognized as a union.
(2) In the second place, the New Zealand law did not prevent
private conciliation or arbitration. Industrial agreements
could be made between industrial unions and employers.
and they would be enforced the same wa:y as if they were awards
of the court of arbitration.
(3) Now as regards the conciliation and arbitration f eatures

of the law. The law provides for two bodies, conciliation
boards arrl a court of arbitration. The arbitration court
was to be used only as a last resort, every facility
being offered the disputants to settle their controversy
peacefully before arbitration was compelled.
(a) New Zealand was divided up into as many "industrial
districts" as the Governor thought proper, and for
each of these districts there was to be established
a board of conciliation. It was to have jurisdiction
to settle industrial disputes in that district.
Members of these boards (either 4 or 6) were elected
by the employees and the employers, each electing
an equal number.
(b) Industrial disputes could be brought to this board
either by toe workers (unions) or the employers.

3. w. F. Willoughby, "Foreign Labor Laws," Bulletin of the
Department of Labor, No. 33 (March, 1901), Washington: Government
Printing Office, 1901, pp. 207-234•
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However, ·after the board once had jurisdiction,
the employers could not use the lockout, and the
workers couldn't strike. Things were to go on as
usual until the board had made its decision. If
the decision wasn't satisfactory to either of the
parties, it had to be taken to the court of
arbitration.
(c) The court of arbitration consisted of a single body
for the whole C~olony. The three-man court was appointed by the Governor; one member on recommendation
of the unions, one of employer's associations, and
the third member, who acted as president of the court,
had to be a judge of the Supreme Court. The court acted in most respected as an ordinary court of law, except that the ppocedure was simplified, and the decision was not ta be written up in technical language.
(41) The awar<Eof the court of arbitration were to be enforced
through the regular law courts, but could not be enforced
for longer than a two-year period.
(5) There was no provision for imprisonment for violating the
All penalties were money payments.

This was the essence of the law then. Strikes were outlawed, in
fact were crimes against society. Workers who didn't organize into unions
did not come within jurisdiction of the act, however, and employers who
prevented their workers from organizing could disobey the act. Mr.
Reeves had it in mind that these boards ~uld do most of the work in
handling disputes, and that the arbitration court was to be used only
as a last resort. However, out of 109 cases dealt with by the boards
up to June 30, 1900, 73 went on to the arbitration courts. 4 This
would seem to show that the conciliation boards merely prolonged the
settlement of disputes and served no useful purpose in the compulsory
system.

4. Bulletin o..!_ the Department of Labor, No. 40 (May, 1902), Washington: Government Printing Office, 1902, PP• 552-553°
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Mr. Henry Lloyd very succinctly stated the underlying philosophy
of this act when he made the following statement.
We cannot understand • • • why compulsion cannot be used
to prevent economic crime, as well as any other crime, or to
repel economic invasion of one class by another, which is
just the same thing, for all intents and purposes, as the
invasion of one country by another.5
If any one part of any society, then, takes it upon itself to invade
the rights of the others, the State can step in to protect itself, because the State is composed of all the component parts of society.
This should be kept in mind because it will be seen later that those
who created the Kansas Industrial Court used exactly the same argument
as part of their supporting statements for the act.
At about the same time that New Zealand was starting her experiment in compulsory arbitration, beginnings were being made in
Australia too. In 1894 the Colony of South Australia passed an act
entitled.,

11

An Act to Facilitate t e Settlement of Industrial Disputes, 11

and it followed in many respects the system as created in New Zealand.
However, it was more of a conciliation plan than it was compulsory
arbitration. Neither party could _compel the other to take the dispute
to a conciliation board, there was no general system of compulsion,
and six years after the law was enacted not a single case had been
tried under it. 6
Most of the other colonies in Australia passed, in the late 19th.
and early 20th. century, acts intended to suppress strikes and to cause

5. Lloyd, 2.E• cit., p. 125.
6. Bulletin of the Department of Labor, No . 33 (March, 1901),
Washington: Government Printing Office, 1901, PP• 252-253•
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labor disputes to be adjusted, if possible, by agreement under public
sanction, and in the last resort by the awards of special legal tribunals. The fundamental provision of most of these statutes was that
a strike or lock-out was illegal v.hen other means were provided for
settling disputes.
The Commonwealth itself enacted an act in 1904 entitled, "Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Act. 11 It made provision for a
Commonwealth Arbitration Court. One of the most important provisions
of the act was that which forbade strikes or lockouts umer penalty
of 1000 pounds. Thus, the right to strike was denied the Australian
worker, but he was encouraged, as in New Zealand, to organize into
unions so that he could bring his disputes as a unit of workers and
try am get them settled peacefully. 7
Next should be mentioned the attempt made in Canada at some
sort of compulsory arbitration

stem. An act was passed in 1907

called, "The Industrial Disputes Investigation A.ct." It, as will be
clearly seen, was not pure compulsory arbitration as the system set
up in New Zealand was. The act applied to coal mines and metal mines,
public utilities, including municipal service corporations, transportation of all kinds, including occupations subsidiary thereto, and to
all agencies of communication. Whenever a dispute arose between an
employer and any of his employees, and the parties thereto were unable
to adjust it, either of the parties to the dispute could make appli-

Survey,

7. Mary Chamberlain, "Settling Labor Disputes in Australia, " The
XXXII (August 1, 1914), P• 455.

8

cation to the Minister of Labor for the appointment of a Board of
Conciliation and Investi gation, to which Board the dispute was to be
referred. ·Like the Arbitration court in New ZE;Sland, every board was
to consist of three members, one appointed on recommendation of the
employees, one on recommendation of the employer, and the third chosen
8
by the above two •. The main purpose of this act was to prevent and' not
prohibit strikes apparently, and did not aim directly at compulsory
arbitration like the New Zealand act.
The act made it unlawful for employers in these industries and
occupations to lock out their -workmen or for employees to strike until
this board had investigated the dispute and had made a report of its
findings. After the report of the board had been issued the parties
could refuse to accept its findings and start a strike or a lockout,
whichever the case might be. 9 Therefore, if this attempt at conciliation
was a failure, either side could then resort to industrial warf are. The
law merely forbade strikes and lockouts while the dispute was being
investigated by this board appointed by the Minister of Labor. It can
be seen that the actual compulsion didn't extend as far as it did in
the New Zealand act.
The last example to be mentioned before getting into the actual
history of the Kansas law will be the experiment made in the state
of Colorado in 1915. It was patterned somewhat after the Canadian Trades
Disputes Act.

8. Charles W. Eliot, "The Canadian Act," McClure's Magazine, XXX
(November, 1907), p. 149.

9. United States Bureau of Labor Statistics, Monthly Review, III,
No •. 4, (October, 1916), Washington: Government Printing Office, 1916,
PP• 16-19.
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The Colorado law created an industrial commission, and conferred upon it· certain powers as to the adjustment of industrial disputes.
The act made it unlawful for employers to declare or cause a lockout,
or for employees to go on a strike prior to or during an investigation
or arbitration of a dispute by this industrial commission. The law required 30 days' notice before a strike or lockout was actually engaged
in. Conciliation efforts were to be carried on during this period to
try and reach a peaceful solution. If this failed, informal conferences
could be held to afford a means at arriving at an understanding. If all
this failed, then a strike or lockout could be called.lo
These, then, were some of the previous attempts at some form of
compulsory arbitration of labor disputes. To what extent was the Kansas
law copied from these? Did they serve as a model for the industrial
court established in Kansas in 1920? Governor Henry J. Allen, who was
largely responsible for the t..nactment of the Kansas law, very definitely stated that they did not serve as models for his court. In the first
place he criticized these laws because of the makeup of the boards of
conciliation and arbitration. He didn't believe at all in having eith er
a representative of labor or a representative of capital of them.
When you, representing employing capital, select your
member of the board of arbitration, and I, representing
labor, select my representative and the two choose the
umpire, that umpire may do one of three things. He may join
your side an:i secure a partisan decision; he may join my
side and secure a partisan decision; or he may dicker back
and forth and secure a compromise. But into the consideration

10. United States Department of Labor Statistics, Monthly Labor
Review, X (March, 1920), Washington: Government Printing Office, PP• 216217.
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of that board of arbitration, there never comes an,y concern for the other party in the triangle, the party which
in eve1I essential industry is chiefly concerned, the
public. 1
Thus Governor Allen developed his theory that the greatest sufferer
in industrial warfare was the public, and that the only way that the
public could do something about it was to form a court whereby industrial disputes were tried and settled in a court like an,y ordinary
civil suit or crime. But, it was not to be an arbitration board made
up of representatives of labor and capital, as the result was too often
compromise, not justice for all.
Here, then, is where the proponents of the Kansas law made a
differentiation between compulsory arbitration and adjudication. Governor Allen had no faith in arbitration boards at all. Only with impartial
judges adjudicating industrial disputes could any form of justice be had
at all.
The chief fault of industrial arbitration, fundamentally,
is not that of commission, but of omission. It is only a
rudimentary and defective form of adjudication not suited
to the handling of sweeping industrial issues. It omits what
is most necessary in adjudication -- namely, inherent and
fairly constructed authority, and the application of policepower principles. 12
Governor Allen admitted that arbitration had worked well in boundary disputes and other similar private cases. But he said that in these cases
the paramount interest of the public scarcely ever entered as a factor.

11. Allen, .2.E• cit., P• 74.
12. Henry J. Allen, The Party of the Third Part, (New York: Harper
arrl Brothers, 1921), P• 234.
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Neither was there any class interest involved. In those cases the arbiters
were fairly open-minded because there was no historic or deep-seated prejudice to be overcome . Then there was anot her and more important factor
which most champions of arbitration overlooked. That was that if civil
arbitration failed, the contending parties knew they must resort to a
court of law; hence they were constrained always to accept what their
·,

consciences told them to be reasonably fair by the knowledge that there
always lurked in the background the resort to the process of law, which

might not be overridden. 13 In other words, it was the law standing in
the background that made civil arbitration successful. But if industrial
arbitration failed there was no resort to law but to strikes, lockouts,
and boycotts in the majority of cases.
In his book Governor Allen also noticed that throughout the
history of industrial arbitration there had occurred the phenomenon
of swinging from compulso

to voluntary and back again. Neither had

proven satisfactory •. He felt that the ideal spirit of arbitration was
inherently that of voluntary agreement, and that it could not be bent
to the fonn of compulsion. To him an arbitration board did not present
an atmosphere of calm, detached impartiality, but one of prejudiced
and clashill?; viewpoints, of pulling and hauling and jockeying for
position.14
Out of these ideas

13. Ibid., P• 223.

14. Ibid., P• 227.

am

theories of Governor Allen,

am

of

12

others who played an important part in drawing up the Kansas law of
1920, a statute was enacted with the idea in mind of correcting these
failings and evils inherent in conciliation ani arbitration •. fhe result, as was mentioned in the beginning, was a law distinctly different from any passed before or since its time. The things it was
aiming for were largely the same, industrial warfare must be done
away with, ani the people as a \'bole must be protected by outlawing
this warfare. But the Kansas law went one step farther. It took into
account that if the laborer was to be denied the right to strike to
get redress of his grievances, and the employer the lockout, something else had to be provided to give both an equal chance to secure
their rights and insure justice. This was the Kansas Court of Industrial
Relations.
As the Kansas Court of Industrial Relations was also conceived
out of an emergency period, a bri ef review will be given of this
crisis as a fitting background for the actual establishment of the
industrial court.
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CHAPTER II
CONDITIONS LEADING TO THE FORMATION OF THE INDUSTRIAL COURT
The General Coal Strike of 1919
It was mentioned earlier that all of these attempts· at compulsory arbitration of labor disputes arose out of great national
emergencies. Mainly, these emergencies were in the form of serious
strikes affe?ting the country as a whole. The Kansas Court of Industrial Relations grew out of the same sort of circwnstances. In this
instance it was the nation-wide strike of the bituminous coal miners
which precipitcmtd the experiment in Kansas. In order to give the proper background for tre formation of the Court, a brief picture will be
given of the national strike and its spread to the coal fields in
Kansas.
The coal strike of 1919 was merely another manifestation of the
industrial unrest prev~lent in the United States during the years following the end of World War I. During tre war years the workers in
many industries had refrained from striking, and in some cases had

accepted wage scales proposed by governmental agencies, in order to
further the war effort. With the end of the war, workers in many industries began to demand a change, demanded higher wages and new
contracts with their enployers.
The orders to strike in 1919 were issued directly as the result
of the adoption of the recommendations of trn scale committee by the
miners' delegates at the Twenty-seventh Consecutive and Fourth Annual

14
Convention of the United Mine Workers of America, held in Cleveland in
1
September, 1919. The Central Competitive Field, made up of Illinois,
Indiana, Ohio, and Pennsylvania, had entered into a contract with the
operators at the beginning of the war, and which was to last for the
duration of the war. It was not, however, to extend later than March
31, 1920. The convention took the position that the war in effect was
over, even though the United States had not signed a peace treaty officially ending it, and that it was only fair for a new contract to be
negotiated. Because they hadn't had a wage increase .for more than two
years, and in view of the fact t hat the cost of living had gone up greatly during that period, they thought it only right that a rise in the wage
scale be granted immediately.
The order calling all union (U. M. W.) bituminous coal miners of
the country to "close production of coal at midnight on Friday, October
31, 1919 11 was issued from the international headquarters of the union
on October 15, 1919. The order was signed by John ,L. Lewis, acting
President , and William Green, secretary-treasurer of t he miners. 2 Lewis
blamed the operators, saying that the union had made a sincere effort
to negotiate a new wage agreement, but t hat the operators had persisted
in an arbitrary attitude which resulted in a final adjournment of the
joint wage conference held in Philadelphia, October 11, 1919., As the
strike order was to include all bi. tuminous coal miners in the United
1. C. E. Stoddard, "Bituminous Coal Strike 11 , u. s. Bureau of Labor
Statistics, Monthly Labor Review, IX (December, 1919), P• 61.
2. Topeka Daily Capital, October 16, 1919.
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States, it was thought to affect around 500,000 miners.
The miners were making a very drastic demand as far ~s a wage
increase was concerned. They wanted a 60% increase immediately.3 In
addition to this they wanted a six-hour day, a five-day week, and a
few other minor demands. The demand for a five-day week was misunderstood by many at the start of the strike. They wondered why the miners
should only have to work 30 hours per week .. The fact of the matter was
that the miners were asld.ng for more work rather than for less. According to Mr. George

o.

Smith, director of the United States Geological

Survey, "in the twelve weeks of February, March, and April the average
working time of bituminous coal miners were only a fraction over 24
hours, 114 or six hours less than the miners wanted to work. Because of
the seasonal character of coal-mining the mines closed for many days
during the year. The miners, therefore, were askirg for a guaranteed
time of work. It was almost impossible for them to seek employment during slack periods because they couldn't know when t he mines would reopen. There were even charges that operators kept mines closed for long
periods in order to keep coal prices up.
After the strike call had been issued the government at Washington stepped in and took measures to prevent it from taking place. President Wilson called on the miners and operators to continue negotiations,

P• 420.

3. "The Coal Miners' Strike, 11 Current History, XI (December, 1919),

4. "Down to Facts in the Coal Fight," Literary Digest, LXIII
(December 13, 1919), P• 16.
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and if they failed to agree, to submit the controversy to a board of arbitration. The operators accepted the proposal but the miners turned
it down. President Wilson then branded the strike as unjustifiable and
unlawful and said that the laws v.0uld be enforced. He called attention
to the probable effects on the country of a nation-wide coal strike, but
the miners went ahead with their plans.
Attorney-General Palmer then intervened and said tbat the strike
was a distinct challenge to the , law, that the mines would be protected
by the government, and that the Justice Department was preparing to
take vigorous steps against all who conspired to restrict the supply

or distribution of the nation's fuel supply. "All the resources of the
Government

'WO

uld be used, 11 said Attorney-General Palmer,

11

to prevent

the national. disaster involved in the threatened strike." 5
The Senate and House voted to assure President Wilson the support
of Congress in maintaining o der during the threatened industrial emergency. The t\\U houses resolved:
That we hereby give the national administration and all
others in authority the assurance of our constant, continuous,
and unqualified support in tre use of such constitutional and
lawful means as may be necessary to meet the present industrial
emergency, and in vindicating the majesty and power of the
Government in enforcing obedience to and respect for t he Constitution and the laws, and in fully protecting every citizen
in the maintenance and exercise of hii lawful rights and the
observance of his lawful obligations.
On October 31, Judge Albert Anderson of the Federal District Court at

5. "The Coal Miners' Striken, 2£• cit., P• 422.

6. Congressional Record, 66 Cong., 1 sess., P• 7761.
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Indianapolis showed what he understood by such "constitutional and l;awful" means. 7 He issued a temporary injunction restraining John 1. Lewis
and other officials of the U. M. w. from taking any further steps in directing the coal strike called for the following day. Naturally t he issuance
of this injunction was bitterly resented by the miners.
At midnight on the last day of October a large proportion of the
bituminous coal miners quit work, despite the fact that their leaders had
been silenced and prohibited from further activity in promoting the strike.
Meanwhile, the government took steps to insure the workers• protection,
and troops began to move into the various coal fields.
Measures were immediately taken by the government to prevent
profiteering in coal and the Railway Administration took steps and perfected plans for the transportation of the coal supplies already on hand.
In the meantime, the miners had decided to fight the temporary
injunction order. They said

he government had no right to interfere in

the dispute. 8 On Novanber 8, however, Judge Anderson ruled that t he bituminous coal strike was a defiance of the Fuel Control Act (the Lever
Act), was almost equivalent to rebellion, and refused to listen to the
miners I representatives who sought to demonstrate the miners I right to
strike. He then issued an order to the United Mine Workers union to
recall the strike order before November 11, 1919. 9 Judge Anderson, in

handing down this order, said, "I consider this rebellion. That is what

7. Topeka Daily Capital, November 1, 1919.
8.

11

The Coal Miners' Strike," 2.£·

ill·,

9. Kansas City Star, November 8, 1919.

P• 425.
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it is•

11

He went on to s ay that, "The government is supreme even to -the

labor unions. 1110 He was m~rely echoing the prevailing opinion among
many people in all walks of life during t his trying period of our
history that there was a real danger from radical labor unionism, and
that they should be curbed by all th e powers at the c ontrol of the
Government •
After Judge Anderson's order to call the strike off by November
11 was received, a meeting of the district presidents and other officials of t h e U. M. w. was called for Indianapolis. They met there, and
after an all-night session and much debate for arrl against compliance
wi. th the order, the union issued an order calling off the strike. "Gentle-

men, we will comply with the mandate. We do it under protest. We are
Americans. We cannot fight our Government. That is all. 1111 This terse
statement signified the capitulation of the union to the "majesty and
power of the Government. 11
The way was open now for negotiation between the miners and the
operators to look for some way of settling the dispute. Another question
' that arose at this time was _whether or not the miners would obey the
order rescinding the strike and g o back to work. In many areas, especially in the Kansas coal fields, very few, if any, miners reported
for work when the whistles blew at the mines the next day . In some
fields the miners said the order they received abrogating the strike

1.0. Loe. cit.

U, Kansas City Star, November 11, 1919.

19
was sign~d by typewritten signatures and they wouldn't obey such an
order. They thought it might be a ruse of Lewis' to get around the injunction order issued by Judge Anderson.
On November 14, 1919, the joint conference of the miners and the
operators began in Washington to try and find some basis for permanent
settlement. For several days th.ere was little or no progress made and
Dr. Garfield, Fuel Adninistrator, appeared before the meeting and told
both the miners and the operators that coal would have to be mined on a
large scale, and produced at a reasonable price. This seemed to be threat
of added government al intervention and spurred the two parties to buckle
down and really try to reach an agreement. Neither side wanted the government to intervene more than it already had. The operators feared government operation of the mines and the miners were fearing added coercion
in the form of injunctions.
Secretary of Labor Wilson interceded at this stage and proposed
a straight

31%

increase in wages. The miners said they would accept this
12

on the basis of a 7-hour da.y-..

The operators refused to accept this how-

e~r and Dr. Garfield tried another proposal. He proposed a wage increase
of 14% with the understanding that the price of coal to the public would
not be increased ani that the Government ~uld continue provisionally in
control of prices. He also urged the formation of an advisory body, to
be permanent, with equal representation of miners and operators to get
information regarding the industry which ~uld govern future disputes. 13

12. "Settlement of the Coal Strike," Current History, Il (January,

1920), P• 25.

13. Ibid., P• 26.
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The operators accepted this proposal, but Lewis turned it down. He
announced ths. t he was standing squarely behind Secretary Wilson I s
offer of a 31% wage increase. He took the stand that the Government
was pledged to this increase on the basis of SecretaryWilson 1 s position,
saying t hat if they didn't stick with it they 'WOuld be breaking their
word. With this the negotiations reached an impasse.
It was at this juncture that President Wilson intervened in a
personal attempt to settle the controversy. He suhnitted a proposal of
his mm to both parties and it was immediately rumored that it would be
acceptable by them both. 1 4 The actual proposal, however, was kept secret
from the public for seYeral days.
Then, on December 10, 1919, the strike of nearly 500,000 hard
coal miners came to an end when the general committee of the United
Mine Workers of America agreed to accept the plan offered by President
Wilson. The plan, as agreed to , provided for immediate return to work
at a 14% increase in wages over the wartime scale. Operations in the
mines were to be resumed, except as to wages, on the same basis which
obtained prior to the strike. Immediately followi ng the return of t he
miners to work the President was to appoint a commission of three men,
including one practical miner and one ope1:ator or mine owner i n active
business. This commission was to consider further questions of wag es
and working conditions. It was also to consider profits of operators and
the proper coal prices. The duties of the commission were to include the

14. Kansas City Star, December 8, 1919.
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readjustment of both wages an::l. coal prices. Its report was to be made
within 60 days and would be accepted as the basis of a new wage agreement .15
At last the coal strike was brought to an end, and one of the
greatest industrial battles in the history of union labor in the United
States up to that time reached its climax in a Presidential intervention.
This strike, as do all general strikes in an important industry, had
reached far beyond the confines of the coal mining industry. It had
paralyzed business, manufacturing, and transportation, and caused acute
suffering in many localities. Here, then, lies the beginning of the
Kansas Court of Industrial Relations. To get closer to the actual inception, however, it will be necessary briefly to review the strike as it
occurred in Kansas.
The Coal Strike in Kansas
When the strike of bituminous coal miners was cal.led by John L.
Lewis in October, 1919, it affected the southeastern corner of Kansas
also. Here were found the Kansas coal mines and District 14 of the United Mine Workers of America. They went out on strike with the rest of the
miners thoughout the United States. The state was brought face to face
'With a difficult situation and had to almost strike out blindly in an
attempt to find some way out of the dilemma. Here was born the Kansas
Industrial Court. Governor Henry J. Allen, who was largely responsible
for the legislation resulting in the formation of the court, has stated

15. Kansas City Star, December 10., 1919.
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graphically the situation faced by Kansas in that winter of 1919, at
least as seen by the chief executive of that state.
Whether government is supreme; whether the nation and
the state were sovereign in their powers and superior to
an organized minority of capital or of labor or both;
whether a helpless people were to be protected against
industrial strife, in the making of which they had no part;
whether the forces that regard neither the name nor the
fundamental principle of democratic government, using its
freedom as an opportunity to destroy the spirit of democratic institutions, should overawe and set at naught the
welfare of the majority; these are the questions that
were at stake when Kansas and the nation faced a fuel
famine, the result of a c~gntry-wide coal strike at the
beginning of last winter.
This statement of Governor Allen will show the manner in which he was
judging the crisis, its cause, and its ramifications. He was to be of
the group fearing radical unionism with the resultant decay of our
democratic institutions, and he was to vigorously assert the power of
government as being supreme i n ~ matter affecting the welfare of the
people at large. The coal

trike and the suffering it brought to many

people proved to him that something, drastic perhaps, had to be done
and done right away. He attacked the situation in Kansas in a vigorous

manner, created a vigorous instrument to prevent future occurrences,
and was this instrument's most vigorous defender throughout its short
life.
What struck Governor Allen with the most force was the widespread inconvenience and suffering which were brought home to many
people in the state, and the seemir:g inability of anyone to do any-
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thing about. it. To him the ma.in question was not that of continuingindustrial production, but of the more basic one of keeping wann and
preparing food. The situation was serious in Kansas because t here was
hardly a reserve supply of coal at all, the winter weather was very severe, and people were going around actually begging for a small supply
of coal. Schools and churches had to be closed and all industry shut
down.
After two weeks of this situation had brought no relief, and in
fact had merely intensified the suffering, Governor Allen took precipitate action to do something about it. An a pplic ation wa s file d with
the supreme court of the state f or a receivership for the mining
corporations on the grounds that these corporations were derelict in
their corporate duties. On November 18, 1919, every coal mine in the
Crawford-Cherokee Kansas fields was put in the hands of the receivers. 17
The Court order provided tha t the receivers
Are instructed to take immediate possession of all of
said property ani to operate said mines and produce an::i
distribute, and sell within the State of Kansas, all coal
possible at once. And for said purpose said receivers are
empowered and directed to employ all labor or necessary
agents and make all construction necessary. Said rec eivers
shall execute their bonds in the sum of $25,000 before
entering upon their duties.18
It was one thing to put the mines in the hands of receivers, but it was
another thing to get three men to accept the recreivership. Two of t he
first two appointed flatly refused to serve. Both the miners and t he -

17. Topeka Daily Capital, November 18, 1919.
18,. Ibid.
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operators refused to suggest men to represent them on the board of receivers. Finally, three men were fourrl who accepted the responsibility.
The next problem, of course, was to get the coal then in possession of the state out of the ground and into empty bins. Governor
Allen, himself, went direct to the coal camps, called meetings, arguing
and pleading with the miners to return to their jobs and work for the
state,

Realizir:g that the miners \ooOuld not and could not return to

work for the operators, Governor Allen appealed to their sense of duty,

to their fealty of citizenship, to the fact that now the State was running the mines and needed their help to relieve the suffering. He
promised them that they would be paid at the old wage scale until a
new scale was fixed, and then that that scale would be retroactive to
the date they returned to work. It was further proposed that if no
national agreement should b

reached by Janua:ry 1, 1920, the State

would enter into a separate agreement with the Kansas miners. However,
all this came to naught and he was not able to persuade the miners to
return to the mines. The union officials would not permit the miners to
work for the state. The typical attitude was expressed by August Dorchy,
vice-president of District 14, United Mine Workers, when he said 11 The
public is sympathetic with itself because of a temporary inconvenience,
but indifferent to the fact that hundreds of thousands of miners are
forced to work hard at a hazardous occupation and earn t'b little that
they an:i their families live in • • • squalor. 1119 He went on to say

19. Topeka~ Capital, November 22, 1919.
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that Governor Allen I s proposal for the miners to return to work under
state receivership offered the miners nothing that the operators did
not concede before the strike began, that is, that if they went to
work any wage increase granted would be retroactive. Nothing the governor could say would get the miners back on the job. He was received,
in the main, courteously, and was listened to respectfully wherever he
went, but that was all.
As the Governor then saw the situation, there was only one thing
left to do, and that was to call for volunteers to mine the coal. This
aspect of the strike in Kansas received much publicity and fanfare, and
was typical of the actions taken by Governor Allen all throughout the

trying period. At least it can't be said of him that he sat back waiting
for something to happen to relieve the situation. He grasped the bull
by the horns and waded right into the wallow.
On November 27 Governor Allen issued a fonnal call f or volunteer
workers to dig coal in the Kansas mines. His attempt to get the miners
to work for the State had failed utterly and this was his answer to
their negative decision. He inserted the f ollowing notice in the paper:

WANTED -- 1,000 MEN
Wanted - one thousand able-bodied young
men to dig coal to 11 keep the home fires
burning" in Kansas. Experience unnecessary. Hardy young men able to take
care of themselves and to wield a pick
arrl shovel preferred. Travel expenses
and at least $5 a day guaranteed by the
State of Kansas. Also forty-five engineers to run steam shovels in the Kans as
strip mines, with an equal number of
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firemen. Can use also a limited number
of men accustomed to use of dynamite.
pply in person, by telegraph, telephone
or by mail, to Governor Henr~ J. Allen,
State House, Topeka, Kansas. 0
What, just exactly, was the position taken by the state in this matter,
and what were the explicit reasons for taking it? Governor Allen explained the State I s attitude in this manner:
It is the duty of government, and it has the inherent
power, to protect the people whose welfare is dependent
upon it. Facing a desperate situation, through a stoppage
of coal production at the beginning of winter, government
in Kansas is brought to the pass of using all its powers
to protect the people whose suffering will be unspeakable
unless relief is afforded. If government is to mean anything, then its obligation is to prevent innocent people
from becoming the victims of a fuel famine which, in the
course of events, is both unnatural and unnecessary.21
In other words, the police power of the state can and must be used to
protect the health, the peace, and the welfare of all t he people. This
is important because it is one of the main principles upon which was
built the Kansas Industrial Court.
Governor Allen went on to say that the situation in Kans as, and
in the nation as a whole for that matter, was distinctly a challenge t o
government. President Wilson and Attorney-General Palmer had t aken
exactly the same attitude towards the situation. According to GQvernor
Allen, the government of Kansas was going to accept t he challenge, arrl

for that reason had called for volunteer workers for the coal mines. He

20. Topeka Daily Capital, November 27, 1919.
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wanted it understood, however, that it wasn 't a strike-breaking enterprise at all, and that it was not intended to affect t he adjustment
of the issues between the miners and the operators. "But once and for
all it must be understood that the powers of the state now surmnoned
into action for th e protection of its people are above and beyond
those of any as sociation or organization, whether of capital or of
individuals.
The response to the call for volunteer workers exceeded the
fondest expectations of the governor. There are no reliable figures,
apparently, on just how man.y men volunteered, but the estimate is
generally put at around 10,000. They came from all walks of life, from
the colleges, from the stores, from the banks, from the fi elds and
farms. Many were returned soldiers and sailors. The 1000 who had been
selected were escorted to the coal fields by the National Guard, but
there was little or no violence on the part of miners attempting to
prevent them from mining the coal. Their attitude was only of disbelief that anything of real benefit could be accomplished by these
volunteer workers. Their attitude was not belligerent, it was
skeptical.
Governor Allen started the volunteers out at $5 per day, but
later raised the pay by 14%- The men had to work under incredible hardships. They only took coal out of the strip mines, the law prohibiting
them from going underground. The strip mines had to be pumped out, as
they were full of snow and icy water. The machinery was in need of

22. Loe. cit.
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repair. Added to this was the bitter weather w'nich existed all through
the time the volunteers were digging the coal. But they all seemed to
be willing to put up with the inconvenience to get the coal dug. Friendly rivalry developed between delegations from rival colleges to see who
could get the most coal out. A great quantity of coal was not mined, but
enough was produced by the novice miners to aid localities in which the
need was particularly acute.
While the volunteer -workers were still in the pits word came out
that Governor Allen was proposing the calling of a special session of
the state legislature to appropriate money to pay the expense of the
receivership and maintaining order, and also to discuss statutes which
would eliminate strikes altogether.
On December 12, after the national coal strike had been settled
on the basis of President Wilson's proposals, Alexander Howat , president
of District 14, United Mine vorkers of America, ordered the miners back
to work. The job of the volunteer miners was done.
On December 17 the coal mines of southeastern Kansas were returned
to the owners. At the same time Governor Allen announced that the legislators at the special session of the state legislature which was to meet
in January, 1920, w:>uld have a pleasant surprise waiting for them. He
said they would not be asked to pay the expenses incurred during the
state's operation of the coal mines. He announced that every item of
expense incurred by the state in effecting the receivership, in hiring
and transporting the volunteer workers to the mines, and in paying their
expenses and wages could be met out of the proceeds of the receiver-
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Just what had these volunteer miners accomplished during their
brief stay in the Kansas mines? It was reported that 600 Federal
troops and 1,200 Kansas National Guardsmen were in the Kansas fields
at one time or another . Also approximately 1200 volunteer workers
engaged in operatiI¥s the strip pits . There were approximately 145
cars of coal mined in the Pittsburg district alone, which was enough
to furnish temporary relief to 23,200 families, 500 lbs. of coal
being available to each family. 24
Thus came to an end the national bituminous coal strike during
the winter of 1919 . In its wake it brought the creation of the first,
and only, truly industrial court, one that vigorously took hold of
the problem and held out a solution it sincerely believed w:>uld be
the death of industrial warfare. The story of that court's creation,
its successes and failures, and its demise will be the theme of the
remainder of this paper.

23. Topeka Daily Capital, December 18, 1919.
24. Topeka Daily Capital, December 14, 1919.
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CHAPTER III
CREATION OF THE COURT
It has already been seen that Governor Allen felt very strongly
about the coal strike in Kansas, the refusal of the miners to even
work for the state, and the suffering brought to many homes because of
the cessation of work. During the weeks of the crisis he was beginning
to formulate his plan which he felt would put an end to such warfare
between the forces of labor and those of capital. We find in him a
preoccupation with the whole industrial situation over the nation. He
was beginning to feel that the labor leaders were largely responsible
for the wave of unrest sweeping the country . This was during the
fundamentalist revival following the World War and it wasn't hard to
associate labor leadership and strikes with radicals, Reds, and unAmericans . However, the result which arose out of the Kansas creation
was not merely a repressive measure directed a gainst thes~ men. While
Governor Allen believed that the only way to do away with industrial
warfare was to outlaw it, he still realized that something in its
place had to be provided so that both labor and capital could somehow find redress for their grievances.
As early as December 8, 1919, word was announced that "new laws
looking toward the establishment of industrial courts" might result
from the proposed special session of the legislature which was to meet
in January, 1920. 1 It was aloo announced that arbitration might be

1 . Topeka Daily Capital, December 8, 1919 .
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compulsory if the kind of legislation expected was put through. Then
on December 9, 1919, it was announced by Governor Allen that "the
first industrial court the world has ever known will be established
in Kansas, 112

that is, if the legislature called into extraordinary

session for January 5, would take action in accordance with suggestions
upon which he would urge immediate action.
Before going into the recommendations made to the legislature
by the governor, something should first be said as to the origin of these
recommendations. Where did Governor Allen find his industrial court? It
was not completely original with him at all. Mr. William L. Huggins of
Topeka was mostly responsible for the original idea, and for the actual
drawing up of the bill as presented to the legislature. Mr. Huggins, a
Topeka lawyer, happened to be thinking along the same lines as Governor
Allen about the industrial situation, and when Allen became familiar
with Huggin I s beliefs he prevailed upon him to translate them into
definite form. On October 30, 1919, Mr. Huggins had delivered an address
before the Topeka Rotary Club, at which ti me he developed his thinking
along the lines later made part of the industrial court. It wijs after
reading this speech that Governor Allen got together with Mr. Huggins,
out of which meeting the legislation was born.
Vfuat were these ideas held by Mr. Huggins which so impressed the
governor and others attempting to find a solution of industrial warfare?
In the first place he saw the industrial strife then raging over many

2. Topeka Daily Capital, December 9, 1919.
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parts of the United States as a distinct threat t o our democracy. It
was a momentous problem which had to be solved by peaceful means. Having in mind the threatened coal strike of November, Mr . Huggins said:
When the responsible head of an almost all-powerful industrial trust peremptorily and contimptuously refuses to meet
and confer ~dth representatives of anployees on matters relating to wages and working conditions or other matters of
interest to such enployees, when he refuses to arbitrate
matters in dispute, when he denies the right of the i,,orkingman to bar gain dollectively, he commits acts of tyranny which
should not be, cannot be, and will not be tolerated any longer by a free people.3
Then Mr. Huggins had something to say about the other side of the problem too.
On the other hand, when the duly elected representatives
of a great labor trust presents to employers demands, justifiable or injustifiable, and couples these demands with a threat
that if his requirements are not promptly complied with he will
call out on strike a hall' million workingmen and thereby
paralyze industry and cause incomparable nation wide suffering among his fellow citizens, h e also commits an act of
tyranny which is without parallel in the history of free
governments, and one which, in the new industrial code which
we must havek should be denominated 11 treason" and penalized
accordingly.
This was strong language indeed, but to many far-thinking indivd.duals,
that was just the kind of language, coupled with action, that was needed to find some way out of the maze. It can be seen, theri., that this new

industrial code that Mr. Huggins mentioned would have as a vital part of
in the outlawing of the strike., the boycott., and the lockout. However.,
and we have mentioned this previously, the solution had to go far deeper

3. William L. Huggins., Labor ani Democracy,_ (New York: The Macmillan
Company, 1922), P• 130 .

4. Ibid. , P• 131.
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than that.
In his Rotary speech Mr. Huggins went on to point out that in
justice and fairness the right of the worker to strike could not be
taken away from him unless he was given something better as a means
of defense. He realized that then the worker had no other means of
defense and that he had to be provided with something. That something
turned out to be an impartial industrial court meant t o give just
adjudication to labor disputes, the same way that orS,inary courts
did to civil arrl criminal suits•
Mr. Huggins also mentioned something else in his speech which
later became one of the main foundations of the Kansas Court of Industrial Relations. That was the principle of "public int erest". This
principle had long been applied to public utilities and the railroads,
and the essence of this principle is that the public has interest@::.
which transcend the private int erests of those engaged in providing the
necessities and comforts of life to the public. The statute enacted by
the Kansas legislature extended this principle to include many more
industries than the two mentioned as generally having been consi dered
as being affected with a public interest. Along this line Mr. Huggins
said that the new·in:iustrial code which should be devel~ped should
provide that all lines of industry whose business affected the production or distribution or cost of the necessaries of life be impressed with a public interest, because they affected the entire public, and
that in case of any dispute which might affect t he operation of such
industry, the matter should be taken into court, investigated and

ad-

judicated.
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This was later incorpor ated into the Kansas statute.

After having mentioned the taking of industrial disputes into
court, Mr. Huggins brought up the question as to what kind of court
was needed, and whether or not the present court system might not
suffice for this purpose. I£ it would not he was in favor of creating
one that IDuld. It seemed to him that there should be lawful means to
adjudicate industrial conflicts the s ame way in which civil and criminal
disputes were taken care of. He made it clear that he was advocating a
court, not a commission or a committee, and he wanted adjudication, not
arbitration.
The last thing mentioned by ¥1r. Huggins in his Rotary speech
which was eventually made part of the new "industrial code" in Kans as,
was the theory that the businesses affected with a public int er est
should be required to operate continuously unless a court of competent
jurisdiction should find justif i able causes for disoontinuanee.He had
in mind the rumored practice of many industrialists who curtailed
production in certain seasons in order to raise the price or keep it
at a high lev:el.
These, then, were to be the main underlying and guiding principles
to be included in the legislation asked of the special session by Governor Allen in January, 1920. On January 5, 1920, Governor Allen was invited before the joint session of the legislature to deliver his message

5. Ibid., P• 137.
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in person. Before explaining the proposed legislation he delivered a
brief preliminary statement concerning past labor troubles in Kansas,
and also warned the legislators against the efforts of the organized
lobby to defeat the purposes of the special session. 6 He produced
statistics to show that from April, 1916, to December, 1918, there had
been 364 separate strikes at the individual mines in the State of Kansas.
He pointed out how small had been the victory of the miners in these
strikes by saying that the record of the operators proved that the
amount of dollars and cents gained to the strikers was $784.84. The
total loss to miners in wages, as figured at the scale rate per day per
man, on account of these strikes was $1,006,454.41. According to the
governor there had been on the average 11 strikes per month in the coal
fields of Kansas, and that most of them had been called on trivial
grounds.
He mentioned that most of the mire rs would favor the new legislation if they were left to their own initiative, because it would protect them in their desire to work and would prevent the needless closing
of the mines, either on account of strikes called by their officials or
for any unjust shutdowns by the operators. Then he accused the labor
leaders of urging the miners to fight the legislation, labor leaders
who made their living off labor controversies. He specifically accused
the Fourt Railway Brotherhoods of leading the fight a gainst the proposed
legislation.

6. Preliminary statement appears in pamphlet, The Court of Industrial Relations, Topeka, 1920, PP• 3-4.
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After delivering the preliminary statement Governor Allen went
right into his regular message outlining the proposed legislation. In
the beginning he reviewed the coal strike in Kansas, how the people had
suffered from lack of coal, the heartlessness of both operators and miners
union officials in not even providing coal for hospitals, and how the
state was finally forced to take over receivership of the mines and operate them to alleviate widespread suffering and possible death.
After reviewing the growing quarrel between capital and labor,
Governor Allen said he had come to the conclusion that no progress had
been made toward t he provision of a just and orderly basis of solution.
Then too, the largest party at interest, the public, scarcely ever received a hearing.
I believe the time has come, in the increasing industrial
life of the country, when a tribunal should be established
which shall have the power to take under its jurisdiction
the offenses committed against society in the name of industrial warfare, a tribu nal which shall have the authority to
meet industrial discontent, before it crystallizes, by a
careful oversight an:i regulati. on of the conditions of labor
before any injustices are allowed to fester and breed class
hatred and bitter antagonisms.?
According to Governor Allen there was no reasons why government should
not have the same power to protect society against the ruthless offenses
of industrial strife as it had always had to protect it a gainst recognized
crime. The industrial court, -which he hoped to create, was to provide a
substitute for strikes and lockouts and protection for the public from
abuses arising out of industrial controversies.

7. House Journal, State of Kansas , Special Session, 1920., P• 8.
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Governor Allen also touched upon the growing r adical labor
movement, saying t hat it was attempting t o set up a system of intimidation which set government at naught . He went on to say that he knew
labor had bettered itself by organization and threats of strikes against
capital for advantages they should have been given willi~ly. But, he
said, the trend now was toward a situation which made it clear that t he
final app eal in labor controversies should not rest on the issue of
industrial warfare.
In my judgment the legislation enacted should not deny
to labor the right to collective bargaining, but it should
establish somethiQ?: saner and juster, when an effort at
collective bargaining has failed, than recourse to strike.
Arbitration has never provided a guar antee of justice
because at best it leads only to a compromise , an:i into
the deliberations of a board of arbitration there seldom
comes a representative of the public, wni ch, in the controversies8affecting essential industri es, is chiefly
concerned ,

It is seen that the governor was very much impres sed by the fact t hat
the public, through th e state, should have an effective voice in the
settlement of labor controversies. The suffering of various commur:atie§
duriQ?: the coal strike had touched him deeply, and made him antagonistic to those agencies he held responsible. This doctri°' t hat
these so- called "essential" industries were so important that they
were subject to state regulat ion was not a new one. The United States,

and many of the individual states, had had laws providing for the
regulation of railroads and public utilities for several years .
Saying that legislation was i mperatively needed , Governor Allen

8. Ibid., P• 9.
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wanted a law:
1. Declaring the operation of the great industries affecting focxi, clothing, fuel and transportation to be impressed with a public interest and subject to a reasonable regulation by the state.
2. Creating a strong, dignified tribunal, vested with power,
authority and jurisdiction to hear and detellll.ine all
controversies -which ma,y arise and which threaten to hinder,
delay or suspend the operation of such irrlustries.
3. Declaring it to be the duty of all persons, firms, corporations and associations of persons engaged in such industries
to operate the same with reasonable continuity, in order
that the people of this state may be supplied at all times
with the necessaries of life.
4. Providing t hat in case of controversy arising between employers and employees or between different groups or
crafts of workers which may threaten the continuity or
efficiency of such industries and thus the production or
transportation of the necessaries of life, or which may
produce an industrial strife or endanger he peaceful operation of such industries, it shall be the duty of said
tribunal; on its own initiative or on the complaint of
either party, or on the complaint of the attorney-general,
or on complaint of citizens, to investigate and determine
the controversy and to make an order prescribing rules and
regulations, hours of labor, working conditions, and a
reasonable minimum wage, which shall thereafter be observed
in the conduct of said i ndustry until such time as the
parties may agree.
5. Providing for the incorporation of unions or associat ions
of workers, recognizir:g the right of collective bargainir:g
and giving full faith and credit to any and all cont racts
made in pursuance of said right •.
6. Providing for a speedy determination of the validity of any
such order made by said tribunal in the supreme court of
this state without the delay which so often hampers the
administration of justice in ordinary cases.
7. Declaring it unlawful for any person, firm, corporation or
association of persons to delay or suspend the production or
transportation of the necessaries of life, except upon
application to and order of said tribunal.
8. Declarir:g it unlawful for any person, firm, or corporation
to discharge or discriminate against any employee because of
participation of such employee in any proceedings before said
tribunal.
9. Making it unlawful for any person, firm or corporation engaged
in said lines of industry to cease operations for the purpose
of limiting production, to affect prices or to avoid any of
the provisions of this act, but also providing a means by
which proper rules and re gulations ma,y be formulated by said
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tribunal providing for the operation of such industries as may be affected by changes in season, market
conditions, or other reasons or causes inherent in
the nature of the business.
Declaring it unlawful for any person, firm or corporation,
or for any association of persons, to violate any of
the provisions of this act; or to conspire or confederate
wi. th others to violate any provisions of this act, or to
intimidate any person, firm or corporation engaged in such
industries with the intent to hinder, delay or suspend the
operation of such industries and thus to hinder, delay or
suspend the production or transportation of the necessaries
of life.
Providing penalties by fine or imprisonment, or both, for
persons, firms, or corpor ations or associations of persons
wilfully violating the provisions of this act.
Making provisions whereby any increase of wages granted to
labor by said tribunal shall take e~fect as of the date of
the beginning of the investigation.

This was a large order and was a far-reaching program, which, if passed,
would project the state ri ght into the middle of the industrial life of
Kansas. It was taking the state into radically new fields. Strikes, boycotts, and lockouts were absolutely pro hibit ed. The operator of one of
the essential industries couldn ' t suspend his operations whenever he
wanted to, the court had the last word an that. Minimum wages, hours of
labor, and working conditions were all to come under the purview of the
industrial court. It can readily be seen that many is sues would inevitably arise out of the application of this act, there were many points
at which the act could be attacked as violating freedom of contract,
due process of law, and other rights coming under the protection of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution. Naturally, a statute as allembracing as this one was, and one that had no precedents, was bound

9. Ibid., PP• 10-11.
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to be challenged by those directly affected by its operation. The story
of those challenges and their results is reserved for a later section
of this paper.
These things which Governor Allen desired to incorporate into the
legislation he was a sking for is a brief outline of the final provisions
of the Industrial Court Law. Just what did the state think it could accomplish by passing such a law? For one thing they felt that strikes, lockouts, 1:x:>ycotts and blacklists unnecessary and impossible by giving labor
as well as capital an able and just tribunal in which to litigate all
controversies. ·They thought they could insure the people a steady and
continuous supply of the so- called "necessaries of life". This was to
prevent a recurrence of the situation during the coal strike. It was
held that by stabilizing production of these goods, the price to the
producer and consumer would be stabilized as well. They were going to
insure labor steadier employment by keeping the industries running continuously, arrl insure a better wage by setting a minimwn wage scale. The
result of all this being, of course, the prevention of the colossal
economic waste which is always a part of industrial warfar e.
So this was to be Kansas' answer to the growing industrial struggle
penneating every part of the United States. Radical labor and selfish
capital were to be constrained and held to the level of the public interest in their relations with one another. There was no doubt but what
something was needed. Even the International Executive Board of the
United Mine Workers of America, pointing to the situation in Kansas, nad
agreed that the situation had become intolerable. They issued a special

report

10
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in which they recognized that District 14 (compri sing the Kansas

fields) had been in one continuous turmoil. The report stated that it had
been the practice to allow all the outlying disVicts of the union to
enter into "district agreements", which provided for tribunals to which

grievances were submitted for adjustment when dis putes arose between
employers and employees. It went on to say that for some time past the
procedure adopted by the Kansas mine workers by which their grievances
were adjusted had become such a howling farce that the people of Kansas
went to the other extreme and enacted the industrial court, believing
that the Mine Workers had become an organization of contract-breakers
and composed of an irresponsible membership. This very concisely stated
the prevailing belief of many persons in Kansas, including Governor
Allen.
At any rate, the gauntlet was down an d the struggle was on. The
struggle was to come after th e enactment of the law, however . Apparently
the same feeling toward the situation had pretty well affected the
people of Kansas as was held by the architects of the industrial law.
There was to be little difficulty in pushing the bill through the

special session of the legislature. Labor, capital, and representatives
of the public were all given a hearing at the session, but it was fairly
well understood by most that it was nothing more than display. The temper
of the times insured a quick and easy passage.

10. Official Statement~ the International Executive Board,
United Mine Workers of America, in regard t~the Kansas Controversy,
International Headquarters, Indianapolis, Indiana, P• 4.
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Even though their arguments had no affect on the ultimate passage of the act, we should look briefly at what these various factions
thought of the proposed industrial court. Speaking for labor, and presenting their attitude, was Mr. Frank P. Walsh, a lawyer representing
the Four Railway Brotherhoods. He had represented labor in the courts
for years.
Government has neither the oonstitutional nor moral right
to take away t h e right to strike. Labor is not a commodity,
to be bought arrl sold, nor can the workingman be constitutionally held, nor can he be morally expected, to observe a contract for his labor if under new conditions that contract does
not seem to him reasonable. 11
His main attack against the bill was based on what he called the fundamental and inherent ri ght of labor to work for whom it chooses, when it
chooses, and on what terms it was able to wrest. He called the statute
state socialism in that it gave to a bureau the right to regulate, control, and in emergency, to operate, industries, includi~ transportation.
Later on in his same speech he expressed the hope that the Federal
Government w::>uld continue to operate the railroads, and transport all
12
products at cost.
Mr. Walsh spent much time, he spoke most of one whole day, in
attacking capital, corporate interests, profit eers, and big business
generally. He mentioned their huge profits during the World War. After
his tirade against business, Mr. Walsh got right down to the Court itself.
11

As for us (labor), we oppose every line and ev.ery clause of this bill --

11. Topeka Daily Capital, January 9, 1920.
12. Loe . cit.

except the object sought .
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He thought it would completely strike -

down the labor movement in Kansas. He took the line that there could
be no final settlement of the labor struggle, that it was bound to
continue as long as mankind advanced. He thrust aside the fears of
many- that it all would lead to Bolshevism or Communism by saying that
he had every confidence in his country, that such ideelogies just
couldn't possibly find a place in our scheme of thing s.
Walsh attacked the bill as infringing the 13th. Amendment to the
Constitution, which forbids slavery or involuntary servitude except as
a punishment for crime. In closing, Mr. Walsh said that the law gave to
a board created by human minds, "powers that were an attribute of the

Almighty. 11
Mr. J. I. Sheppard, representing the State Federation of Labor,
also made a speech before the legislature on behalf of labor. 14 He made
more of a hit with the legislators than did Walsh •. He first declared
himself in thorough accord with Governor Allen's handling of the coal
strike in Kansas. He said that Alexander Howat, president of Di strict
14, had been wrong in his action during t he strike. He defended Howat,
who was to prove a mighty thorn in the side of t he industrial court throughout its entire existence, however, at the same time making a plea for labor
and its troubles. He pictured Howat as a gig-hearted and patriotic man
who did wrong because his viewpoint was wro ng . He pointed out that Howat

13. Loe. cit.
14. Topeka Daily Capital, January 10, 1920.
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had been fighting for the miners for ye ars and all he had ever gotten
for them had been by tooth and claw. "It is the only way labor has
obtained what rights it has now, arrl while I deplore his stand, I do
not condemn his motives."
Mr. Sheppard approved of the industrial court measure, except for
the penalty clause.
I know the old tooth and claw business has got to stop • • •
But your jail and penitentiary law puts the claws deeper into
the matter. The strike penalty is a bad thing. You are depriving us of the right to use force, but you use force against us.
Don't write the law of force into this statute. Write the Golden
Rule into it. Provid e for your court, make its findings publig,
but don't make labor a criminal for fighting for its rights.
In other v.0rds, take all the teeth out of the law, and create a mere arbitration court with no power whatever to enforce its decisions. Mr.
Sheppard apparently overlooked the fact that when it came to fighting
for bread and shelter, money and profits, the Golden Rule was most often
lost in the shuffle someplace.

heppard suggested that the law be written

so that in case the employer and employee finally couldn't agree, the
state would step in, as it did in the coal strike, and take charge of
the property. The paper reported that no member of the legislature was
unkind enough to remind Sheppard, when the time for questions came, that
that was just what happened in the coal strike, and the miners refused to
work when the state did take charge, with the result that the governor
had to call for volunteers to dig coal, and for the National Guard to
insure protection for them.

15 . Loe. Cit .
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Mr. John S . Dean, of Topeka, and r epr es enting the empl oy ers ,
also made a sp eech opposing; passage of th e b ill. 16 Mr. Dean, apparently, presented the most log ical le ga l a r gument s a ainst the measure that

had been heard du.ring the three days of discussion. Dean took the vi ew,
and stuck closely t o it without any excursions i nto other fields, that
th e measure was unconstitutional, a s it undertook t o c onfiscate property
and provided for involuntary s ervit ude. There was one s t r iking difference
between the argument s of Dean and t hos e pr e se nt ed by Sheppard the day before, but their attitudes toward t he bill were much ali ke in one r espect .
The y wanted the p enalty clause chang ed . Sheppard had wanted the penalty
again st t h e workingman stricken out, but t he provisi ons bringing industries under re gulation by the proposed court he thought were all right .
Dean, on the other hand, wanted the i ndust ries left more or less alone ,
but wanted the penalty clause a gai nst stri ke s i n s erted in th e meas ure,
but purely under the police p wers of the s t at e .
This, after all, wa s natural on both t heir part s . Labor had always ,
and does today, vi gorously oppose any r est ricti on on their ri ght to
strike. Capital, on t he other hand, s hies away from s tate regulation of
any kind. Dean went on to urge tha t th e mea sur e should be amended to

eliminate the sections gi vi ng t he court the "confiscatory" powers referred to, and the right to r egulat e pr i va t e industries . He s a id that if
these provisions were left i n the bill, t he c ourts -would declare it unconstitutional. How right he was l ater p roved t o be J

16. Ibid., January 11, 1920.
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Next, it was the turn of Mr. William L. Huggins, the man who did
most of the drafting of the measure, to answer these opponents of the
bill. Mr • . Huggins was representing the public in his ~peech before the
17
legislature.
In the beginning Mr. Huggins took issue with Mr. Wal sh
coreerning the definition of the word "democracy", a very elusive t erm
at best. As he remembered the speech made by Mr. Walsh before t he legislature, he recalled that that gentleman had said he approved of the
methods used by the Four Railway Brotherhoods at the t ime of t he passage
of the Adamson Act, that is, pass the law or suffer a nation-wide tieup
of the railroads. Then he recalled Mr. Walsh's statement favoring democracy. To Mr. Huggins that wasn't government by the people, of all the
people, nor was it for all the people. That was coercion to favor one
group, merely one unit of that "all the people. 11
Mr. Huggins als:> scored Mr. Walsh's statement saying he approved
of the methods used by the Kansas miners during the coal strike. He was
referring to such things as their refusing coal to hospitals, schools,
and other needy institutions. Mr. Huggins also thought that Mr. Alexander
Howat was a very able man, but that he was misguided from having viewed
the abuses perpetrated on the miners for so many years.
One of the fairest portions of the bill as far as labor was conc er ned, said the drafter of the original bill, was the fact t hat the poorest

working man could come into the court with his case, without posting bond,
the court would collect his evidence, and handle his case f or him wi"thout

17. Speech Delivered Before the Kansas Legislature !?z W. 1· Huggins,
January~, 1920, State Printing Plant, Topeka, Kansas, 1920, PP• 1-18.
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one cent of cost to himself. If the worker didn't think he had received
justice from the industrial court, he could have his case taken for him
to the state supreme court. Mr. Huggins couldn't see how anybody could
be a gainst this section of the bill, having in mind the statment of Mr.
Walsh that labor was against every line of the proposed law.
He scoffed at the argument that the bill was anti-union, saying

that surely ta.kills away the right to strike was not a death-blow to
labor unionism. Wasn't there something more in unionization that just
the right to strike down their opponents by force? Besides , the worker .
had a rig ht to quit his job any time he wished, but couldn't conspire
with others to do the same. The worker would do so, however, with the
understanding that after he quit his job someone else was perfectly right
in getting his job.
The spectre of Bolshevism also entered into Mr. Huggins• s arguments
supporting his bill •. To him, any laboring man who put his union first,
above the welfare of his state or country, was a bolshevist. In other
words, this could easily lead into the so-called "dictatorship of the
proletariat. 11 To him, the only thing wrong with the American labor movement was just that. Th~ radical leaders, and the ideas they had imported
from Russia, had gotten into the movement and got a voice in it. The
loyal element, meanwhile, remained inarticulate.
matter with it

nothing else. 1118

18. Ibid., p. 13°
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That is what is the
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To me, this seems to be one of the basic fears lying behind the
Kansas experiment of 1920. Too many times this fear of radicalism is
mentioned by the men responsible for the drawing up of the measure to
think that only a si nc ere feeling that something should be done to compose the struggle between capital and labor was the guilding motive of
those creating the law. Certainly this was pa.rt of it, but it stemmed
from the belief, and fear, that if this composing wasn't done soon there
would develop a dangerous threat to our government and way of life. I
would like to quote part of the conclusion of Mr. Huggin' s speech before the legislature, because I feel it summarizes this basic drive of
those bringing up the measure.
I think this is the most serious time in the history of this
republic outside of the first three years of the civil war. I
bar no other period. The statement by Mr . Walsh that there is
no danger from bolshevism goes co ntrary to the known f acts.
The government of the United States is hunting down, arresting,
putting in jail, and deporting thousands of these agitators,
arrl I don't believe they ever will get near all of them, because
some of them are too smart to get caught. We are challenged by a
soviet government, we are confronted by a condition where a
considerable portion of the people in this country say that
their first duty is not to the government of the United States,
but some other government, a goverrunent within a government; a
government that is more powerful than the government of the
United States, a government that demands their fir st loyalty.
There are too many who believe that. They never deport enough
of them. Any man who says: 11:My first duty is to my union, or to
my church, even, or to my lodge - - I owe no allegiance to t he
government of the United States nor to the State of Kansas that
I will not freely set aside if my union • • • tells me to 11 - no man who believes in that is a good citizen. No man who acts
in this manner should be granted the protection of the law which
he despises, and no penalty that yau can i npose upon that kind
of a man is too severe. 1 9

19. Ibid., P• 18.
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This also served as a final reply to those who said they favored the
law, l::ut were opposed to the penalty provisions of it.
These, then, were the main arguments f or and a gainst the industrial court bill as presented bef ore the special session of the Kansas
legislature in January, 1920. Mr. William Allen White was also invited
to speak on behalf of the public before t he legislature and did so on
January 12, 1920.

20

His arguments supporting the measure were largely

taken up with the belief that eventually both capital and labor would
look upon t he Kansas act as that mich finally emanci pated them from
their own strangle hold on each other, arrl that which established an
equitable and living relation between them.
Passage of the Law
Immediately after th e introduction of the industrial court measure ,
labor leaped into the fray with all its f ury to try arrl defeat it. Mr.
Alexander Howat., president of District 14., United Mine Workers of America
led the struggle against the law. He foresaw absolute slavery for the coal
miners, and all other classes of labor in Kansas, if the bill was passed.
He called it the most drastic and vicious bill against labor that was
ever heard of; it would put the workers at the absolute mercy of the
employers; they would be brutalized and oppressed more than ever before;
and it would completely destroy the usefulness and effectiveness of the

20. Kans as City Star, January 12, 1920.
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labor movernent. 21 He urged every member of the union to use his utmost
effort in defeating the proposed legislation.
It wasn't long, however, before labor realized that the cards
were stacked against them and that they would be unable to defeat t he

law. The labor lobby in Topeka then turned its fight to strike out the
penalty clause of the bill. This was the clause that provided for the
enforcement of the measure, and to remove it, would have been to simply
create a court of investigation without the power to have a court of
competent jurisdiction enforce its orders. This was just what labor
wanted as it would have still left the strike as the f i nal s elution of
all labor controversies with capital.
Those favoring the bill, however, said there would be absolutely
no compromise with the penalty clause. 22 They said that if the people of
Kamas wanted the law they should prevail upon their repres entatives to
keep the penalty clause. To t hem a law without the penalty clause would

be nothing . They saw that exactly the same sort of situation which brought
on demand for the bill, meaning the 1919 coal strike, could take place in
Kansas again the next winter and the people would be powerless to prevent
it. No, if there was going to be an iniustrial court law, one worthy of
the name, it would have the power to enforce its orders and decisions.
The Kansas Industrial Court Act was not a partisan measure, supported by one party and opposed by another. It was created by the Republicans,

but was just as vigorously supported by the Democrats of the state. On

21. Ibid., January 10, 1920.
22 . Loe. cit.
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January 13 the Democratic members of the legislature held a caucus and
voted to support the industrial court bill. They announced, however,
that they would attempt to anend the bill so as to make the members of
the court elective after the first tenn.g3 The law made provision for
their appointment by the governor. Whether this amendment passed or not,
they announced they would support the bill.
The Kansas Industrial Court Act had been introduced into both
houses of the legislat ure as companion bills on January 5, 1920. In the
senate the bill went to the judiciary committee. This committee in the

senate wrote an important amendment into the act. This amendment prohibited
the "check-off" system at the Kansas coal mines. 24 Under the check-off
system, the coal operators were compelled to collect union dues and fines
from their union employees and turn the money over to t he union officials.
The money was held out of the miners' pay envelope and the result of the
system was that the mine oper ators were made the r eal support of the union.
No miner could work without p83'ing his due s arxl he had no way of r esisting
the imposition of any fine the union might impose . The system left the
mine laborer at the absolute mercy of the union, the amendment was f inally
dropped.
The bill passed the senate by a vote of 33 to 5. The senate , upon
convening, voted as a committee of the whole to recommend the measure.
Little oratory or tirne was wasted in the quick passage of the act. 'rhe
bill was voted on section by section, and the senate voted down the

23. Ibid., January 13, 1920.

24. Ibid., January 14, 1920.
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Democratic amendment to make the judges elective. It was passed as it
had come from the judiciary committee. 25
As mentioned above, the original bill was introduced into both
houses as companion measures. Both houses proceeded to pass their own
measure. The result wa s that there were a few differences outstanding
between them. The two bills differed only in three essential points, all
three being amendments adopted by the house. They broadened the powers
outlined in the original draft . They (1) allowed the industrial court to
regulate profits, price.s and wages of all industries engaged in the sale
or barter of food or food products, (2) required labor contracts with
unions to be approved by the industrial court before they became binding,
and (3) prohibited any "closed shop" contract with labor organization. 26
The senate voted not to accept the house amendments, so a conference was needed between representatives of both hous es to iron out the
differences. Two conferees were appointed from each house to accomplish
this. Points 2 and 3 seemed to be those most outstanding between the two
houses. The senate was apparently disposed to grant the house contention
that there should be some tribunal in which retail prices might be considered and regulated, but that it should be ,worked out in a separate
bill and not tied in with a measure intended to deal only with industrial
controversies arrl thus endanger the constitionality of the entire
measure. The result was an agreement which didn't materially affect the

25 . Ibid. , January 16, 1920.
26 . Ibid . , January 17, 1920.

53

original senate measure. 27 The amendment in regard to retail pricefixing was written into a separate bill, and the open shop amendment
and the one requiring labor contracts to be approved by the new court
were dropped entirely. Both houses approved of the conference report. 28

As was mentioned the measure passed both houses on January 16,
1920, subject to the later agreement on the conference report . It might
be well to glance just a moment at the vote as it occurred in both houses
on the bill. It has been seen that the vote in the senate was: Yeas 33,
.
29
Nays 5, absent or not voting, 1.
Three Republicans an:i two Democrats
voted against the bill. A Republican abstained. These men who voted
against the measure were from Leona, Fort Scott, Girard, Wichita, and
Galena . Most of these towns were in the coal-mining district. The
abstainer was from Kansas City. James Malone, who voted aye on the
measure explained his vote in the following manner, which showed that
he was apparently thinking more level-headed than were some of his

colleagues.
In my judgment we a:re acting with too much haste in enacting this legislation at this time . At this moment of .unrest and discontentment, immediately following t he great
World War, an:i also following the great industrial disorder,
when men 's pas sions are aroused and the accumulated vengeance
of the public is directed upon labor and labor unions, there

27. Ibid., January 22, 1920.
28. State of Kansas, Senate Journal, Special Session, 1920, P• 98.
29. Ibid., P•

44.
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is serious danger of doing a grave injustice to the laboring class . JO
He thought the legislation should have been held over until the next

regular session, an1 that the court should have been made elective .
However, since the prople were asking for legislation of this kind, he
voted aye, believing that in the future the act would be amended to
make it elective.
In the house the Industrial Court Act passed with the following
vote: Yeas 104, Nays 7, absent or not voting, 13. 31 Of the seven voting

no, four were Republicans and three were Democrats. They were fairly
widely spaced which showed that apparently their independent judgment,
not pressure from coal-mining communities, influenced their vote. They
were from Topeka, Augusta, Parsons, Ashland, Weir, Hays, ani Galena.

Some of these can be seen to have come from the coal fields however. Of
those not voting, 12

were Republicans ani one a Democrat. They were

from widely spaced parts of the state. Representative Mulroy of Hays
explained his no vote in this fashion:
Believing a law placing in the hands of the governor
the authority to appoint three men whose duty it will be
to regulate everything and everybody to be fundamentally,
if not cons titutionally, wrong, and as a protest against
the ~team- roller tactics anployed in the last hour, I vote
no. 3
·
Anothe r representative explained his vote in much the same way, saying

JO . Ibid. , P• 45.
31. State of Kansas, House Journal, Special Session, 1920, P• 77.
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he didn't approve of having measures like this shoved down his thro_at.

The Kansas Industrial Court Act had successfully cleared the
legislative hurdle, an:i the great experiment was ready to get under way.
It will be necessary now to see just what the new law provided for, as a
means of doing away with industrial controversy an:i warfare .
The Kansas Industrial Court Law33
The Court of Industrial Relations was to be composed of three
judges, to be appointed by tbe governor, by and with the advice and
consent of the senate. The three judges originally appointed were
appointed for one, two, and three year terms to begin simultaneously.
Each succeeding judge was to be appointed for a three-y ear term. The
salary of the judges was $5 ,000 per year.
The act conferred upon the industrial court the jurisdiction
formerly held by the Publ· c Utilities Commission, but these powers
were to be taken away after a mort while.
In order to preserve the public peace, promot e the public welfare,
protect the public health, prevent industrial strife,

a.rrl

to secure the

regular and orderly conduct of the businesses directly affecting the
living conditions of the people, the following businesses were declared
to be affected with a public interest and subject to state supervision:
(1) the manufacture of food products, (2) the manufacture of clothing
and wearing apparel, (3) the mining or production of fuel, (4) the

33. Laws of Kansas, Special See~ion, 1920, Chapter 29, PP• 35-48.
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transportation of food products, and (5) public utilities an d common
carriers.
Because it was recognized that the continuous operation of these
industries was necessary to the peace and security of the people, and so
that they could be supplied with the necessaries of life, the law provided that no person, firm, corporation, or association of persons should

in any manner wilfully hinder or suspend the continuous operation of an
industry for the purpose of evading the purpose and intent of the act,
nor could they refuse to perform any duty for'oidden by the act with the
intent to hinder or suspend the continuous operation of any of these
industries.
Cases could be brought before the court by either party to a controversy, or the court could initiate a case on its own if they thought
the situation warranted it . Then, too, any ten citizens in an area
threatened by an in:iustrial dispute could bring suit before the court to
prohibit a strike from resulting, arrl the Attorney-General was given the
right to institute cases before the court.
The industrial court was given the power to make chang es in t he
industries affected with a public interest in regards to working and
living conditions, hours of labor, and could set a minimum scale of
wages to be paid by the employer. Such changes were to co ntinue for
such reasonable time as fixed by the court, or until changed by a greement of the two parties with the approval of the court .
If either party refused to obey an order of the industrial court,
that court had the authority to bring proceedings in the supreme court
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of Kansas to compel obedience to such orders . Also, eit h er part
could bring suit in the state su preme court if they wer en 't satisf ied
with the ruling of the industrial court. Such cases were to be given
preference over other civil ca ses before t he supreme court. Su ch suit
had to be brought within 30 days of t he service of t he order made by
the industrial court •
The act also recognized t he right of collective ba r gaini ng , an:::l.
any agreements made collectively by labor an d cap it al we re to remain in
force as long as both parties were s a tisfied wi. th t hem. Then, if they
couldn't agree on another contra ct, the i nd ustrial court a ssumed j urisdiction in order to prevent the di sag reement from endi ng i n a st rike,
boycott, or lockout.
It was made unlawful by the act f or any corpor ation engaged i n
the industries covered by the act to fire an employee because h e
testified before the i ndu~trial court, or bec ause he wa s in any way
responsible for the bringing of a suit bef ore s ai d cour t . It was unlawful for any of t h e industries affected with a public i nter est t o
cease or limit operations with the idea in mi nd of raising prices, or
for avoidir.g a ny provision of the act. These i ndustries oo u l d apply t o
the in:::l.ustrial court for permission to cease or l imit operations,

how-

ever, and if the application was f ound to have been ma de in good fait h
authority to take the action would be given.
The Kansas Industrial Court was given the power to make rules,
regulations and practices to govern the operations of industries whose
operation might ordinarily be affected by changes in season, market
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conditions, or other causes inherent in their line of bu sire ss, so _that
the best service i,,ould be rendered to the public at all times.
The law outlawed the right to strike. Individual workers were
free to quit their employment at any ti me they pleased, but they could
not conspire with others to quit their employment for the purpose of
hindering or interfering with the operation of any of the industries
mentioned in the law. Picketing was declared to be unlawful also.
Section 18 was the penalty clause of the act and made it a
misdemeanor to wilfully violate any pro vision of the act, or any valid
order of the industrial court. Upon being found guilty of such violation by any state court of competent jurisdiction, punishment was by a
fine not to exceed $1,000, or by imprisonment in

the county jail for a

period not to exceed one year, or by both such fine and imprisonment.
Section 19 provided that any officer of the industries mentioned,
or any officer of a labor

· on, who -wilfully used his power or authority

coincident to his official position to intentionally influence or compel
any other person to violate any provisions of this act, or any valid

order of the court, was to be deemed g uilty of a felony, and upon conviction, should be punished by a fine of not to exceed $5,000, or by
imprisonment in the state penitentiary at hard labor for a term not
to exceed two years, or by both such fine and imprisonment.
The court was given authority by the act to take over and operate
any industry mentioned in the a ct, in case the operation of that industry
was being suspended or limited contrary to the prlbvisions of the act, if
it appeared to the court that such suspension or limitation of operations
might injure the public welfare, public peace, or public health. During
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the period of state operation a fair return was to be paid the owne_rs
of such industry, and a fair wage to the v.orkers.

The court could institute investigations into various subjects,
and could hire competent help to carry them on. Any order made by the
court as to a minimum wage was to be deemed prima facie reasonable and
just, and if this wage scale was higher than the wages currently being
paid by the industry, the new scale was to be paid from the date of the
service of summons or publication of notice institution said investigation into that industry.
The last section of the act, Section 28, made the following provision:
If any section or provision of this act shall be found invalid by any court, it sh all be conclusively presumed that this
act would have been passed by the legislature without such
invalid section or provision, and the act as a whole shall not
be declared invalid by reason of the fact that one or more
sections or provisions may be found to be invalid by any court.
This section is very important because it was later used as a basis for
saving parts of the act not declared unconst itutional by the Supreme
Court of the United States.
We have said that the Kansas Court of Industrial Relations was a

new creation entirely, that it had no precedent, nor has it had any
successor. But an act that goes into such f ar fields as does this measure
certainly is created on the basis of somethil'\g that has gone before. In
other words, the men who drafted the Kansas act of 1920 first found some
basis of authority upon which to found their new court. There wouldn't be
much use in writing the law if it was so new and different that it could
not be sustained by something more definite than urgent need. In the case
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of the Kansas statute, citations of authority were gathered by Mr .
Huggins and others mainly responsible, which seemed to show them that
what they were doing would be held constitutional by any court in the
land. Not only did they believe in the main principles of their act,
they believ ed also in its legality. Where, then, did they find justification and a legal basis for the Kansas act?
In the main they turned to the Supreme Court of the United States
and studied c ases which see.med to them similar in point of law. In several

of these cases they found support for their doctrines of "public interest",
and the right of a state to use its police power to protect the public
welfare , health and comfor t of its citizens . One case in particular which
was studied was Munn y. I l linois, 34

which, to them, was sufficient

authority for their declaration that certain industries were affected
with a public interest and were therefore subject to regulation by the
state. The United States Supreme Court said that:
Property does become clothed with a public interest when
used in a manner to make it of public consequence, and affect
the community at large. When, therefore, one devotes his
property to a use in which the public has an interest, he, in
effect , grants to the public an interest in that use, and must
submit to be controlled by the public for the common good, to
the extent of the interest he has thus created. He may withdraw
his grant by discontinuing the use; but, so long as he maintains the use , he must submit to the contro1.35
There is a very important sentence in this excerpt, that which says
that he has to submit to public control to the extent of the interest

34.

94 U. S . 113, 1877; 24 Law. Ed. 77.

35 . Ibi d., P • 84.
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he has thus created. Well, then, is the business of the food producer,
and the clothing producer affected with a public interest to an extent
subjecting it to public regulation? It isn't a question of principle,
but of extent, and that was to be one of the pitfalls of the Kansas act.
Another case studied by the creators of the Kansas industrial
court was German Alliance Insurance Company!• Lewis.3 6 This case con-

cerned a Kansas law of 1909 which gave t~ state superintendent of insurance ultimate control over the rates that could be charged by insurance companies in the state. The company claimed, that since they
were a private business, there was no constitutional power to allow a

state to fix the rates and charges for services rendered b~ it. Here
a gain the Supreme Court brought out the principle of public interest
when it said, "The underlying principle is that tu sine ss of certain
kinds hold such a peculiar relation to the public int ere st that there
is superinduced upon it the right of public regulation. 1137 The Supreme
Court then declared that the insurance business fell within this
category.
The case, Buddy. State of New York, 38 was another citation
apparently confirming the stand taken by the Kansas industrial court
law. This conc erned a New York statute which regulated the fees and
charges "for elevating, trimming , receiving , weighing, arrl discharging
grain by means of floating and stationary elevators and warehouses in

36. 233 U.S . ~a); 58 Law Ed. 1011.

37.

Ibid., p. 411.

38. 143 U. S . 518, 1892; 36 Law. Ed. 247 .
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the state. 11 The claim was made that floating elevators i n the port of
New York were private, were not affected with any public inter est, and,
therefore, were not subject to regulation of rates. In upholding t he l aw
the Supreme Court relied heavily upon its decision in the Munn case.

11

We

must regard the principle maintained in Munn y_. Illinois as firmly
established. • • • 1139 This main principle, which was seemingly used in
these cases in arriving at when a state could use its police power in
regulating businesses affected with a public interest, was stated by
Mr. Justice Bra,dley in speaking of the Munn case.

The inquiry there was as to t he extent of t h e police power
in cases where tre public interest is affected; and we held
that when an employment or business becomes a matter of such
public interest and importance as to create a common charge
or burden upon the citizen; in other words, when it becomes a
practical monopoly, to which the citizen is co mpelled to resort, and by means of which a tribute can be exacted from
the community, -- it is subject to regulation by the legi slative power . 40
Now, here is t h e critical point in th e whole l::usiness. When a busi ness
is such trat it creates a virtual monol)Oly, then it is subject, under
the police power of the state, to legislative regulation. Well, is
the manufacture of food and clothing a monopoly? It is interesting to

note that in all these cases being mentioned, that which is declared
t o be affected with a true public interest is fenerally a virtual
public utility or means of transportation, some sort of enterprise
that is generally recognized as being monopolistic . Nothing y et has
been mentioned of the ordinary pursuits of manufacturing food products

39. Ibi d., P• 255 .
40. Ibid., P• 253 .
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and clothing f or general consumption . Again, it seems that on prin~
ciple the Kans a s court was on s:>lid ground, but on the extent to
which the pri JXiple was extended, on dubious ground.
The c a s e , ~ y. Walker41 was used to justify the exercise of
the police power in Kansas to enforce the industrial court act, that
is, in the state's claim that in enforcing the act it was in reality
protecting the public welfare. This case involved an Idaho statute
putting certain restrictions on t he grazing of sheep on the public
domain. The Supreme Court upheld the statute as a valid exercise of
the police power. They claimed that indiscriminate grazi ng of sheep
was harmful to the public domain, and therefore, in restricting it
the state was merely protecting public property.

The police power,

said the Supreme Court, "embraces regulations designed to promote the
public convenience or the general prosperity, as well as regulations
designed to promote the public health, the public· morals, or t he public
safety. 1142

The State of Kansas, t hen, was doing the same by prohibiting

industrial warfare and re quiring labor and ca pital to compose their differences according to public regulation.
It also seemed to the supporters of the Kansas law that Mul ler y.
0regon43 gave supporting sanction to the fixing of working co ndi t ions by
the industrial court, as a valid exercise of t he police power . In t ~is

41. 204

u.s.

311, 1911.

42. Ibid., P• 317.
43. 208

u. s.

412, 1908.

case the Supreme Court upheld the validity of an Oregon statute w~ich
made it unlawful to employ women more than 10 hours in any one day.
The law was challenged as being an abridgment of freedom o f contract.
The Court held that there were limits on the freedom of contract. Because of the possible effect on the race of overworking women in industry, laws limiting the number of hours they could be anployed a day were
valid. Women were in a different position than men .

11

•••

her physical

structure and a proper discharg e of her maternal functions - - having
in view not merely her own health, but the well-being of the race - justify le gislation to protect her from the greed

• of man. 1144

Another case, Holden~· Har~y45 added more justification to the
st ate's regulation of working conditions and terms of employment, without being in violation of the freedom of contract. This c ase arose out
of a Utah statute regulating the hours of labor for un:lerground miners,
a limit of 8 hours per day ha ving been set. The question was whether or
not this was a violation of freedom of contract, or was it a valid
exercise o f the police power of the state? The Supreme Court thought

the latter .
We think it a settled principle, growing out of the nature
of well-ordered civil society, that every holder of property,
however absolute and unqualified may be his title, hold it
under the implied liability that his use of it may be so
regulated that it shall not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having an equal right to the enjoyment of
their property , nor injurious to the rights of the community.
All property in this commonwealth, as well that in the interior as that borderir:g on tide waters, is derived directly

44. Ibid., p . 422.

45 . 169

u.s.

366 , 1898.
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or indirectly from the government, and held subject to
those general regulations which are necessary to the
common good and general welfare. Rights of property,
like all other social and conventional rig hts, are subject to such reasonable limit ations in their enjoyment
as will prev ent t hem from being injurious, and to such
reasonable restraints and re gulations established by law,
a s the legislature, under the governing and controlling
power vested in them by tge Constitution, mc33" think
necessary and expedient •.4
Because of co nditions in underground mines, therefore, the state was
empowered to reg ulate the ti me of working in them, as unlimited exploitation of underground miners muld have a detrimental ef fect on
the public . This seemed, to the crea tors of the Kansas act, as complete
justification for the court of industrial relations to fix wages, hours
of labor, and working con:iitions in state industries to promote public
welfare an:l. protect public health and morals .
Another very important case studied by those responsible for
the industrial court in Kansas was Re Debs. 47

Mr .

w.

L. Huggins had

this to say about the case:
In Re Debs
• Justice Brewer delivered the opinion and
with his usual clarity of thought and felicity of expression,
stated the principles of law which very largely influenced
and guided in the framing of the Kansas Industrial Act.48
Eugene Deb s had violated an injunction forbidd.ing _him to obstruct interstate commerc e on the railroads during the Pullman Strike of 1894• The
Supreme Court held t hat the United States Government could, through its

46 . I bid., P• 392.
47 . 1 58

u. s.

564, 1895 -

48 . w. L. Huggins, Labor and Democracy, (New York: Macmillan _
Company, 1922) , P• 75 .
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official agents, use physic al force to carry out the powers and functions that belonged to it. This included the power to command ob edience
to its laws, and hence the power to keep the peace to that extent.
Supporters of the Kansas statute made an analogy between the right of
the Federal Government to use police power to prevent hindrances to
interstate comrnerce and the right of the state to use its police
power in cases which might arise urn.er the Kansas Industrial Act. Then,
to support the power of the industrial court to apply to courts of competent jurisdiction for orders to enforce its decisions, the founders
relied upon this statement of Justice Brewer:
Ev.ery government, entrusted by the very terms of its being with powers an:i duties to be exercised and discharged for
the general welfare, has a right to apply to its own courts
for any proper assistance in the exercise of the one and the
dis charge of the other. • • • 49
The Court went on to · say that, while it was not the province of the government to interfere in the mere ma tter of private controversy between individuals, or to use its great powers to enforce the rig hts of one
against another, yet, whenever the wrongs complained of were such as
affected the public at large, then the mere fact tha t the government
has no pecuniary inter est in the cont roverey was not sufficient to

exclude it from the courts.
The last principal case used as a citation of authority for tbe
act was Wilson

y. New. 50

49 . 158 U.S . 564, P• 578- 9.
50.

243

u.s. 332, 1917.
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It is claimed that in everthing, except possibly its
penal sections, the Kansas Industrial Act is strictly·
within the principles of law laid down by Chief Justice
White in the prevailing opinion in Wilson y_. New. 51
This case upheld the constitutionality of the Adamson Act, which
established wages and hours on railroads in interstate commerce. It was
to avert a threatened nation-wide strike on the railroads th at the law
was passed. In this case the foll owing was relied upon by Mr. Huggins,
apparently, as encompassing the main principles contained in the Kansas
law and justifying them •
• what benefits would flow to society by recognizing

the right, because of the public interest, to regulate the

relation of employer and employee and of the employees
among themselves, arrl to give to the latter peculiar and
special rights safeguarding their persons , protecting them
in case of accident, and giving efficient remedies for that
purpose, if th ere was no power to r emedy a situation created
by a dispute between employers and employees as to rate of
wages, which , if not remedied, would leave the public helpless, the whole people ruined, arxi all the homes o.f the land
submitted to a danger of the most serious character?~ ••
We are of opinion that the r easons stated conclusively establish that ••• the act before us was clearly within the
le gislative power of Congress to adopt, and that in substance
and effect, it amounted to an exertion of its authority under
the circumstances disclosed to compulsorily arbitrate the
dispute between the parties by establishing ••• a legislative standard of wages, operative and binding as a matter
of law, upon the parties • • . • 52
Translate this to the state level and you have, as it looked to Mr. Huggins and the other founders of the Ians as experiment, ample justification
to regulate wages, hours of labor, and working conditions in industrial
disputes , if the public welfare was in any danger, by the state indus-

51 . Huggins,££• cit., P• 77 •

52. 243 U. S. 332, P• 351.

68
trial court.
Upon these cas es was princi pall y based the authority to establish t he Ka nsas Court of' Industri a l Relations. The founders were confident that they had not only found a way to eradicate industrial warfare altogether, but that they had also found a constitutional way to

do it. It was to be up to the Supreme Court of the United States to
eventually decide whether or not the Kansa s law could be support ed by
these other decisions. We have said t h at the Kansas law was not entirely new, and that it was in part based on previ ous pri nci ples enunciated
by the highest court din the land. Mr. F. Dumont Smith, a Hutchinson
lawyer, and one of the f ramers of the industrial law, said that the
industrial court was not new or novel, but was simply the ap plication
of the police power , the old attribute of sovereignty, in this respect
to a modern condi ti on that had become intolerable. 53 To him, the police
power had little or no l imitations , and was the broadest -and the most
und efined of all go vernmental powers . It was, in fact , the final end
and aim of civilized government , and that whic h all other governmental
powers had to r espect. It could even override the sacredness of contract .
At least, it has been seen that it was relied upon heavily in the creation
of the indust rial court.
Opinion For and Against the Court
It might be well to j ust pause at this point to briefly summa-

53. Topeka Dai l y Capital, July 20, 1920.
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rize some of the arguments, pro and con, concerning the Kansas law.There were literally hum.reds of articles, books, editorials, and newspaper articles written about the court. It seems as if the writer was
either very much in favor of the law or very much against it. There
didn't seem to be too much written in a purely objective lig ht on t he
merits and demerits of the new statute. Of course those of labor were
bitterly opposed to the law, and even many representing capital; while
those who had had a part in the passage of the law were passionately
supporting it. Some writers, in most part colle ge professors, economists,
arrl political scientists who had no direct interest in the law, impartially weighed the law, looking more at its possible reception in
the courts, certain fallacies in its principles, and mentioning the
parts of the measure 't.Orthy of praise, and whether or not such a
measure was really the answer to industrial warfare.
One such writer was Mr.

w.

E. Atkins of the University of Chicago. 54

It seemed to him that the Act was colored with the impatient thought of

the post-war period, and that under more tranquil conditions its would
have been difficult to conceive of such legislation being passed, at
least for s:::>me time to come . He emphasized the tense atmosphere of the
Kansas legislature, and the fact that they apparently wanted to settle
the matter (of possible recurring strikes in the coal fields) once and
for all. He was under the impression that three things should have been

54. w. E. Atkins, "The Kansas Court of Industrial Relations,"
Journal of Political Economy, XXVIII (April, 1920) , pp. 339-352.
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clear to the legislators when they passed the .law. First, that there
were limits to the implications some people found in t he doctrine of
public interest -- when difficulty arose between employer and employee,
especially when the doctrine of public int er est was spread as it was
in the Kansas act, that the int erest of the public was distant and indefinite compared to that of the worker who was fighting for what he
termed his very existence. Secondly, Mr. Atki ns thought that since

labor had had difficulty with the courts f or many years, the act might
provoke rather than curb difficulties. For his third point , he f ound a
danger in the provision th at the appointment of the judges lay with th e
governor; he was not bound, moreover, to choose a purely represent ative
group of judges.55 It should

be

brought out here that it wasn't the

idea of the governor, nor of those who framed the bill, to have a r epr esentative group chosen for the court. This w::mld have made it more a.ft an
arbitration court, with haggling bet11een t he judges, and a compromise
solution probably being the result fun the majority of cas es. The i ndustrial court was to be exactly like any of the other legally constituted
st ate courts, made up of impartial judges who would adjudicate the
industrial disputes purely in th e light of known facts, tempered with
justice for both parties.

Mr. Atkins did think the court had possibilities am might gather
some success because of the fact that Kansas was largely ag~icultural,
not predominantly an industrial state. He did think the do ctrine of

55. Atkins,

.Q.12•

cit., P• 347.
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public interest had been spread much too far, especially in the inclusion of the production of wearing apparel.
Mr. William Allen White was one of the virgorous supporters of
the Kansas industrial law. Besides speaking before the special session
of the le gislature in support of the bill, he wrote several magazine
articles in which he upheld the content and purpose of the law. He
emphasized the advantag es held by the industrial court over former
arbitration and conciliation plans. Arbitration and conciliation had
sought peace, on the best terms possible, but it was only a temporary
peace. Now the Kansas court would seek justice in labor controversies,
this justice naturally being followed by that peace in our industrial
life that everyone wanted. 56
Numerous magazine articles were written by Governor Allen in
support of his court. In all these writings his a rguments fo llowed the
same line of thought. Why di d Kans as - create the irrl us trial court?
The state reasoned that government has put a stop to
every other quarrel which threatens the welfare and good
order of society. The industrial quarrel is t he only one
which government anywhere allows to proceed on its own
destructive will. And so reasoning that the state by the
broad exercise of its police powers has t he rig ht to protect the public a gainst the danger and the waste of t h e
industrial controversy, it adopted a law which declares
that neither labor nor capital shall conspire to close down
an institution which is engaged in the production of an
essential commodity such as f ood, f uel, clothing, or
transportation.57

56. William Allen White, "Industrial Justice -- Not Peace, 11 The
Nation's Business, X (May, 1922), PP• 14-16.
57. Henry J. Allen, "What About the Public?" The Rotarian, XXI
(September, 1922), PP• 117-119.
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He always reiterated his f ear that a small group of radicals were in .
the process of g etting cont rol of the workingman, and was encourageing
him to look for justice through t heir own fo rc e, not through just ice as
rendered in the courts of the land. Government should come out right now

and prove that it was able to protect the many against any encroachments
by the few. Governor Allen was by far the staunchest supporter of the
Kansas law, not only whi le he was in office, rut after he had' retired
to private life.
Labor, largely through the

\0

ice of the American Federation of

Labor, was always a bitter critic and opponent of the measure . They called it involuntary servitude, said that it was meant to protect the f inancial interests of t he employ er, and that it had been passed largely due
to a wave of hysteria created by Governor Allen during the period of the
coal strike and after. 58
Samuel Gompers, President of the American Federation of Labor, was
especially bitter in his oppositi on to the act. He once engaged Governor
Allen in public debate over t he issue. 59 'rhe main thing he had against
t he Kansas Court was it s prevention o f strike s. He thought the whole
act was undemocratic arrl wouldn't work . "Th e right to quit work must be
maintained inviolate i f freedom :ti.s to be preserved. 1160 He scof fed

58. "Kansas Court of Industrial Relations , 11 Ame rican Federat ionist ,
XXVII (July , '1920) , pp . 627-629.

59. See, Debate Between Samuel Gompers and Henry{• Allen at
Carnegie Hall, New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., 1920 .
60. Samuel Gompers, 11 The Ca se For Or ganized Labor, 11 The Rotarian,
XXI (October, 1922), p. 174.

73
at the contention of Governor Allen that there was a distinct "thirdparty" which had a very vital i nterest in _all industrial disputes . He
said there was no such thing as a detached general public; that the
whole population was divided as employers and employees . His solution
to the industrial problem was to hang on to volunt ary arbitration.
The framers of the Kansas statute al ways disputed with the
opponents of the oourt the question concerning this right to quit work.
The court made a differentiation between striking and the mere quitting
of work.

61

To labor they were one an:i the same t hing . In reply to the

charge of Mr. Gompers that the court had taken away the divi ne right of
the worker to quit work whenever he so d esired, Mr. Allen said, "We
have merely helped to take away Mr . Gompe r•s divine right to order a
man to quit work. That is all . 1162
Mr . Johns . Dean, a leading Kans as lawyer and one-time Unit ed
States District Attorney for Kansas, was another who felt that the
Kansas law was fundamentally wrong. He feared for private enterprise
under the system as established by the Kansas law. He made much of the
fact that manufacture and pro duction were fundamentally and unchangeably private business. It was one of the inalienable ri ghts of the
Ameri can people, that of engaging one's pro pert y and services in
business activities, to control and manage t he same as he wished, t o

61. Section 17.
62 . Henry J . Allen, Address to Kans as Bankers' As soci ation, A
Moder n Weapon, Topeka, State Printer, 1921 , P• 11.
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hire and discharge whom he desired, and to be left perfectly free in
contracting for his labor. 63
Mr . Dean thought the main features of the law contravened the
most elementary principles of individual liberty and private property.
He could not see how economic change and modern progress had suddenly
impressed such private industries as the production of food and clothing
to such an extent as to subject them to state regulation.
To select these particular industries and deprive the owners and the workmen employed by them of the freedom of contract,
untrammeled control of their own property and their individual
liberty, while leaving the ta.lance of their fellow-citizens in
the full possession of these invaluable ri ght s; to burden the
owners and v-.0rkers in these particular industries with the
supervision, control and manag ement of a state collilllission, is
a flagrant denial of the equal protection oft re law guaranteed
by the tzurteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States .
These have been some of the principal argumerri:,s used by those for
and against the Kansas industrial law. One screamed justice, the other
tyranny. A middle g rourli was hard to find. Mr . F. Dumont Smith refuted
the arguments that the law made men work against their will, that it
made an irrl ustry continue operation at a loss, etc., which were principal arguments used by the opposition. He said the law didn't even
pretend to do these things. "It merely attempts to prevent a breach of
the peace by settling a strike before it reaches that point, and merely

63. Johns. Dean, The Furrlamental Unsoundness of the Kansas
Industrial Court Law, 11 American Bar Association Journal, VII (July,

1921), P• 333.

64. Ibid., p. 63.
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asserts the power to co mpel conti nued production when a stoppage of'
production would endange r the public health. 116 5
In a speech before the International Convention of Rotary Clubs
in Atlantic City, New Jersey, on June 22, 1920, Mr. Huggins very adequately summarized the main purpose of the Kansas statute, and what it
would do for both capital and labor. He said that:
The prime purpose of the industrial law is the protection
of the public against the inconvenience, the hardships and t he
suffering so often caused by industrial warfare . It protects
every citizen in his God-given right to work, to su pport his
family li ke a free man without molestation and without fear .
It conf irms the right of every man to quit , to change his employment, like a free man; but it forbids him either by viol ence or by intimidati on to prevent others from working . It
assures capital i nvested in the essential industries f reedom
from the great economic waste incident to industrial warfare .
It offers a fai r r eturn upon such investments. It guarantees
to workers en gaged in these essential industries a fair wage,
steady employment, and healthful and moral surrourrlings. It
gives to enployers, to employ ees and to the general public
alike an impartial tribunal. to which mey be submitted all
controversies vitally affecting the three . It declares anew
the democratic principles that the will of the majority l egally expressed shall be the law of the land. It prohibi sand
penalizes the rule of the minority by means of intimidation.
It prohibits trial of industrial disputes by gauge of battle,
and it offers in place the reof, a safe, sane and l?i vilized remedy
for industrial wrongs.66
The success, or failure, which attended the efforts of the Kansas i ndustrial court to fill in this picture with effective action will be left
for the next section of this paper. In it will be described the intimate
workings of the court, including sample cases arrl investigations, plus
a short summary of the court's struggle with organi zed labor.

65. Topeka Daily Capital, July 20, 1920.
66. The Kansas Court of Industrial Relations,! Modern Weapon;
(Topeka : State Printer , 1921), p. 6.
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CHAPTER DI
THE COUR T IN OPERATION

This chapter will be _mainly co ncerned with the activities of
the court in connection with industrial disputes. However, a word
about the supplementry activities of the court. When the Court of Industrial Relations wa s organized, February 2, 1920, th e powers and
duties formerly belonging to t he Public Utilities Commission were given
to it. The court only had this jurisdiction far nine months, at whic h
time the Public Utilities Commission was created again. During its
first year of operation the court was mainly occupied with the utility
side of its duties. During the first nine months, ll04 cases concerning public utilities, their rates, stock and bond issues, approval of
building plans, and sales were decided by the Utilities Di vision of
1
the court.
Aside from the public utility functions of the court, 28 cases
were f iled on the i ndustrial side during the first 10 months , which is

roughly the period cove red by the First Annual Report. Of these, 25
wer e filed by labor and 1 by capital , while 2 investigations were
initiated by the court. Of the 25 cases filed by labor, 20 received
formal attention and decision. In 13 of these cases a wage increase
was granted; in 3, wage s wer e found to be fair so that no increase was
allowed; in 2, only workiil!; conditi ons were involved; while in 1 the

1. Court of Industrial Relations, First Annual Report, St ate of
Kansas , (Topeka: State Printing Pl ant, 1921), P• 4,
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empl oyers took action satisfactory to the employees, the court simp1=y
approving the settlement . lhe remaining case was merely a referee a ction
on a collective agreement • 2
During the times between cases the work of the court went on. In
order to correctly adjudicate labor controversies, them mbers* found
that they needed information concerning such things as the cost of liv.i. ng,
the working conditions in the various industrial plants throughout the
state, hours of labor, sanitary and health conditions, safety appliances,
ruxi a variety of other matters. The court employ ed tw::> lawyers to act

as i nvestigators or inspectors, and whenever a complaint was made, they
went to the plant or industry a f fected and tried to ascertain th e f acts
involved .

t times questionaires were sent out by the court to gat her

information concerning prices and costs, in order to gauge the rise or
fall in the cost of livi rg •. This was an important matter in the adjudication of disput es where a wa g e increase was asked for .
At the time that the powers and duties of the Public Utilities
Commission were removed from the jurisdiction of the indust r i al court ,
other duties were conferred upon it by the le gislature . The le gisl atur e
placed the activities of the labor department, free employment service
and Industrial Welf are Commission under the jurisdiction of th e indus-

2 . U. S . Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Kansas
Court of Industrial Relations , Bulletin No . 322, (Washington: Government
Printing ffice, April, 1923), P• 37 .

*

The first three j udges of the industrial court were: W. L.
Huggins , presiding judge; James A. McDermott and John H. Crawford,
judges . In 1923 Henderson S . Martin replaced Mr . McDermott on the court,
and in 1924 j u dge Crawford was succeeded by Joseph Taggart .

trial court .

3
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This is how the functions and duties of t he court were tBen

lined up . The court was composed of five main divisions .
I . Industrial divis ion
1 . Adjudicat ion of disputes between employer and employees in
the es s ential industries named in the statute
2 . Adjudic ation of disputes in any industry subnitted by agreement of the parties
3. Original investigations in essential industries
4. Pro curing continuous and efficient operations of essential
industries sufficient for the protection of the public
II. Labor divi sion
1. Mine inspection department
a . Ac cident prevention, ventilation and sanitation
b. Mine- rescue work . Maintenance and superintendence of
mine- rescue stations at Pittsburg, Arma, and Scammon
c . Making statistical reports on mines, surveys , tonnage
production, workmen employed, etc.
2. Factory inspection department
a . Safety and sanitation
Fire prevention
Safety of buildings
Elevator ins pection
Machinery inspection as to safety appliances, etc.
Lighting
Ventilation and sanitation
Orders for betterment
b . St atistical inspections and reports
Number an:i classification of e:nployees
Wages paid
Minors employed
3. Administration of all labor laws
a . Eight-hour day on public work
b . Reports of industrial accidents (fatal and nonfatal)
c . Other miscellaneous provisions.
III . Women's division ( and child labor)
1 . Investigat ion as to ¼Omen in i ndustry
2. Promulgating of orders relating to:
Hours of labor
b . Minimum wages
c . Safety, sanit ation and welfare
d . Child employment
e . Recording and supervising issuance of child-labor permits
f . Enforcement of child-labor penal laws

a.

3. Court of Industrial Relations, Second Annual Report, State of
Kansas , Topeka, State Printing Plant, 1922, PP• 5-6.
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IV. Free employment service
1. Maintenance and supervi. sion of public free employment

offices.
a. Topeka, Wi .chita , Kansa s City, Salina , Hutchinson
a nd Parsons
b . Cooperating with fe deral employment service
2. Regulation and supervi si on of private employment agencies
3- Investigat ion of nonemployment, and reports to stat e and
f ederal authoriti es
4. Harvest labor
V. Miscellaneous activities
1. Reports and i nvesti gations of settlements in industrial
accid ent cases
2. Advisor y-workmen ' s compens ation claims

One of the new duties thus imposed on the i ndustrial court was that
of factory inspection. This had formerl y been done by the labor commissioner in the Department of Labor and Industry.

long with this was the duty

of se eing that the labor laws were enforced . In doing t his a systematic
and regular ins p ectio n of all places of employment was required. The
labor department had been carryi ng this out for y ear s, now it merely being under th e direction of the new court. Since most of the activiti es
newly-conferred on t he court were mere routine, they will not be gone
into in any detail in this paper.
An example of t he worki ngs of one of t hese other minor divisions
is a pro j ect carried out by the Women ' s division in 1 921 . It made a Cost
of Living Survey, which was later us ed as a b asi s for hea rings held to
aid the industrial cour t in investigati ng conditions pr e liminary to
revisi ng mercantile, laundry, factory and public housekeeping orders of
various Kansas cities. 4

As a result of these hearings modifications of

4. Court of Industrial Relations, Thir d Annual Re port, State of
Kansas , Topeka , St ate
i nti ng Plant, 1923, p . 115 .
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orders affecting ...omen workers were made by the industrial court. Cn_anges
were made in minimum wages, hours, ove?'time, and p rohi bition of night
work. The Women I s Division alro made an investigation of the child labor
conditions in Kansas and published a report in 1922 mainly concerning
child-labor in the sugar-beet fields. 5
As we have seen, tbe Kansas Court of Industrial Rel ations was organized primarily to deal with industrial problems and oo n troversies. For
this reason the remainder of the discussion concerning the activities of
the court will be in connection with this function . One t hing will be
noticed in this respect, arrl that is, that each yea:r the number of cases
of the industrial side of the court declined in number,until in 1925 the
court was nearly inoperative a s far as adjudicating i ndustrial contro-

versies was concerned. There seem to have been several reasons for this.
In the first place, t he re was a g radual lessening of industrial t ension
by 1923 throughout the oountry , and especially in Kansas. Then . there was
the fact that Kansas wasn't a g reat industrial state to begin with, as a
result of which there would never b e marry industrial con fli cts to be
settled. In 1923 Mr. Jonathan Davis was elected gove rnor of Kansas. He
was a Democrat and had been elected on a platform of abolishing the
industrial court. 'fhis apparently sh owed that the people in Ka nsas were
losing interest iri their industrial court. In his first message to the
Kansas legislatur e, Governor Davis advocated t h e repeal of the industrial
court law. 6 He said the greatest progress toward t he p eaceful settlement

5. Results of this investi gation published on pages 123-124 of the
Third Annual Report.

6. State of Kansas, House Journal, January 10, 1923, PP• 9- 24.
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of differenc~s between employer and employee had been made in mutual
understanding and by the state's aid in conciliation. To him the law
was a failure because it had failed to en gage the mutua l confidence
and support of ather enployer or employ ee. He, too, saw in the law a
threat of spreading socialism. "Followed to the ultimate conclusion, the
principles involved in the attempt to regulate wages and conditions and
activities through this so-called court, would involve the state in t he
regulation of all business and produce state socialism • • • • 11 7 He
attacked the legality of the court also, saying that the so-called court
could not enforce its decrees save through the civil courts, nor could
it be properly clothed with power to do so . It was not even a court, and
the legislature could not create a court in this manner .
Governor Davis had a n alternative plan in mind to resolve differences between labor and capital. He thought a law should be enacted
creating the office of industrial commissioner, consisting of one commissioner to be appointed by the governor with the consent of the senate. This

commissioner would aid in arbitration and conciliation of labor disputes.
In case of a dispute, he was to ask the governor to appoint a representative
of labor and one of capital to meet with him and form a board to try and
draw up a settlement . It could make investigations, subpoena witnesses,

am.

publish its findings, b.l. t could not force either party to agree to any

settlement it might decide upon . 8

7. Ibid ., P• 17.
8 . Ibid., P• 18.

82
He wasn't able to abolish the industrial court law, however, because the legislature was Republican and they were committed to support
of the court . He was successful in weakening the court though. Heappointed Mr. Henderson Martin, who had opposed him in the gubernatorial
primary on an anti - court pledge, to a vacancy on the court. To another
seat he named Mr. Leo Goodrich, repeatedly and publicly pledged against
the court and all its works. Als:>, the appropriation made for the
industrial court for the next two years was $77,900, barely enough to
9
keep it alive. The staff of experts, engineers and accountants was
also drastically re duced. It looked as if the only reason the Republicans
in the legislature had retained the court was because the Democratic
governor wanted it abolished.
Another reason for tr.e growing weakness of the court was an adverse decision rendered int~ United States Supreme Court on its con-

stitutionality.lo The decis · on outlawed the provision allowing the
court to fix minimum wages in the flou.t'-milling industry. This case
will be taken up and discussed in the next and final chapter.
The 28 cases filed in the industrial side of the court during the
first year was the greatest number for any one year. During 1921
· d ustri· al
there were only 13 cases filed on the 1.n

· d e.
SJ.

ll one of th ese,

the Charles Wolff Packing Company ca se was later carried to the United

9. Charles B. Driscoll, 11 The Kans as Industrial Court -- Gassed, 11
The Nation, CXVI (April 25, 1923), p. 489 .
10. Wolff Packing Co . !· Court of Industrial Relations, 262 U.S.
522, 1923 .
11 . Secord Annual Report , PP• 14-15 °
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States Supreme Court and was responsible for the series of cases resulting in the virtual nullific ation of the more important features
of the Kansas law. There were 10 industrial cases filed during 1922. 12
The number of cases had dropped to 2 by 1923, 13 and in 1924 only one
new case was brought before the court. 1 4
Illustrative Cases Before the Court
Examples will be given of certain of the more i>-riportant c a ses
which appeared before the co u rt f or settlement, plus an original investigation entered into by the industrial court, to show t he methods
used by the court in reaching decisions and adjudicati ng the disputes.
The fir st case appearing in the court for settlement was the Topeka
Edison Case. 15
The complai nt in t h is case was brought by the attorney-general
of Kansas on behalf of the electrical workers, members of Local Union
No . 841, International Brotherhood of Electrical Worke rs, and the
respondent was the Topeka Edison Company, a corporat ion engaged in
generating and selling electricity for lighting and power purposes in
Top eka, Kans as .
A dispute had arisen between the local union and the company in
the matter of hours of labor and wages . The complaint charged that all

12. Third Annual Report, p . 23.
13 . Fourth Annual Reoort , pp . 12 and 14.
14. Fifth Annual Report, p .

7.

15. Miscellaneous Pamphlets, Volume II. The State of Kansas ~ · The
Topeka Edison Company, Docket No. 3254-I- 2, pp. 3-10; The Court of Industrial Relations, Selected Opinions and Orders, Topeka, October 12, 1922,
pp. 10-15.
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efforts to reach an agreement with the company had failed. In their
reply, the company admitted that there was a controversy, but that they
had offered the workers an increase of 2½¢ per hour, which they had
turned down. They were insisting on an increase of 10¢ per hour and a
standard 8-hour day.
The workers, in particular, who were complaining were the linemen, the men who put up and maintained the line s transmitting the
electric power from the co mpaey to the cit y . It was mentioned that
their work was very hazardous, that they were all enployees of long
standing with the company, and were skilled workers in every s ense of
the word. Upon this ,mainly, they were justifying t heir demand for a
wage increase, and the standard 8-hour day. The matter of the 8-hour
day was settled between the tw:> parties with the concurrerce of the
court, and so wasn't any longer pa.rt of the dispute to be settled by
the court.
The wage of the workers (the linemen) had increas ed from a daily
wage of $2.75 in 1916 to 60¢ per hour for a basic 8-hour day in 1919, with
time and one half for overtime arrl double time for ..ork on Sunday. In the
hearing it was brou ght out that prior to the yea r 1919 the workers were
able to · live ard support their families reasonably upon the wag e which
they then received. Some, apparently, were able to save a little money .
The 60¢ per hour wage for the 8-hour day, of course, raised the daily
wage to $4.80, but the men were complaining, that with the tremendous
rise in the cost of livir:g, they were not able to support their families
as well on this as they formerly had on the $2.75 wa ge scale. The ceurt
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remarked that it was evident the cost of living had indeed gone up, and
that the cost of food had inc reased 100% by November, 1919 , over November, 1913, and that clothing and furnishings had risen even more. The
worker's rent, and the price of coal, had also gone up as much as

50%,

the

court reported .
The s e statements of fact naturally brought up the most important
point of the whole case, arri that was what the industrial court considered a fair wage . How did the court arrive at a so-called fair wage? The
court made a differerce between a living wage and a fair wage. A living
wage was defined as a wage which era.bled the worker to supply himself
arrl those absolutely dependent upon him with sufficient food to maintain

life and health ; with a shelter from the inclemencies of the weather;
with sufficient clothing to preserve the body from the cold, and to enable persons to mingle among their fellows in such ways as may be necessary in the preservation of life .

16

As to a "fair wage", which the

court said that all industrial workers were entitled to, several important
circumstances were taken into consideration, namely:

1 . the scale of wages paid f or similar kinds of work in other

industries .
2 . the relation between wages and the cost of living.
3. hazards of th e employm~t .
4. the training and skill required.
5. the degree of responsibility inherent in the job.
6. character and regularity of the employment.
7. skill, industry, and fidelity o f the individual employee. 17

16. Ibid., P• 5.

17.

Ibid., p .

7.
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The court went on to say that a skilled worker should have a higher wage than an unskilled worker. Such skilled workers were entitled to
a wage which would enable them to procure for themselves and their

families all the necessaries and a reasonable share of the comforts of
life. They were entitled to a wage which would enable them, by industry
and economy, not only to supply themselves with opportunities f or
intellectual advancement and reasonable recreation, but also to enable the parents world.ng to gether to furnish to the children ample
opportunities for intellectual and moral advancement, for education,
and for an equal opportunity in the race of life. A fair wage would
also allow the frugal man to provide reasonably for sickness and o:id
age.
However, the industrial statute 5Upowered the court to fix only
a minimum wage. The minimum could be fixed by the court, but the maximum
must depend upon the skill, fidelity an:i industry of the employee, the
fair and equitable disposition of the employer, the prosperity of t he
business, an::l. other economic circumstances.
The court foun:i that the wage pa.id to the workers mentioned was
unreasonably low and was not a fair wage to be paid them and other workers similarly situated and employed by the Topeka Edison Company. The
main reason given for the fact th at the wage was unduly low was the
rise that had occurred in the cost of living during the years following
the World War . A minimum wage of 67½¢ per hour on the basis of an 8-hour
day, time and a half for overtime and double time for Sundays, was
established by the court in this case. The wage order was to be
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continued for a period of six months, unless changed beforehand oy
agreement of the two parties, with the approval of the court.
This case shows the points taken into consideration by the
industrial court in its attempts to a rrive at fair minimum wag es, a
difficult job in any situation by any board or commission. The same
criteria were used in the other cases brought before the court in which
attempts were made to find a new wag e scale. There was no contention
in the 'l'opeka Edison Case concerning the a bility of the company to pay
the increased wag e rate. In the following case this point did come up,
and it is int eresting to note the philosophy developed by the judges
concerning the relationship between the need for a higher wage scale
and the financial inability 9f a company to pay it.

The case to be mentioned now was the Joplin and Pittsburg Railway Company case. 18 The officers and members of local union No. 497 of
the Amalgamated Association of Street and Electric Railway Employ ees
of America brought this action before the i ndustrial court. The company
concerned operated an electric railway in Crawf ord and Cheroke e counti es
in Kansas, and to Joplin, Missouri. The union memb ers represent ed al l t h e
various occupations connected with the railway company.
The union claimed that the wage paid t hem was unfair, was unreasonably low, and was not sufficient to provide r easonably livi ng
conditions for them and their families; and they mentioned that the

18. The Court of Industrial Relations, State of l\.ansas , Selected
Opinions and Orders, Topeka, issued by W. F. Wilkerson, Clerk, Octo ber
12, 1922, pp . 25-30.
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controversy wuld endanger the continuous operation and efficient service of the company •. It was, of course, only under this co ndition that
the industrial court could take jurisdiction. The union claimed that
efforts had been made to work out an agreement respecting wages with
the company, but that the company had refused to come to any agreement. The union claimed that, since the controversy w::iuld affect the
public, would endanger the public health, and the general welfare of
many people in Kansas, the industrial court should take jurisdiction,
make an investigation, and establish a reasonable minimum wage for them.
The railway company claimed that the industrial court had no
jurisdiction, as they were in interstate transportation busine ss and
could only be regulated by the federal government . The court ruled, however, that they did have jurisdiction over th e matter. The company also
denied that the controversy would in any way endanger the public health
or welfare, and claimed that, with its present earnings, it would be
unable to pay a higher rate of wages than they were then paying. 19
Two entire days were taken up in hearing the evidence upon the
issues brought up . The evidence was very voluminous a.nq covered a wide
range of facts . Among other points, the evidence showed that within
recent years a strike of 80 days had occurred, totally paral yzing
business, with a result of more than $68,000 loss to the company. Later,
a thirty- six day strike occurred with a corresponding loss to the company.

19 . Ibid ., p. 26 .
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Also, it was found that some voluntary increases in wages had been made
since August 1, 1914. Then, in May, 1918, a wage controversy was submitted to the Hon . William Howard Taft, and Frank P. Walsh , j oint chairmen of the War Labor Board, and on July 31, 1918, a decision was rendered
by this board fixi ng a certain wage scale for the enployees of the company.
This award was to continue for the duration of the war, except that either
party might reopen the case before t he arbitrators at periods of six
months' intervals, beginning February 1, 1919 , for such adjustments as
changed conditions mi ght render necessary.At the time of thi s case, 1921,
the workers claimed the right to reopen the case before the Court of
Industrial Relations as the War Labor Board had ceased to function. The
court upheld them in this oont enti on.
The problem was made difficult by the fact that both skilled and
unskilled labor was involved, and there was a wide divergence between the
various crafts and classes o f labor as to the responsibility imposed. This
made it difficult to fairly- adjust the difference in the wage rates to the
various classes. The oourt said t hat it was evident that there had recently occurred a rise in the cost of living , and thought that the 42¢ per
hour minimum fixed by the War Labor Board f or both skilled and unskilled
workmen was unfair. The court mentioned again the criteria used to determine a fair wage. These were mentioned in connection with the Topeka
Edison Case.
During the case the question arose as to whether or not the railway company was financially able to pay a higher wage rate to its employees.

The company hadn't been .financially prosperous for years arrl didn't pay a
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reasonable return on the physical value of its property. Th ere had ~e en,
however, imreases in f reight and passenger rates gr anted by the industrial court. The growing competition of b us lines and trucking service
was mentioned as having had effects on electric railways the country over.
Then the court brought out a bit of philosophy which was adhered
to by it throughout all its existence. It said:
This court is very desirous to do nothing in this case which
will unduly burden the resporxient ( railway company) . However,
it must be admitted that wages to labor shouild be considered
before dividends to the investor, and that a business which is
unable to pay a fair rate 8f wages to its employees will eventually have to liquidate. 2
This was justification for the power conferred upon the industrial court
to fix a minimum wage and have it obeyed by the corporations. Then, too,
the court in this case brought out the point that t he poople of southeastern Kansas ir.ould vitally need the services of t he electric railway for
years to come, which merely meant that, even with the financial straits
enveloping the company, it must remain in operation. This wasn't outright ordered because the company didn't a sk to cease ope rations, but if
the company had, it is quite probable that the court would have denied
the permission. In that case t he state ...ould have been in position to
assume operation of the company if necessary to maintain its continuous
and efficient service to' the people in that sector of Kansas.
The industrial court found that the wage then being paid by the
company was unreasonably low and was not a fai r scale to be paid to the
employees. The court then set another scale which was to be paid by the

20. Ibid., p. 28.
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company. This new scale raised the minimwn wage to be paid the employees
as much as 10¢ per . hour for rome types of work. It was a g eneral raise
for all classes of employment. This new wage rate, however, was only to
apply to such employees who were bona fide residents of Kansas, and likewise was to run for a period of six months, unless changed by the parties
during that time.
But not every case before the court result ed in th! g ranting of a
wage increase. It mi ght be well now to glance at a case in which a request for a wage increase was denied, and at the reasons why it was
denied. This was a second case involving the Joplin arrl Pittsburg Railway Company.

21

It ini:.olved train despatchers on the line. They brought

suit in the court to get a wage increase shortly after many ot her employees
of the company had been g ranted an increase, referring to the case just
mentioned.
In this case the industrial court took t h e f ollowing attitude. The
wage then being paid train despatchers by the r ailway company wa s $160
per month. The court found from the evid ence that the work was done by
telephone, and was ,-.ork of the sort that it required by a short space of
time for an apt student to learn. The work was not heavy and was not comparable with train despatching on the steam railroads, either in the
matter of skill required, or of the responsibility imposed. From this
evidence, the court ruled that the wage rate was not unfair. It believed
that the $160 per month that was being paid for such work was a fair wage.

21.. Court of Industrial Relations, First Annual Report, State of
Kansas , Topeka, State Printing Plant, 1921~44-
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The request for an increase was there fore denied by the court.
Here is another case , one in which a decision was made by the

industrial court on things other than wages. It is the Fort Scott
Sorghum-Syrup Company Case. 22 This company manufactured syrup from
sorghum cane, and furnished for the most part only seasonal employment.
The grinding of the cane and the first preparation required something
more than 100 men from 50 to 90 days in the fall of the year, running
the plant 24 hours per day. During this time from 5 to 7 steam boilers
and engirl's were in use . After that the process of mixing and ref ining
the syrup and preparing it for table use and for shipment, called for
but a few men and only one steam boiler.
On July 15, 1920 , the company made an agreement with the International Brotherhood of Firemen and Oilers in the nature of a closed
shop contract , There was no controversy except as to the rrumber of men
employed after the heavy fall campaign, the period of the year when the
plant operated at full capacity, was over. During previous years two
engineers and t

W::>

firemen had be en required to run the necessary b oiler

and engine, but in the autumn of 1920 the company found its elf doing
only about 4 or 5 percent of its average business. The company, therefore , sought t o reduce expenses by discharging the two firemen, two
engineers working alternate shifts and firing their own boilers. The
two engineers were willing to fire their own boilers in view of the
small amount of work required, saying that to fire the engine would

22 . Selected Orders and Opinions, PP •

35-38.
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not require to exceed two hours of time per day. The Engineer's union
refused to permit this , as it would violate the "one man, one job 11
poli cy of their union.
The company felt that some concession should be made, otherwise
they would be required to pay $12 per day for men to perform two hours'
work. Admitting that the sum was relatively small, the company said that
nevertheless it would simply increase the deficit the company had been
operating under . A general representative of the union, who was present
at the trial, thou:e;ht that the cone ession ought to be arranged, and expressed his belief that local officers had made a mistake in insisting
on the "one man, one job" idea . The court wished to waive decision until
the unions could make their own arrangements, but both parties stated
that they had agreed to abide by the order of the court and insisted
upon an immediate and authoritative decision.
In its decision the court recognized the closed shop in the
particular case because it had been instituted by mutual agreement,
but it did think it was unfair to require the enployment of two men to
do the w:>rk of one . In this connection the court ordered t hat the
contract should be so modified as to permit one man to work at two or
more jobs not requiring excessive periods of tir11e, in which case his
union membership might be transferred without cost to any party so long
as the necessity for this work should continue.
The last representative case to be mentioned also concerns the
Joplin and Pittsburg ~ailway Company. In this case the same employees
who had been granted a raise in wages by the inoustrial court in 1920,
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the first Joplin and Pittsburg Railway Case reviewed in thi s paper ,
went into the court for another incre ase . 23 Also included in their request was the adjustment of a collective a _'reernent relative to train
crews, hours of labor, and days per week.
rhe i ndustrial court dccl · n

the wage increase on the ground

that there was a g eneral tendency toward a decrease in living c osts , and
while it had not yet materially affected the ultimate consumer, there had
at least been no advance. The ot her point decided by the court in this
case was similar in some res pects with the Fort Scott So r ghum case, t.tlat
is, the company complained too many me n were being demanded by t e union
for performing c ertain functions , merely increasing the operating costs
of the company.
The me n wished the co ntra ct to require three men on their trains
that handled t hree or more cars at the same ti ne . The court I s view of
this was , that considering the nature of t he w:,rk done upon the freight
trains usually handled by the company, the third man would add an unjust burden to the costs of operation wit h out public benefit, a result
which ...uuld ultimately be reflected in lower wages to the men or poorer
service to the public.
In this case the court again brou ~ht out the principle that wages
to labor should come before all else in the business operations of the
concerns affected by the Industrial Court Law. That is, the company
should see that fair wages were being paid to t he -workers, then di vidends

23 . Selected Opinions and Urders, PP· 30-34~ U. S. ureau of Labor
Statistics, Monthly La bor Review, XII ( April, 1921;, P• 123 .
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a nd pro f its wo uld fall into second p l ace . Another poi nt in this c ase_
related to t he establishment of an 8- hour day . A method of working an
18- hour shift on an 8-hour basis was work ed out by t he chief ac countant
of the court, but it was comput ed tha t thi s -would add $25 , 000 to t he a nnual
operating cost, an amount t h e company c ould not pay without subtra cting
from its deprecia tio n f und or f ai ling t o pay int er est due. The court
maintained its view that wa ge s mus t come be for e divid ends , and t hat a
business which couldn't pey-

f air wage , and at the s ame time earn a

reaso nable return, must event ually go out of busines s . However, as t he
problem was eventually worked out, t h i s 8- hour sys tem was not instituted .
Instead , it was deci ded t hat , t aking i nt o consi der at ion t he nature of
th e wor k performe d , a 9-hour d ey- v.0ul d not unduly deprive t he wo r ker of
a reasonable t i me f or r es t , r e c re at i on , self- improvement , social di v ersion, and the family circle .
These r a ndom c ases will t end to illus t r ate t he working s of the
court in its decis i ons regar ding indust ri al disputes . A standard had
been s et up t o mea sure a fai r wage , c ertain i deals r egar ding the opera tion of b usi n ess es affect ed by th e i ndus trial law were enuncia t ed, a nd
t he long rocky road to i ndus tri a l peace was being warily trod by the new
court. Another important act ivity of the court th at s hou ld be mentione d
at t h is t ime is t h at of maki ng original i nve stigations i nto certain
industries. Out of t hese i nves tigations th e court gathered much valuable
i nformation relati ng to suc h t hings a s t he co ntinuous operation of
certain industries, could they b e o per at ed mor e regular ly t h an they

were, or were t here coge nt reasons f or par tial el apsi ng of ope r ations ?

We have mentioned the surveys carried out by certain minor divisions of
the industrial court and their importance . Investigations were made i nto
the coal industry at various times in order to furnish the court with
needed information in correctly adjudicating disputes occurring therein. 24

One such investigation, which will suffice in pointing out th is part of
the court I s activities, was the original investigation carried out by
the court concerning the continuity of production in t he flour- milling
industry at Topeka and other points in the state of Kansas . 2 5
The occasion of this investigation was the i nformation, which
came to the court in an informal way, that the flouring mills located
in Topeka, Kansas, were reduci ng production .

preliminary i nvestigation

was held and testimony was taken from the seven milling companies and
from many others located throughout the state . The one outstanding
fact which emerged from this investigation was that t he mills had not
stopped operation in any general sense, but that owing to condi t ions,
the mills of Kansas generally were running at about 60i capacity . The
court was to decide whether or not there was any nint t h at the millers
were in any way hirrlering production merely to bring the price of flour

up. In summing up the results of the investigation, Judge Wi l liam L.
Huggins, the presiding judg e of the industrial court, went back over
certain parts of the industrial law to make the situation clear. He
mentioned section 6 which said that it was necessary for the public

24. First Annual Report,
25 . Select ed Opinions arrl Orders, p. 39; First nna al Report

pp . 68-71.
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good that the in:iustri es encompassed by the a ct be operated with reasonabl~ continuity and efficiency. The law then provided, however, t hat because pf seasonal changes, market co nditions, or other factors influencing a certain industry, an application could be made t o the court to fix
certain rules and regulations whi ch should govern the operation of t he
industry so as to give t he best possible and eff icient service t o th e
people. Then, if the suspension or limitation of pro duction in any
industry would threaten the publi c welf ar e, the court was authorized to
tak e control and operate it throughout the emer gency period. It wa s to
be real emergency, like t he 1919 coal strike , though, bef ore this final
step w:>uld be t ak en.
After the i nvestigation t he court decided t hat the flour mills
had not been guilty of deliberately slacking production in order to affect the market pri6fe. I t found tha t the world conditions made the
situation so that t hey coul d onl y operate at about

60%

capacity . There

was a surplus of Canadian wheat, bei ng marketed in the United States
free; an innnense wheat crop was being harvested in Australia,

and in

the Ar gentine; then, the European peopl es were so destitute that they
were poor customers f or American wheat . Because of these circumstances,

it was f ound that there was excuse enough fo r the cur tailed ope rat ion of
the f lour mills in Kan sas . "Unquestionably the testimony shows that the
millers of Kansas are conf ront ed with market conditions which are beyond
their control and beyond co ntrol o.f this court . "

26. Ibid., P• 70.
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The court also found from the evidence that the milling indu~try
was om of the essential industries in the sense of the Kans a s statute,
and was therefore subject to such re gulation as was necessary to protect
the public . The court further found that the industry was affected by
market conditions, that such influences were inherent in the nature of
the business, and that reasonable rules , regulations and practices should
be prescribed by the court to be observed in the operation of the industry
for the purpose of keeping whe court informed as to continuity and efficiency of productio n, and of securing the best service to the public consistent
with the rights of employers and employees engaged in its operation as
provided by the Kansas industrial law. In view of this fact, the fo llowing rules and regulations were drawn up to apply to the flour-milling industry throughout t he state.
1. Each company to make reports to the industrial court at such
times as they might be called for . Forms would be prescribed
by the court.
2. In case any company was forced to reduce its production below 75% for period of 15 days or longer, to make application
to the court, listing reasons for reduction.
3. Every company operating a flour mill in the state should
familiarize itself with the demand for flour in the state
at all times, and should cooperate with, and use all possible
means, to assist the industrial court in preserving t he flour
supply and preventing shortages.
4. In so far as it was reasonably possible, head millers, chief
engineers and all other skilled w:>rkmen in mills located in
the state should either be paid on a monthly basis or be given
other employment during the period of reduced or suspended production, so that efficient production could be promptly resumed
when conditions permitted .
5. All employees of Kansas flour mills were to be given reasonable
notice, when possible , before any cessation or limitation of
production takes place, in or~ar that they may provide thems elves with o t:, her employment •

30 . Ibid., P• 71.
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These last rules and regulations promulgated by the industrial court
show the extent to which the state was inserting itself into the conduct of private business in the name of the public welfare. It is no
wonder that intensive opposition grew up in the state opposing this sort
of activity. These sample cases and investigations are illustrative of
the industrial fun ctions carried on by the Kansas court. It can be seen
that all aspects of hl siness and industrial relationships came under
purview of the court.Not only were industries instructed as to how to
actually carry on their business in some respects, but such things as
minimum wage sc ales , hours that workmen could be worked, and the number
of men to be required by the unions in various tasks were taken under
consideration by the court.
The re is another interesting sidelight to the workings of the industrial court, and that is concerned with its success in preventing
strikes in the industries aff,,- cted by the industrial law. That was one of
the main reasons for the pas sage of the a ct, it was to be one of its main
purposes, and was to be an important excuse for its very existence. It
was not successful, however, in preventing industrial strife in Kans as.
side from numerous small and minor stoppages, there were four major
strikes called in violation of the Kansas Industrial Court Law. A brief

review of these strikes, and the stand taken by the industrial court in
their regard will now be taken up as illustrative of this side of the
court I s functions . It will certainly bring out the fact that a large
group of people cannot be kept from taking certain actions merely by
the passage of a penalty law. This is especially true of a g roup repre8'nting, not only a certain occupation or trade, but a distinct class of
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the populatio n. You can't j ail s ev e ral thous ~nd p eopl e f or violating
such a penalty law, at least its neve r been tri ed. Somt hing deeper and
more basic is a pparently needed in all co ntrove rsies if they are to result in peac e , understandi ng ani agr eement. You have to er a s e the
fundamental causes bringing on the dispute s, ins t ead of pr oviding f or
punishm ent for t h ose t aki ng part i n them .
St ri kes and t he Kans a s I ndus t r i al Co urt
The mos t bitter and persistent enemie s of the new Kansas court
were t he coal miners of sout hea st Kans a s, and es peci ally thei r leaders.

The principal le ader in th is f i ght o n the court was 1r. Alexander Howat ,
president of District 14, United Mine Wo rke rs of Ame ric a . He was the
cause of a s eries of cas e s t ak en t o the Kan s as supreme court, and later
to t he United State s Su p r eme Court c one er ning the validity of the new
l aw. When Governor Allen s poke of radic al labor leader s , men who lived
off of i rrl ustrial stri f e a nd miners' dues, he had Alexander Howat
especially in mind. They were at it "hot and heavy 11 during the y ears
the industria l court was in exist ence. Thi s was the man oft en mentioned
during the debate previ ous to the passa~e of the law in January, 1920.
To supporters of th e mea sure he was a t y r a nt who had refused coal to
hospitals and child r en du r ing the 1919 coal s trike . To labor leaders he
was t h e apostle of t ~

awakened worki ng cl a ss ; to o thers a mis guided ,

man, sincere in his ef f orts to improve l he l ot of the coal miner, but
wrong in his methods of seeking this i mprovement . He was casti gated by
his enemies as creating class hatred , and of fomentimg industrial s trife
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the so-called "Saturday-holiday movement." 1 t,e in June , 1920,

nd e:i.rly

in July, and throughout the mo th, there was a seri us sh rt ge of railroad cars in Kansas to move the coal from the co al mines. The in ust i 1
court sent a man to investigate this shortage . '£he co· 1 o erat re· h
complained that the railroads wer e furnishi
ed by the operators . 34 Accordir
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and therefore didn't return to the mines rapidly •. '£ hen , too, there we
long waits on sidings and t he cars moved oo slowly in trans· t.3 5 A ng
with these delays there was also an admitted shortage of railroad car •
This condition resulted in intermittent operation at the mires,
no use mining the coal until th re were cars en
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away. As a result, numerous local unio ns voted to discontinue wo k on
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mines then by the first of the week to i\1rnish falrly steady eruployiue L
until the next week- end .
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The contract of the miners with the operators, however, provided
for fines of f rom $1 to $2 per day for f ailure to work Saturdays . Therefore, when about half the miners of the Pittsburg district quit work on

Saturdays, th e operators deducted ac co rdingly from their pay.3 6 Alexander Howat deelared the levying of fines -- even though authorized by the

contract -- an outrage , and asserted on July 25 t hat the miners would
start a clean-up of the mines the next day, preparatory to a walkout . 37
'fhe actual number o f miners who s truck in protest against th e fines is
not known for sure. Alexander Howat claimed there were 7,000 miners out,
but the operators' association officials set the number at 180o.3 8
Apparently this part of the co ntract had never be en enforced bef ore, so when the opera tors invoked it in this case, t hey let themselves in for the charge that they were conspiring to run the pr ice of
coal up. It was thought by some that they were goading the miners i nto
a stri ke, ...hich w:>uld result in a shortage of co al, and then the pr ice
would go up. The re probably was little truth in the all egation.
Because of the shortage of coal cars up to the we ek of the
strike, the production and shipping of coal f rom the district had not
been seriously affected by the efforts of th e miners to shorten their

working ti me to f ive days a week . However, after t he st rike occurr ed,
Gov.;ernor Allen announc ed that the production of coal was s eriously

36. Domenico Gagliardo, The Kans as Industrial Court, Universit y of
Kans as Publications, Lawrence, 1941, P• 134.
37. Topeka Daily Capital , July 25, 1920.
38., Ibid., July 28, 1920.
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impaired , that

a> out of 127 miners were idle with the chance that more

soon would be, an d that th e point would probably be reached where the
normal production of the district would be reduced about one-third . 39
After the above announcement by the governor, the court began an
investigation i mmediately, arrl tre g ranting of a perma nent injunction
against Howat and othe r union officials was considered. It was even
rumored that drastic st at e action, meaning state operation of the mines,
might result, but only if t he production of co al reached th e point where
the public welfare was aff_e cted. The governor hoped tha t this wouldn ' t
be necessary.

As t he whole matter ended , the industrial court -was not obliged.
to t ake any action whatever . A quarrel develop ed b etween John L. Lewis,
p resi dent of the United "1:i.ne Workers of Ame rica, and Alex Howat, president of the Kansas district. Lewis, aft e r studying t he situati on, decided
that the miners were in clear vi olation of their co ntra ct and t hat t hey
should be ordered back to wor k . Lewis sent a t e legram to Howat denouncing
him for fostering the strike trouble .

40

In t his message Lewis declared

the pr esid ent of the Kans a s miners h ad made no att empt t o s et t l e th e

strike as provided in th e contra ct wi th the o perat ors, and h e warned
Howat t h at he must comply with t he laws of t he union .
A corrtinuation of t he mad cours e y ou a re pur s ui ng i n
Kans as will bring f urther condemnation to your orga ni zation
a nd st amp you a s a man d evoi d of pri nci pl e a nd destitute of
ho nor • • • • The mi r e r s of Kans a s, t hrough the ioc e ss ant
and continuous strikes whic h y ou have di r ectly or dered or

39. Ibid., July 31, 1920.
40. Ibid., Au gust 5, 1 920 .

105
sanctioned, are g radually being reduced to a state of
poverty and woe • • • • The office is in receipt of
appeals from many members of t he organization in Kansas
pleading for the intervention of the int er:pational union
to s a ve them from your ruinous government.41
Lewis was insisting that all local unions abide by the contracts they
had with the operators . He went on to inform Howat the wails which
would no doubt emanate from him upon receipt of the message would not
change the situation at all. "The miners of I ansas shall not be permitted to be sacrificed to the whims and caprices of a demagoge. 1142
This acti on of Lewis I undoubtedly came as a shock and a surprise
to Howat, who had apparently thought Lewis would stand clear and let
him fight it out with Governor Allen an::l the court by himself. At any

rate, it was a critical spot for Howat . Lewis bad ordered Howat to send
the miners back to work, and upon Howat 1 s refusal to do so, had himself
sent telegrams to 33 local unions in Kansas ordering them to return to
work and end the strike . 43

Thi s was too much for Howat , and he sent a

return telegram to Lewis denounci r:g him for taking the action he had. He
denied having c ailed the strike in the first place, and said that if Lewis
had stood as firmly in defense of the mine workers of the country during
the 1919 coal strike as he was now standing in defense of the operators,
a lot of labor quarrels could have been avoided now. He challenged Lewis
"to do his worst . 1144

41. Lo e. cit.

42 .

Loe . cit .

43 . Kansas City Star, August 5, 1920.
44. Topeka Daily Capital, August 6, 1920.
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Little by little the miners went back to work and. all were again
at work by August 24. This was t he first major clash in the struggle between Howat and Lewis which was to result in the final defeat of Howat.

The operators, in the meantime, refunded the fines that they had collect ed.
As it turned out the industrial court took no def inite action of any kind.
Governor Allen pointed out t hat under the law no jurisdiction was conferred
upon the Court of Industrial Relations except in cases where a controversy
of this kind threatened the public. 46

He then said that since it appeared

the whole thing would be settled by the national union there was no
occasion for any further a ction on the pa rt of t he court. Was thi s sidestepping the issue? When does, or will, a controversy threaten the public
welfare? It seems as if the court was left a lot of leeway as to what
action to take, if any, in industrial disputes, and that it would be
easy under certain circumstances to not intrude too far into t he question.
The next important stri ke taking place after t he formation of the
industrial court was t he so-called Howat strike of 1921. It developed
out of a minor affair known as the Mishmash strike. This had occurred
some six months after the strike over the Saturday-holiday movement .
Mishmash had worked in a mine on a boys' pay until reaching the age of
19, at which time he was paid a mans' wage. He later sued for back w_ages
as he claimed he had reached 19 years of a ge before t he date he originally

45. Gagliardo, 2.E· cit. , p. 136.
System,

46. Henry J. Allen, 11 I s the Industrial Court Maki ~ Good?"
XXXIX (January, 1921 ) , P• 100.
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claimed . The di spute dr agged on for sever al years, the union making
no attempt t o collect the back pa;y . The result was that Howat apparently used the trivial affair as an excu~e to call a strike, with the
pr obable intention of testing the industrial court law. The strike
was called on February 3, 1921. 47 The industrial court held a hearing
and ordered the George Mackie Fuel Company, where Mishmash had formerly worked, to pay the boy more than $20o. 48 The court also notified
the miners not to refrain from returning to work because of the strike
order issued Febr uary 4. Needless to say , the operators were much put
out with the award to Mishmash , some even threatening to join Howat in
his fight against the industrial court. After the money was awarded to
Mishmash the miners all went back to work.
On September 30, 1921, Howat went to jail

0n

a six months'

sentence for violating the Kansas Industrial Court Law in calling the
Mishmash strike. This occasioned the

11

Howat strike 11 of 1921. When Howat

went to jail the miners went out of the mines in protest against hi s
imprisonment . There was no actual strike call issued, but a majority
of the workers went out on strike .
By October 4 all Kansas miners were out on strike. As yet the
industrial court had held no conference on the situation, apparently not
being in agreement as to what action should be taken. Here was a clear-

47. Kansas City Star, February 3, 1921.
48 . Ibid., February 18, 1921.
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cut violation of the industrial law and a chance presented to the court
to prove that the measure actually had teeth. Judge Huggins said he personally was in favor of giving Lewis a chance to straighten out the situation before the industrial court took .any action . 49 Immediately, however the judge changed his mind and advocated that the court take vi g-

orous action in handling the situation. He formulated a five- point "program fo r resuming coal production in

ansas.

11

50

Here were the main

points of his program:
I . The irrlustrial court should at once ask the governor . . .
to organize through the adjutant- general, a military police
force of sufficient strength and. of selected men from the
various National Guar d units • · • . • Said military police
force should be used if needed in the mining district to
protect miners who are -willing to work, so long as such
protection may be needed .
II. If production was not resumed by Uctober 12, the court
should ascertain the cause why it hadn 't. If the cause
was defiance of' the industrial act as reported, then the
court was to find out whether, with police protection,
the operators would be ,dlling to rest.Uie operations with
the miners then in the district . If not , and the operators
were -willing to resume, the court should aid in getting
labor from elsewhere to operate the mines .
III. Advocated abolition of the 11 check-off 11 system.
IV. If t h e opera tors were unable or unwilling to proceed at
once in producting coal, then Lhe court should proceed
under Section 20 of th e industrial law to take over and
operate the mines .
V. If the court did take ov e r, the program should be same as
outlined above .
This plan was not adopted because the other two members of the court did
not concur in it. This hesit lion on the part of some can probably be ex-

49 . Topeka Daily Capital , Uctober 4, 1921.
~ . Herbert Feis, "Ka nsas Miners ana the Kansas Court, 11 Survey,
XLVII , (Februarry 25, 1921), p . 825 .
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plained in the foll owing manner. There was a pparently no s erious coal
shortage as yet , t he judges couldn't _agree on jus t WJ.at action should
be taken , and there was always the h ope that Lewis would st ep in again
and settle the matter onc e arrl fo r all.
Meanwhile, on October

7,

Governor Allen announced that the

i ndustrial court had formulated a definite program of a ction in the

event of a prolonged coal stri ke . He said merel y that the details would
be r e vealed from time to time as developments warrant ed. "The publ ic may
b e assured t hat after t l e ef forts of a year and a half to devise a t r ibunal to i n sure industrial peace, i t will not fail to a ct when the
proper time comes. 1151 But when is the proper time? That , of course, was
to be decided also by the court.
The strike deadlock was broken on October 13 when John L. Lewis
suspended the Kans as distri ct of the United Mine Workers, Di strict No •. 14.
Alexander Howat and all other distric t office rs were removed, and provisional officers appointect. 52 All loyal miners were ordered back to work.
This involved abo ut 12,000 dues-paying miners in the district . Legal pro ceeding s were initiated to f orce th e outgoing offi c ers to surrender records, books., and offices . They had refused to do oo . Howat's reaction to
this a ction by Lewis was c onsis tent with his previous attitudes .

11

To hell

with John Lewis and Governor Allen. Our plans are unchanged . We will
continue the f i ght . 1153

51. Kansas City Star, October 7, 1921.
52. Ibid., October 13, 1921 .
53 . Loe. cit.
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The cause of the action in suspending district 14 was based on
the refusal of Howat and his district board to put back at work miners
called out on strike during the Mishmash affair . The International
Convention of the union had voted for Howat to put the men back to
work, and he had refused to do so. In other w::>rds, the laws of the
union were being flagrantly violated by the Kansas district .
When the provisional government in distr ict 14 ordered the
mire rs back to work, they re f used to accede , with the result that the
charters of the local unions were revoked and all miners re fusing to
return to work were automatically expelled from the union. New unions
were organi zed by the international organization, and such miners as
were willing to r eturn to work and 'Who were acceptable as members of

the new organization were received and admitted into the union. By this
process a larg e numb er of miners g r adually returned to work , thus permitting resumption of operations, until within 60 days practically normal
resumption of mining was accomplished and the very radical element in
the miners' unions was eliminated . 54
No sooner had pro duction been re sumed in the mines than disturbances broke out in the coal field , necessitating the calling out of the
National Guard. Bands of women attempted to halt the work being resumed
at the mines and intimidated many of t he men attempting to work . The
industrial court took no formal action whatever during the entire
controversy,held no hearings, took no t estimony , and issued no orders.

54. Second Annual Report, p. 10 .
55 . Gagliardo , 2£• cit . , P• 143.
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In other words , the court took no effective action to break the strike,
but the state did.
On January 4, 1922 , attorney-general Hopkins met the peace
officers and city officials of t 1e two counties, Cherokee arrl Crawford,
affected by the strike, and demanded that every town in the district
pass the following ordinance:
Any person engaged in any unlawful calling whatever, or
who shall be foun loitering witho ut visible means of support,
or who being without visible means of support, shall refuse to
work when work at fair wages is to be procured in the community,
or vtio shall threaten violence or personal injury to fellow
workmen or to employers of labor shall be deemed a vagrant,
and, upon conviction thereof, shall be imprisoned in the city
jail for a period of not less than ten days nor more than 30
days for each offense, and shall be compelled to work at hard
labor until sentence is fully complied with .5 6
As can be plainly seen, this was aimed directly at striking miners present in the mining section, to make them go to work or leave the state.
It was also aimed at preventing any more disturbances in the coal fi elds.
Th~ state was still looking upon all miners who went out on strike as
being radicals, and thought this one good way to run them out of the
state . Attorney-generd Hopkins said that no man could be compelled to
mine coal, and that a man could quit work when he pleased, but could
not quit honest employment and be a loafer depending on charity if there
was work to be had in the community. Hopkins was referri~ here to
strike benefits being given the miners 'qy unions in Kansas and Illinois .
Most of the towns passed these ordinances, apparently arousing no
opposition as being distinctly un-Arnerican except from the miners them-

P • 240.

56 . "Forced Labor in Kansas, 11 New Republic, XXIX (January 25, 1922),
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selves. These ordinances were drafted without reference to the indu~trial court, and the court wasn't responsible for their issuance. It
is reported that Governor Allen consented to them against his better
judgment 57 in the hope that they -would drive the troublemakers out of
the coal fields. Judge Huggins is reported to have been opposed to the
ordinances and emphasized the fact that the court had had nothing to do
with their passage.
On January 12, 1922 Howat issued a lengthy document from his jail
cell ordering his supporters to return to work. 58

He said that the pur-

pose of the strike had been accomplished, in that it had shown that the
Kansas Industrial Court Law had failed in its purpose of doing away with
strikes and industrial turbulence. He accused Lewis, Governor Allen, arrl
the operators of working in opposition to the aims of the Kansas miners'
organization, but asserted that the 4-months strike had been successful
nevertheless. Attorney-gener 1 Hopkins said Howat had called off the
strike to save his face, and that the vagrancy ordinances had thrown
fear into the miners ,making them realize that if they co ntinued to loaf,
i.e. strike, they would be picked up and sent to jaii. 59 It is hard to
judge just what effect these ordinances did have on many of the men
returning to the mines. The attorney-general also made the statement
that many of the returning mine rs w::>uld find their places filled b_y men
supporting Lewis, and that these men certainly wouldn't be discharged

57. Feis, .sill• cit . , note bottom of P• 825 .
58. Topeka Daily Capital, January 13, 1922.

59. Loe . cit .
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to make way for the returning strikers. These returning men would
have to take what jobs were left, and the rest go on the waiting list.
The final chapter in this dispute came on January 1,5 , 1922, when
Circuit Judge Samuel A. Dew refused to grant Alexander Howat, the deposed
Kansas mine leader, an injunction against international officers of the
United Mine Workers, to keep them from continuing the provisional organization .

60

John L. Lewis hailed this as a vindication of the long-estab-

lished policy of the union of observing co nt racts with employers. The
deposition of Alexander Howat was not permanent, however, as he was reinstated in the union and re - elected to the presidency of district 14

in 1929 .

61

Now why didn't the industrial court take more vigorous action,
and why did they mostly stand on the sidelines during this struggle?
The court made an explanation of its attitude. It based its non-activity
mainly on the fact that there wasn I t an emergency requiring the court I s
intervention. According to the court, during the progress of the strike,
there were only two ~eeks of complete shut-down, and succeeding the first
two weeks, mining operations were gradually resumed.

62

In this period

there was no abnormal demand for coal, the available supply from within
and without the state being more than sufficient to meet the demands of

60. Ibid. , January 15, 1922 .
61 . Gagliardo, 2.E· cit., P· 143.
62 . Second Annual Report , P• 10.
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the public. Then, the court said th at they had original. ly agreed to
stand aside and let the rational union settle the question, which it
eventually was instrumental in doing. If they could settle the question
before a serious fuel shortage developed they were to be left free to do
so. The court also took the view that there had been no actual controversy between employer and employee, the only sort of controversy the
court had the power to settle according to the industrial law. ·whatever
the merits of the arguments, it did add further proof of the inability
of the court to actually prevent industrial. disputes from det eriorating
into work stoppages and strikes .
The next important strike occurring after passage of the industrial
court law was the Packing Strike of December, 1921. This strike involved
the Big Five Packers , which included the Cudahy,- lilson, Morris, Swift,and
1

Armour companies. During the World War the employees of these concerns
were working uni er an award as to wages and working conditions made by
Federal Judge Alschuler, acting as federal administrator unaer tne Bureau
of Conciliation of the United States Department of Labor. This agreement
expired September 15, 1921, and the packing concerns thereupon installed
what was termed a plant assembly representation plan, whereby the e:'lllployees
of the various plants elected their representatives as members of the plant
assemply, the employer also desig nating members of such assembly on its
behalf, and these plant assemblies would then negotiate
terms of the contract of employment .

63. Ibid., p . 11.
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ano

determine the

These assemblies negotiated a
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wage contract which was a very substantial reduction over those wages
received under the Alschuler administration. A strike vote in the Big
Five plants was taken by members of the Amalgamated Meat Cutters and
Butcher :forkmen of North America, authorizing the executive board of
that organization to call a strike in case the packers failed to meet
their demands, and on December 1, 1921, a strike call was issued from
Chicago by the butchers union. 64 It was to take affect December 5, and
was to affect all plants of the Bi g Five packers in the United States.
Mr . Dennis Love, secretary of the packers union, said the strike
had been called because the plant assemblies, which had voted for a

6%

wage decrease, did not represent the workmen am expressed opposition
to the action taken by these assemblies. 65 Following the announcement
of the strike, attorney-general Hopkins filed a petition asking the
industrial court to investig ate into the proposed strike. He charged in
his petition that the parties to the dispute were conspiring , contrary
to the industrial court law, to bring about the cessation of an essential
industry. 66 The public interest was affected because 10,000 workers were
affected by the strike order, and the cessation oft he packing industry
would shut off a large part of the me at supply of the state.
Following this, subpoenas were issued for certain officers of the
local unions, as well as superintendents of the packing plants, to appear

64. Loe. cit., Kansas City Star,

65. Topeka

December 1, 1921.

Daiiy Capital, December 2, 1921.

66. Ibid., December 3, 1921.
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before the industrial court in h..ansas City.

he union early showed a

determination to both strike arrl defy the industrial court. £he union
workmen were ordered to take all their tools home. Pickets from the
packing union challenged the authority of the court by walking the
street in front of the city hall in Kansas City, exhorting witnesses
subpoenaed by the court not to acknowledge the summonses. Only one
union official appeared at the heari[\s; all packer's representatives
came.

67 The court also informed the strikers that if they ceased work

on Monday morning, when the strike was to take place, they were no
longer employees of the packing industry and could not regain their
old positions without the consent of their employer, and that the
court's concern aft er December 5 would be wholly with the employer and
those who took the places of those going out on strike, arrl to further
see that the industry operated continuously and efficiently. 68

Attorney-general Hop.Kins , after the union officials had refused
to appear before the industrial court, applied to the district court to
order the 16 union officials to appear and testify. Before going into
the district court, the members of the industrial court issued an
order taking j urisdiction and forbidding either the packers or the
employees to make any move until after a further hearing of tht:: court.

67. Kans as City Star, December 3, 1921,
68. Second Annual Report, p. 12.

69. Kansas City Star, December 4, 1921.
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That order amounted to a temporary injunction in its ef fect and scope .
The same day the industrial court applied for aid from the district
court, the international headquarters o.f. the union informed the local
officials to ignore any pleas to halt the strike action scheduled for
the fifth , unless word was received from headquarters. They blamed the
industrial court for not preventing the wage reduction voted by the
plant assemblies in November, 1921.
The district court subpoenas were obeyed by all but one of the
16 union officials to whom they were issued. Five of t hem were sworn in
to give testimony .

70

The same day the three industrial court judges warn-

ed the mayor of rans as City that unless the crowds of strike sympathizers
about the packing plants were dispersed by noon of the f ollowing dey, they
would recommend to the governor that the militi a be called out . The court,
in effect, was prohibiting all picketing, even peaceful, which was one
of the powers given to the ~ourt by the industrial law. Picketing in
this instance even referred to the strikers loitering on the streets in
the vicinity of t-he packing plants, whether or not they were doing anything in the way of active picketing .
The union remained defiant through all of this activity . Mr. :E. . W.
Jimmerson, St . Louis, who was in Kansas City directing the packing strike,
defied the industrial court in a speech before 2500 striking packing

70 . Ibid., December 5, 1921.

118

house workers. "If the industrial court w:> uld call on me to end thi-s
strike before you win your fi ght, I would go to j ail before I'd obey
their order. 1171

He

constantly referred to the i ndustrial court as "Allen's

pet dog", and endeavored to outline the conditions on which the striking
emptoyees would go back to work . The crux of his terms was the re-establishment of the federal arbitrati on court with a presiding j udge as fairminded as was Judge Alschuler, who se term expired with the agreement in
September.
Immediately after the strike began, on December 5, 1921, it was
apparent t hat it would never gather much force . By the 6t h. and 7th .
it was already losing strength . The packers estimated on December 6
that meat deliveries were 75% of no rmal . Men were be i ng hired and some
strikers were returning to work . The laoor leaders kept up their assertions t hat from 85 to 98 per cent of the employees affected by the wage
cut were still out on strike. On the 7th . the Big Five announced that
they were meeting the normal demand in Kansas City. 72 Employees who
answered the strike cal l were going back to work in large numbers,
plant officials reported. The ps.ckers held that workers were neturning to work because they no longer feared possible action from the
crowds of t he idle. The se crowds hs.d been prevented from congregating
nea r the entrances to the packing plants . So it se ems as if the nonpicketing order and the policy of t he plants to remain in operation
despite the strike had thrown the ti de against the strike element •

71. Ibid., Dec ember 6, 1921.
72. Ibid ., December 7, 1921.
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The industrial court spent most of its times keeping an eye on
the situation, and members made tours of the plants, assuring themselves that the work was going as per usual. Judge J. H. Crawford reported that it app eared as if the plants were operating all departments
with skilled hands arrl that conditions were about normal. 73
There was one g reat difference between the packing strike as it
was carried on in Kansas City and li1ichita, and the methods used in
Chicago, the seat of the packing industry. There, blood was shed and
there were numerous clashes between police arrl strike sympathizers.
There was none of that in the

ansas section, probably due largely to

the asserti on of the industrial court tnat it would enforce the antipicketing order with the state mill tia if it came to that . Also the local
police cooperated with the court in preventing congregations of strike
sympathizers near the plants where outbreaks could very easily have
occurred. Even t he strike leaders in 1\ansas City urged the strikers not
to use f orce and to scrupulously obey the anti-picketing order.

74

No

doubt they feared martial law and the effect it would have upon their
strike, and what they were trying to accomplish. A few radical and

passionate leaders now and then counselled the disregarding of the
order, 75 but for the most part cooler heads prevailed .
Normal production in the packing plants had so far been resumed
by December 21 that attorney-general Hopkins announced t hat the indus-

73. ropeka Daily Capital, December 8, 1921.
74. Ibid., December 7, 1921,
75. Ibid., December 9, 1921.
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trial court was practically out of the affair . 76 Be said that ~here then
e:xisted neither a controversy between employees and employers, nor a
cessation of production, the two causes for action on that part of the
court . There was no controversy between e~ployees and enployer because
most of the old workers had been replaced by new ones, who naturally
were not part of the dispute; therefore, there was no quarrel bet.ween
the workers an a the plants . Then , too, aince normal production had been
nearly achieved again , at least enough to supply t he demand at that time
of year , there was no threat to the public from a meat shortage . The
stri ke had j u st about ended in a fiasco for the striking workers .
On January 18, 1922, the Federal Governnent made an offer to
mediate the packer ' s strike . Officials of tne Big Five , however, declared
that they saw no need of federal mediation . 77 Plant conditions were normal,
and as far as they were concerned, there was nothing to meoiate -- the
I

I

str i ke was over.

As ti~ e went on more strikers returned to work, and

where they didn ' t , new workers were put on in their stead. Finally, it
became clear even to the remaining men out on strike thi:i t the whole
affai r was a complete failure, and that the only thing to do was to
retur n to v,0rk . On February 1 , 1922, by unanimous vote, 600 packing
hous e st rikers ended the strike against the packers in n.ansas City . 78
Union h eadquarters in Chica go had recommended that the strikers vote to
end the st rike because to continue it would only work hardship on the

76.

Ibi d ., Dec ember 21, 1921 .

77.

Kansas City Star , January 1 8 , 1922.

78 . Ibid., February 1 , 1922 .
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families of the strikers .
Immediately hundreds of the men showed up for their old jobs
and found them filled . The packing houses said they had all the men
they needed, and did not i ntend to discharge men hired when the old
employees were out on strike . The number of idle men was put at 2000.
They received small strike benefits for awhile, but most of them got
behind on such things as rent and groceries. They hadn't won their
strike, and had only created a ci vie problem.
Now there was criticism from sev eral points about the part
played by the industrial court in the packer's strike.

79 1'1ost of them

agreed that the court had acted tardily. Some thought that the court
should have stepped in when the plant assemblies voted for the 6% wage
reduction to be sure it was fairly entered into,and represented the
desires of all parties . Apparently the court was un:l er the impression
that the w::>rkers had vol ntarily accepted the wage reduction. There was
criticism also that all the court did was to enforce the anti-picketing
provision of the industrial law, p reserve order, and prevent bloodshed.
Certainly they had no quarrel with this aspect of the court's actions,
but they thought that along with it should have been included a vigorous attempt to step in and fix wages and hours in the packing plants in
order to prevent the threatened strike .
Judge Huggins, in replying to these critics, defended the court's

79 . Herbert Feis , "The Kansas Court of Industrial Relations, Its
Spokesmen, Its Record, 11 Quarterly Journal of Economics, XXXVII (August,
1923) , PP •· 705- 733 -
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d .
.
a c t ions
ur ing t l1e strike . 80 He said that all the information reach-

ing the court befo r e the strike took place was to the effect tnat the
worker s had accepted the 6% wage decrease declared by the plant
assemblies. Then he mentioned that only a small percent age of the packing house workers had desired to strike, proven by the way in which
they flocked back to the plants following the abolition of picketing
by the industrial court . Since this resulted in nearly normal production
there was no great emergency, no threat to the public welfare through a
meat shortage, an:i therefore, no especial cause for interference on the
part of the court. By keeping order arourrl t he plants so they could be
operated, said Judge Huggins, the court had fulfilled its main duty of
ensurir:g continuous production. He was very pleased wi th the work
done by the court up to 1,he end of the packing strike and emphasized
t he fact that it had not failed in any res pect .

81

As to the probabl,~ action of the court if there had developed
a serious situation, that is i f the plants hadn 't have been able to
maintain production, it is mere s peculation. Probably the court would
have taken over the operation of the plants if workers could not have
been found to run them. The whole thing hinged on the ef fectiveness of
the court in enforcirg the anti- picketing provision arm in maintaining
order, because it was no doubt largely due to this that men flocked
back into the plants to resume operations. But the strike had been a

80. Letter by

w.

L. Huggins to The Survey, 1'1arch 18, 1922, P· 968.

81. w. 1 . Huggins, 11 A Reply to Samuel Gompers, n The Rotarian,
I (October, 1922 ) , PP • 176-177 .
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failure from the start and the court had merely assumed that an emergency
requiring active intervention had not occurred.
The last strike to be mentioned in connection with the industrial
court was the strike of the Railway Shopmen, which occurred in 1922. The
strike, called July 1, 1922, was national in scope and included the lines
maintaining shops in Kansas. Prior to the calling of the strike, the
shop crafts and the employing railroads had submitted their controversy
with reference to wages and working conditions to the Federal Labor
Board, and had received a decision from that board with which the shop
crafts were dissatisfied, and the strike was called as a result.

82

The industrial court also played a minor part in this strike. As
in the packing strike it spent most of its time in seeing that order was
maintained and that there was no intimidation by either party. The court
explained its stand in the following manner:
All the principal r ru.lroads of Kansas are interstate carriers
and do very largely an interstate business, so tnat the men employed in the shops were to that extent also engaged in interstate
business • .-Jhile the men engaged in the mops within the state of
Kansas might in the first instance have submitted their controversy to the Kansas Irnustrial Court, yet the Federal Labor
Board also having jurisdiction of the dispute, and both parties
having submitted their controversy to that tribunal, the Kansas
Industrial Court was deprived of any jurisdiction so far as the
merits of the dispute were concerned; so that upon the calling
of the nation- wide strike, under Section 4 of the industrial
act, it became the duty of this tribunal to see that all of the
provisions of the industrial act were enforced, including the
provisions against picket~~, intimidation, and conspiracy to
inter17Upt transportation .

82 . Third Annual Report, P •

83. Loe . cit .

9.
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Still, there was a strike in Kansas , and such a thing was outlawed by
the industrial law. 'l'his is merely another example of the fact tha t
something mor e fundamental is needed in industrial controversies than
the mere outlawing of certain a ctions and practices. He re was a strike,
and striking was in stict violation of the industrial court law. The
only conclusion, co ming on top of the other strikes w-iich have been
mentioned, is that the court was utterly unable to actually prevent
strikes. True , many controversies were submitted to the court, they
were adjudged, and t he decision was adhered to by the parties , which
otherwise might have resulted in strikes. In that sense it did prevent many stri kes. But, in major cas es, such. as the national packing
and railroad shop strikes, the court could do nothing .
The industrial court still might have assumed jurisdiction in
the matter, regardless of the interstate character of 1,he employment,
and the jurisdiction of th

Feaeral labor board. Something similar to

this had happened before and the court had assumed jurisdiction. In
March , 1920, members of the International brotherhood of Stationary
Firemen arrl Oilers , as existing in Kans as, came befo r e tm court claiming insuf ficient pay. The nine roads named as responderts were engaged
in both i nterstate and intrastate commerce. The court asswned jurisdiction, found the wages were insufficient, and made an order applying

84

only to actual Kansas residents of the union •.

The carriers had been unwilling to submit ti:le matter to the state

84. United States Bureau of Labor Statistics , Monthly Labor
Review, II (August, 1920), P • 142.
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industrial court , and denied the right of that court to assume jurisdiction, as they were engaged in int rstate commerce, and that under
the Transportation Act of 1920, they wer, paying wages l'ixed by the
.uirector--General of the United States rtailroad Administration, ana that
the industrial court had no jurisdiction on account of' t l~ provisions
of t re transportation act of 1920 for settlement of ctisputes by the railroad labor board .
The industrial court based its ri 6 ht to take jurisdiction on a
decision of the United St3.tes Supr ..i"1e Court, 85 setting forth the competence of a state to govern its internal commerce and adopt measures of

a reasonable character in the interests of its people , although interstate commerce mi ght incidentaD.y or indirectly be involved. It was
decided that any ·action that the court mit;ht take would be presumed to
be fair and reasonable, and if so, no injury could come to interstd.te
commerce, and no unnecessary burden be irnposed upon it. Neither could
it be presumed that the Federal Labor Board w:mld rende:c an award
which "IDuld be unfair to the public, nor that the court of industrial
relations would refuse to approve a reasonable order made by the
labor board if such was accepted by the disputants .
In other words , the court was saying that it was possible f' or
the state ani federal laws to exist side by side without conflict, leaving each free to act in its field, and providing a ready means of adjustment if anything in the nature should arise.

85 . Simpson~- Shepard, 230 U. S . 298.
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The court , as has been hinted, spent most of lt s t.l,ne prev .nty w· y wL th trans-

i ng pic keting and s eeing that no one interfered in

portation on the railroads . In t-his the court w· s very efl'ectiv .
of this a ctivity the maximum amount of frei ht was kept rolling

ecuu

n the

railroads during the duration of the strike . In Dece111b r, 1922, th.
industrial court sent out questionnaires to the railroads op

1· 1LLng

n

Kansas for the purpose of obtaining t.heir statemeuts as to shop employment during the strike period, the amount of frel ~ht traffic

Cc

well as the amount of extraordinary expenses incident to the

al d, · s

trike in-

curred by th em from July 1 , 1922 to January 1, 1923 . 'l'h se l'eturn
showed how effective the court was in maintaining
facilities in

86

uequate trar sµu:r·tation

ansas during the strike period . £he report of the court,

based on these questionnaires , showed that , so far

s ton miles o

freight hauled were concernea, durin,g the strlke period.

l,h!'.':

total fo1·

all railroads in Kansas was Jractically the some as for U.e swae perJ od
in 1921. Was the industrial court solely responsible

f'OJ.'

t u.s'? J.cubably

not entirely, but certainly the keepln6 of order, t-lie prevention of
int· idation, and the leaving of the railroads frt:e to owerate wl th the
help tney had, contributed much to the continued ef fici ncy of railrva.
transportation in the st· te. 0y the time this stri e occurred wrions
had come to uccept t 1e fact tr1at one ol' Lhe HHiln fw1ctions of the cuurt,
an

sometring it wo 11

not hesita.t

to ao , wa.s to pcevent picketing

ana otner Kina~ of coe.ccion coru!ll.on to labor
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strike began, a union official in Topeka announced t.hat ther

would

be no picketing by the striking shopmen because it was prohibited by

the industrial court law. 87 This was certainly a raclical departure
from the former conduct of strikes in Kansas .
This concludes the discussion involviug Lhe industrial court and
strikes called after it was formed, the adj udic ation ol' industriul clisputes brought be fore the court by various parties, its investigations
to find out facts and data concernimg dif i'erent phases of indusLrial
enterprise in the state so that continuous and efficient production in
the essential industries w:,uld ensur e the public ad"quaLe necessHies,
and t h e subordinate duties attached to the court by acts of the lec,islature in 1921. It is hoped that a clear pict.ure has been presented as

to how the court conducted itself in attempting to fulfill th e duties
conferred upon it by the special session of the le5islaLure .

87 . Topeka JJail;r 'a ikl, July 2 , 1922.
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CHAPTER V
THE INDUSTRIAL COURT LA'.v BEFORE THE COURTS
The Kansas Court of Industrial Relations law was an intensely
litigated piece of legislation. Roughly speaking , two sets of cases
appeared in the courts relative to the Kansas act. One group of c a ses
concerned Alexarrler Howat , the afore-mentioned president of the

ansas

miners, and his attempts to get the court declared unconstitutional.
The other set of cases grew out of an industrial court ruling involving
the Charles Wolff Packing Company. It was here that the court sustained
its defeat at the hands of the United States Supreme Court . This final
chapter will take up these cases, and will bring out t h e reasons for
the attitudes the various courts took concerning the constitutionality
of the law. The iniustrial court will be followed through the courts
to its demise in 1925.
Shortly after the industrial court law became effective, February
22, 1920, reports came from the coal fields in Crawford an d Cherokee
counties that Alexander Howat, president of the United Mine vlorkers,
district 14, was openly defying the law and threateni ng to call a
1
strike for the purpose of testing certain provisions. There is no doubt
but what Howat was openly defying the court and its principles. In his
fourth report to the biennial convention of district 14, United Mine
Workers of America, Howat declared the court inimical to organized
labor, was an insult to every union man, am was a disgrace to the

1. Court o f Industrial h.elations, First Annual Heport, State of
Kansas, 1920, p. 163.
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state of Kansas .

2

He also foresaw t he destruction of organized lab0r,

not only in Kansas, but in the United Sta tes if such laws were allowed
to exist on our st a tute books. The irrlustrial court received its infonnation concernil'"\g t he calling of a strike from an unidentified miner.
This miner informed the court that Howat and his officials had been
doing field work among the miners and miners 1 locals, endeavoring to
arrange for certain delegates to be sent to their convention in Kansas
City, "and they are expecting to select delegates to be sent from each
local instructed to vote a general strike in Kansas during the session
of the corwention. 113
The information was apparently reliable, because the convention
did vote backing to Howat at such ti ne he should deem it a dvisable to
call a strike . Then, in an address before the Illinois miners' convention late in the same month, Howat castigated the inoustrial court law,
announced his determination + o fight the law "whether or not my bones
rot in a prison cell", am said that, "Be the consequences what they
may, there is no power on earth, injunction or otherwise, that will
make me call off this strike. This strike will be called by me in the
very near future. 114 The Illinois I miners pledged their unqualified
support to Howat and his 12,000 Kansas miners in whatever a ction they
might decide upon.

2. Topeka Daily Capital, March 9, 1920.

3. Loe . cit .
4 . Ibid . , March 21, 1920.
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As a result of all this the industrial court had a temporary
order issued by Judge A. J. Curran in district court, restraining
Howat and 47 other district officials of the U. M. w. from interfering
with coal production in Crawford and Cherokee counties.

5 The order was

issued after Howat publicly declared his intention to call a general
coal strike early in April •. Governor Allen justified the restraining
order on the grounds that Howat was simply going to call the strike to
defy the industrial court, and also on the g rounds, that by issuing
the order, the court was preventing economic waste, loss of wages to
labor, violation of the law, and suffering to the people of Kansas.
The first oonflict between Howat and the court, however, broke
out over something other than the calling of a strike. It took place
during the period when Howat was being restrained by the industrial
court from calling a general coal strike . The i ndustrial court began
an i nvesti gation in the Kansa

coal mining industry upon the complaint

of certain miners of district 14. About 2000 miners were out on strike
at the time . It wasn't an organized strike, called by unions officials,
but a walkout in protest a gainst the award which had been made by Pres ident Wilson ' s coal wage commission. Howat wanted it understood that
"The men are out on their own initiative. 116 He said there was much discontent throughout the coal field over the commission's award.
The industrial court immediately began its investigation into the

5. Kansas City Star, farch 30, 1920 .
6. Topeka Daily Capital, April 6, 1920.
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situation. The investigation

Wi:l. S

directed toward working conditions

in the mines with reference to hours 01 labor, provisions l'or safety
and sanitary conditions; miners' incomes with r elation to living costs;
plans of mining as to continuity of production; con:iil:.ions of the mines
with reference to future supply, and the cost of production as compared
with previous years; school and church privileg es and gener 1 social
surroun'.iings; a ni co mplaints of mine workers, or owners, or the public .
In carrying o

7

tlic investigation between 45 and 50 witn sses, including

operators and miners were subpoenaed to appear as witnesses b !'ore the
industrial court. Along with these men,

25

union officials were ordered by

attorney- general Hopki ns to appear before the court and state why the
miners went out on strike and on whose orders. According to the miners
the strike was l br one day only and that the men would report for work
.
8
the next morru.ng.

Among the union of ficicU. s ordered to appear before the ind us trial
court were Howat, Au gust Dorchy, vice-president of district 14, and
Thomas Harvey, secretary-treasurer of the local. After these men had
been served with an order f rom Judge Curran of the district court to
appear before the court and ;ive their testimony, they were in anoLner
room of the building where t he industrial court was s~ttlng . l'hey told
the sheriff, who went to them because of an in uiry by tne presiding
judge, that they were having a little meeting of their own and would be
through in about 10 minutes . They didn't appear after that, and apparently

7 . State

1 · ~ , 107 Kan. 423, P· 425.

8 . Topeka Daily Capital, April 6, 1920.
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showed no disposition to obey the process.
of his diatribes against the court

9 Howat then issued another

and Governor

llen, saying that

the miners didn't recognize the industrial court. 10
As a result of this action, Howat was taken into court on a
contempt charge. When first brought before Judge Curran he again threw
down the gauntlet of d:cfiance to the industrial court, t hen backed up,
pleaded guilty, changed his mini again, and finally concluded to stand
11
trial.
Howat was c ornmitted to jail, but when he bad asked for a continuance in order to make his defense, he was released on

500 bond to

reappear before the district court. Howat either had to completely
give in and appear before the industrial court as a witness, or refuse
and go to jail for contempt of the district court.
In the meantime there was growing evidence of dissatisfaction
among the miners in the district toward Howat and his actions

12

and

many were going back to work. By April 8 all mines were working except
one which was not because of certain mechanical difficulties.

This

dissatis fa ction directed toward Howat was something often claimed by
the industrial court and the state officials prosecuting Howat, but in
the clutches this dissatisfaction seened to melt away, leaving nothiq?;
but fairly firm support. The miners were probably going back to work
because they were getting hungry, not to show that they were opposing

9.

107 Kan . 423, P• 429°

10. Topeka Daily Capital, April
11. Kansas City Star, April
12. Ibid., April 8, 1920.

7,

7,

1920.

1920.
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their le ader. It will be remembered that tne miners had already
announced that they would be returning to the mines in a short while,
as the

11

strike" was only a temporary affair directed in protest a gainst

the award of President Wilson's cocl commission.
When Howat 's case came to trial, he anuthe officers mentioned
with him,were sentenced to jail until such time as they would consent
to appear before the industrial court as witnesses and answer questions . 1 3
In response, Howat's counsel filed in the district court an answer consisting of 23 paragraphs. The first 21 alleged that the act undertaking
to create the court of industrial relations was void because it was in
conflict wi. th various provisions oft he state and federal constitutions,
and that, therefore, it had no legal existence, 6nd the district court was
without jurisdiction to enforce attendance upon it. rhe 22nd. paragraph
denied the violation of any lawful order of the district court, and the
23rd. was a

6 eneral

denial 14

While in jail, Howat resumeo his attacks upon the court and
Governor Allen . Now he included Judge Curran in his remarks . !"or some
reason or other the sheriff gave t1owat the run of the jail and allowed
him to make a speech from the front porch to an assembly of miner
sympathizers. Here he referred to Governor Allen as

11

that skunk, that

tyrant, that would-be destroyer of organized labor, that oporessor of
human rights."

15 After his sentence to jail, Howat was once more

lJ . Ibid., April 9, 1920,
14. 107 Kan . 423, P• 425,
15, Tooeka Daily Capital,

J pril

13, 1920.
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assured that he wasn I t losing his control of t

re 1\.ansas miner~, as

manJ people were wont to believe.
\1any miners quit

w::i

rk tnrou~hout the Pittsburg area in protest

to the imprisonment of lowat . r'.Iiners I meetings were held around the
district protesti ng the jailing of their president . It was at this ti. e
that evidence was once ,1ore presented 11easuring Lhe part that anti-alien
sentiment throughout the country was playing in influencing many everyda.r events .

fe have mentioned that it, in part , lay behind the agitation

1

for an industrial law in

ansas in 1920. Tne state began to fear that

radical labor elements made up of aliens , not familiar with our system
of government, wou l d try and take over the fight against Howat I s imprisonment . It was even reported that hundreds of socialists were ~orking in
railroad shops and were planning to stage a demonstration in f'avor of
Howat.

16

As a result of this ill- founded fear, Howat and the oLher

officials imprisoned with 1-ii.n, were removed from the jail at Girard and
were taken elsewhere. Immediately, however, the union officials were

released from jail on ;i,2, 000 bond pendir:g c1.ppeal of their conviction to
the supreme court of

ansas .

Immediately before Howat got into trouble with tne industrial
court, arri tne district court, for re1·using to tes ify in the investigation oft~ coa -mining industry, it will be recalled that a restraining order had been issued forbidding ~owat to c· 1 a strike in tne
coal fields . row, after tne miners had _p'1e out because

01

the ir prison-

ment of Howat , Judge Curran issued an order to Ho at and the otrer union

16. Kansas i.J.:U ~tar, . pril 14, 1920.
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officials to order the miners back to work, or show cause for refusing
to do so April 27.

17

The motion for this wider and supplementary order

charged trat the strikers had quit work simultaneously and that the
movement was directed against the industrial court law, and for the
purpose of violating that law by causing a curtailment in coal production. Howat issued a statement saying that the miners themselves would
decide whether or not they would return to work.

18

However, the committee

which had been in charge of the demonstration in sympathy for Howat began urging the men back to mrk.
The hearing on the restraining order was heard before Judge Curran
on

pril -27, and on April 30 he issued a t~porary injunction, which had

been sought by tte state, to prevent the calling of a strike in the Kansas
coal mines. He did not make the injunction mandatory, as to making Howat
call the miners back to work, as evidence of the state mine inspector,
and officials of the opera.tors association, showed that the miners by this

time were back at work. 19 He said, however, that if further proceedings
showed that the miners were not working, a mandatory order would be
issued by the court.
Alexander Howat appealed his contempt conviction, for refusing to
appear before the ind us trial court and testi:t:y, to the 1•ansas supreme
court . 2

° Counsel for Howat attacked the validity of the industrial court

17. Ibid . , April 17, 19.20.
18. Topeka Daily Capital, April 20, 1920.
19 . Kansas City Star, April 30, 1920.
20 . State~- Howat, 107 Kan 423, 1920.
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law before the supreme court. That court said, however, that the only
question involved in the proceedings was whether ~he defendants could
be required to attend as witnesses before t:.he Court of Industrial Relations. It said that it involved no more than the right of' a witness to
refuse obedience to a subpoena. Most of the objections of a constitutional
nature raised in the supreme court.by counsel for Howat were directed to
the provisions of the act creating the court of industrial relations. The
supreme court ruled that the validity or invalidity of these objections
had no possible bearing on the disposition of the case at hand.
The Kansas court did, however, advance a few arguments justifying
the creation of the indus trial court, since the defenaants had attacked
its validity. Saying tra t the court was partly an aoministrative body,
the supreme court was of the opinion that the legislature surely had the
power to pass laws designed to protect the health and safety of miners ,
an:l. could authorize an a ninistrative body to make rules in that connection
having the force of law. The supreme court echoes the attitude of the
principal framers of the industrial law in saying that the police power
of the state could be us ed to protect the public welfare, and t:.hat the
industrial court was merely the instrument of this power .
As Howat and the other officials had refused t.o testify at a hearing held by the i ndustrial court in conjunction with its i11vestigation
into the coal mining industry, the supreme court ruled that their conviction could not be challenged on the grouna.s that the industrial court
d.idn!t have the right to institute such a n investi 6 ation. No reasons
were suggested to the judges why the legislature could not authorize the
court of industrial relations to conduct an inquiry into conditions
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existing in Lhe mining field, and in f urtherance of the inquiry requ;ire
the atL,endance of witnesses .
The supreme cour t a lso upheld the ri 6ht of the inaustrial court to
appeal to a uistrict court for an orcter requiring attendance at its hearings or obedience to its orders, on the ::,rounds that since the industrial
court was mostly an awninistrative body , it had no power to enforce its
own pro cess. The conviction of

1

owat

01

the contempt charge, then, was

upheld by the Kansas supreme court. It was then appealed to the United
States Supreme Court . As it was appealed to this court

i n conjunction

with another case arising out of the 1ollowing circumstances, the aisposition of them in that court will be taken up. aiter these circumstances
have been looked into.
In Chapter DJ a discussion was undertaken of the various strikes
which took place in

ansas after the passage of ~he industrial court law.

One of those mentioned was t1e so-c alled howat strike of 1921, growing
out of a minor strike called the Mishmash strike . This had been a dispute
over back wages allegedly due Mishmash by a coal Illlru.ng company. It
fi gures in the story again here because, in calling that strike, Howat
violated the industrial court law and Judge Curran ' s injunction. It was,
in f act , the first officially-called strike of the coal miners in Kansas
after t he passage of the i naustrial court law. Two hum.red miners were
affected by Howat's order, employees of the George K. Mackie Fuel Company,
where Mishmash had formerly been employed.

Governor Allen announced, a s soon as the strike had been called,
that the only question to be determined by the industrial court was
whether or not the closed mines (there were two involved, both belonging
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to the above- named company) should be oper ated under a state receivership as authorized by the industrial law. The prosecution of Howat und~r
the criminal provisions of the law were in the hands of the attorney21
general an::l. the criminal courts.
Before taking any direct action, however, attorney-general Hopkins wired the Crawford county attorney to

make an investigation of the reported strike. The report apparently
convinced Hopkins that Howat had actually called the strike because
Howat and four other members of the district board were arrested f or it.
Bond was fixed at $500 an::l. the defen::l.ants were all released on their
own recognizance.
There was, i n fact, no po~nt in Howat denying having called the

strike, because before he was brought before the district court, a
miners' union off ici al at Scammon, where the strike had been called,
had showed the original strike order to Judge Curran. When brought be22
fore Judge Curran, Howat readily admitted calling the strike.
He said
he called the strike solely to get injustice for , lishm.ash, a poor boy
being exploited by a

11

greedy corporation. 11

A postponement for the hearing of a week was granted by Judge
Curran . In urging a continuance, the defense counsel suggested to the
court that only two mines were made idle by the strike order, and stressed the fact that the supply of coal to the public was not menaced as a
result . This seemed to indicate that the defense attorneys would offer
as a defense that the union officials actions had violated the letter of

21. Kansas City Star, February 5, 1921.
22 . Topeka Daily Capital, February 8, 1921.
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the state industrial court act, but not the spirit. 23 Judge Curran reminded counsel, however, that Howat was not being tried for violating
the industrial court law, but was accused of ·v iolating an order of the
di.strict court. He went on to say that the constitutionality of the
industrial court law would not figure at all in the case.
The defense attorney made two attempts to halt the hearing when it
was taken up again~ They filed two demurrers, one claiming that the evid-

ence submitted failed to properly show t h at t he defendants had called a
strike, and denying that any of the district board menbers had had anything to do with the calling of the strike. Judge Curran merely pointed
to the admission of Howat at the preliminary he.a.ring that he had called
the Mishmash strike.
When asked by an attorney for t~ irrl ustrial court if the district
board had considered tl-R t the calling of the strike was in violation of
the injunction, and that it might end in a jail sentence for the members,
Howat replied:
We considered only one thing, arrl that was we were out for
justice for this boy and his widowed mother, at whatever cost.
We did not believe that the injunction g ranted ty Judge Curran
meant that these miners had to be chained to their jobs whether
they were paid or not. 've believed that the injunction was a imed only to preven~ a ge~ ral tieup of all the .Jri.nes, such as
took place last winter.

4

This explanation didn't impress anyone very much thoue;h . In the first place,
the union had never pressed the company for the alleged back-pay before the

' 23 . Ibid. , February 9, 1921.
24. Ibid., February lb, 1921.
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creation of the industrial court. Therefore it seemed tra.t the real purpose back of the strike call was defiance

01

tne new law. 11ishrnash, on

the other hand, had not worked at the mine for months, and was not pressing the payment very heartily . Howat got more to the point, tnen, when he
atlded that it had never been the union's policy to go to a court for wa 0
settlements. He said they had always gotten the worst of it,

d.Ild.

so hadn't

gone into the industrial court to recover payment for Hishmash . rtlso, he
declared, . Lhe union considered the inaustrial court unconstitutional..
Judge Curran found 1fowat , and five other union officials, guilty of
contempt for violating the district court's injunction, and sentenced t,hem
to one year in jail and also to pay all court costs. 25 1fotion for a new
trial was overruled by Judge Curran, and bond was set at ~2, 000 when defense counsel gave notice of appeal. The, case was ap~Jealed to the h.ansas
supreme court. 26
In the Iansas supreme court, the defendants attacked the validity
of the injunction itself, and the constitutionalit y of the industrial court
law.

As far as the first point was concerned, the supreme court ruled that

the state had a perfect right to use the power of an injunction to protect
the public health and welfare. Aore emphasis, howeveer, was placed upon
the attack on the constitutionality of the industrial law made by counsel
for Howat and the other union officials.
The main line of attack oy

owat I s counsel was their attack on

the constitu:tionality of the act creating the court of industrial rela-

25 . Kansas Gity Star, February 16, 1921.
26 . State!· Howat, 109 Kan . 376, 1921.
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tions because it contravened the fourteenth amendment to the constitution of the United States, in that it destroyed liberty of contract
and permitted involuntary servitude on the P3,rt of workingmen. The
court went into a long discussion refuting this argument, and it might
be well to mention the main points in this opinion.
Much of the argument of the court in sustaining the industrial
court law was similar to that used bJ those originally proposing the
establishment of the industrial court. It brought out that the public
is usually the greatest sufferer in industrial disputes, that the Kansas
legislature realized this and the need for industria.l cooperation. But,
if the two parties to inaustrial disputes couldn't, or wouldn't, voluntarily get together and collectively iron out their difficulties 11 why
should they be permitted to start a fight, which quickly brings upon the
public a recrudescence of barbarism? 1127 In other words, the state had a
right to step in and rt_;quire them to settle their differences in a peaceful manner.
The supreme court went on to say that in dealing with the constitutionality of the 1920 legislation it would be necessary to bring out a few
disagreeable facts concerning the industrial history of the United States.
The Pullman Strike of 1894, -with all its violence ana inti nidation, was
mentioned by the court as a good example of rampant labor leadership and
the inherent evil in industrial warfare directly resulting. Tne court

_27. Ibid . , p .

395.
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pointed to the strike history of the United States during the ,1orld ,lar
as another blot on our industrial r ecord .
Between Ap ril 6, 1917, am November 11, 1918, tre period of
our participation int
worla war , there were more than 6,000
strikes in the United States , so·'le of whicL h1µ{;riled winning
the war. 11:hen the whole worJ_d was shaken by the earthy_uake of
the world war , and the flower of this country went forward as
willingly as a bridegroom goes to his bride , to hurl themselves
into the raging pit of hell in Western E~ ope , l,heir fate tr.ere
depended on patching up strikes at home .

8

Therefore, the court was implying, ;..he right to strike was not at all unlimited and should be curb ed to some degree . This was one of their bases
for upholding the legality of tne Kansas court. The supreme court went
on to outline the general coal strike of 1919 ana all the suffering it
had brought to the people, inc-'-uding in its discussion tre opinion that
Alexander Howat I s district was ruled in medieval fashion .
The c ourt also based its justification for the establishment of
the industrial court to a great extent upon the world conditions in 1920.
I t s aid the following , which seems to be its principal justification of
the indus rial court.
At the beginning of ~he year 1920 it had not been demonstrat ed that the world would escane bankruptcy as a result of the
war . The problems of' economic ana industrial reconstruction were
not merely local and national, but were international in character . Early hopes of a speedy and easy transition from war to
peace conditions were not realized . Instead of that, the situation, always grave, was complicated ana aggravated by continued
rise in prices, by profiteering, by social unrest fanned by radicalism, and by other ugly influences . The bitterness of the struggle
between those who ought to be partners in industry became acute,
the only remedy for the high cost of living -- joining forces in
gr eater production - was rejected 1rd economic readjustment pro2
mised little but economic turmoi l.

28 . Ibid._, p . 398.
29. Ibid., p . 402 .
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It vas unier these conditions, then, that Governor 1-1.llen called the
spe cial session of the legislature to consider what might be done to
pr otect the prople from dislocations in Kansas certain to ensue from
these conditions , special emphasis, of course, being put on the continued production of those things re f erred Lo a s the necess aries of life.
The supreme court, taki ng the view a,sain that the court was in
reality more of an ad.1!1.inistrative board , said it was an impartial body
with adequate facilities to promulgate just and r easonable re gulations
to govern the relationships between ca pital and labor, and that with a
group of thi s kirrl to appeal to industrial disputants had no moral right
to resort to striking or lockouts. The court even took the view that government could take action to prevent striking because it always affected
the public welfare .
In conclusion the supreme court brought out the fact that heretofore industrial relationships had been r egarded as existing between only
two members - - indus rial managers, and industrial wo r kers . Now, however,
there was a third member, the public , which was to see to it that business

did not come to a standstill because of a controversy between the first two.
Defending the act and its princi ples, the court said that
The privilege of irrlustrial managers to organize is not disputed . The privilege of industrial workers to or 6 anize is expressly recognized. Coll ctive bargaining between che two organizations
is not only encouraged, out is i n effect placed on the plane of
duty . The ri ghts of soci ety as a whole , however, are dominant over
industry; and the state is under obli gation to intervene to compel
settlement of differences w~enever failure of manager an~ labore
to agree endangers the public safety or causes general distress .

30

30 . Ibid. , P • 417 .
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On the basis ol' these arguments the Kansas Slpreme cow-t affirmed ths
judgment of the district court in convicting Howat for violating the
injunction by calling the 1iishmash strike.
fhis case, along with the case 31 upholding ~he decision of the district court adjudging Howat guilty of contempt in refusing to testify before the in:::l.ustrial court, was appealed to the United Stat~ Supreme Court .
This court decided both cases at the same time. 32
In presenting these Cdses before the Supreme Court, Howat's counsel took the same line of attack as they had in the supreme court of
Kansas -- attacking the constitutionality of the Kct11sas Industrial Court
Act. They held that the district court was without jurisdiction to
issue the injunction and that, therefore, they couldn't be punished for
violating it.

They hela that the industrial court law was unconstitution-

al because it violated the liberty of contract; tl::at it was in general
violation of the 14th. Amendme11t; that it abridged tre privileges and
immunities of citizens, that the void. sections were so int errningled with
the other sections to cause the whole act to fall; and that the industrial
court held legislative, judicial, and administrative functions.
In presenting the case for the state of t\.ansas, cou sel first of
all held that the cases presented no federal question. rhen they held
that the district court had authority, even without statute, to issue
the order, that the injunction was authorized by the l.•ansas statute
creating the industrial court, which was constitutional; that it was

31. State!· ~ , 107 Kan 423, 1920.
32 . Howat ! · Kansas, 281 U.

s.

181, 1921.
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competent for a state to declare that strikes should be unlawful generally; that there was no constitutional right to strike; that the injunction could be supported by the power of the state to regulate industries
affected with public use; that the strike called by Howat a bridged the
constitutional rights of the fuel company; ana, finally , that if any
provisions of the statute other than those making a strike unlawful
should be invalid, it would not affect the validity of the strike provisi. on.
Chief Justice Taft delivered the opinion of the Court . Right at
the beginning he said that ''We are of opinion that in neither case is the
Kansas Industrial Relations Act present ed in such a way as to permit us
to pass upon tnose features W'lich are attacked . • • as violative of the
Constitution of the United States . 1133 After going into a discussion of
the act, i ts purposes, powers am it..s operation, Chief Justice Taft said
that the Supreme Court obviou ly could not pass upon the constitutional
validity of an act presenting such critical and important issues unless
the case before it required it to do so . He reco gnized that the industrial
court was misnamed court, and that it should have been called a board, because it was really an a aministrative body. He upheld, however, the right
of such a body to compel the attendance of witnesses to give testimony .
The Supreme Court then held that the supreme court of l\.ansas had
disposed of the c ases without any considerdtion oft he application of the
Federal Constitution to the feature s of the

33 . Ibid. , p . 556.

ansas statute of which com-
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plaint was made . ~ven if those features of the law which had been attacked were void , the Court said tnat the stat,e court had. sustained in cont empt convictions on general law, and that , therefore, the Supreme Court
could not consider the Federal question .
The Supreme Court, in ef fect, was saying that the injunction suit
in the district court was not the enforc ement of the Industrial Relati ons
Act , but was a proceeding wholly independent of that, and didn't depend
upon the ronstitutionality of that act for its jurisdiction in g ranting
the order . The violation was of an or der of the district, court, not of
the industrial law, ro co nstitutional questions didn't enter into it. Even
if the industrial law was unconstitutional, it aidn ' t gi ve Howat the right
to disregard an order of a le g ally-constituted s-r,ate court requiring attendance to it . Nothing can justify the disregarding of a court order, unless
the court itself has no l egal basis or standi ng . "As the matter was disposed of in the state court on principles of gene ral law, ana not Federal
law, we have no choice but to dismi ss the writs of error. 1134
On July 1, 1921, Alexander .Howat and Au,::ust Dorchy, president and
vice-president respectively of district 14, United Mine Workers of ,-unerica,

were charg ed with the violation of the cr.iminal provisions of the Kansas
industria 1 court law by calling the stri ke in February at the mine of the
George K. Mackie Fuel Company, the so-c alled Mishmash strike .

35

Their

prior conviction, it will be recalled, was on the violation of the district

34. Ibid. , p. 559
35, . Topeka Daily Capital, July 1, 1921.
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court I s injunction against the calling of a stri ke . In the trial the
presiding judge made it clear that the industrial court law was not
being tried . He instructed the jury that the question to decide was
whether Howat and Dorchy used their power to call the strike, thus
hindering t he production of coal.
The two were four:rl guilty of a misdemeanor for violating the
cri ninal sections of the Kansas law. No testimony was offered in behalf
of Howat and Dorchy in the short trial . The defense counsel had rested
without calling a single witness .

36

This was Howat 1 s first conviction

by a jury. It was understood when tr:e verdict was b rought in that three
jurors voted for conviction on the felony charg e on tre first ballot. The
felony charge , however, was soon disposed of'. At one st age of the jury's
deliberations , the reports stated, seven were for acquittal . Members of

.

the jury, discussing their v.0rk, said th at it was the g eneral opinion of
the jurors that the Mishmash strike had not been called to curtail product.ion.

37

Howat am Dorchy were sentenced to serve six months in jail and pay
a fine of $ 500 by Judge Frank Boss of the Cherokee County district court.
The judge also ordered Howat and Dor chy to give a bond of U2,000 each not
to again violate the Kansas Industrial Court .\ct. Notice of appeal was
g.i ven immediately and the two were turned loese pending this apoeal. A
moti.on f or a new trial was overruled. ' s part of the motion requesting a
new tri al , counsel for the convicted union officials introduced an

36 . Kansas City Star, J uly 1, 1921 .
37 . Loe . cit.
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affidavit drawn up by the jury which had found them guilty. rhe jurors
said in this affidavit that they returned a verdict of guilty only because they had taken an oath that 11 l'hey would be governed by the law as
set forth in the judge's instructions. 1138
As far as the trial itself was concernea, howat aidn 1 t think he had

been tP-Ven a fair one because there had been no miners on Lhe Jury . A jury
of miners, it seems would have been his concepT..ion of a fair jury to judge
his case. Howat also continued his vituperation against the court and
Governor Allen after his conviction for violati!l!; the criminal

ection of

the statute. He made a speech to a mass meeting of miners at Colwnbus ,
Kansas, at which time he charged that the industrial court law was drawn
to benefit large corporations , and even went so far as to de clare that
three members of the

ansas supr~e court were identified in the drawing

up of the law. He flayed Governor Allen as "the man who tried to ride into
the 1.ihite House on the back of organized labor. 11 39 It was at this time that
there was some talk of booming Allen for the presidency , ,villiam Allen
White being one of the leaders of the movement . After his conviction Howat
also made the statement that he would drop the strike as a weapon a1:5ainst
the court and co n centrate on organizing union labor, farmers and anticourt factions with the idea of getting control of ~he Republican party
by putting anti-court candidates in the field for the Republican nomination
for state of fie es.

38. Kansas City Star, July 8, 1921.

39. Topeka Daily Capital, July 9, 1921.
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Howat applied to J. C. Pollock, United States District Judge for
Kansas,

for

a writ of habeous corpus, raising the question of the consti-

tutionality of the Kansas act. Before the case was decided Howat dismissed the application and went to jail September 30, 1921.

40

There he de-

clared he was willing to remain in jail until the industrial court was
taken off the statute books.

41

ppeal was taken to the supreme court of

Kansas, and on February 6, 1922, Howat was released from jail pending
the final decision o f the case. Before being released from jail pending
this appeal, Howat a.11d Dorchy had to post a $2000 peace l:o d not to call
any more strikes. In rupport of his previous statement that he was willing

to stay in jail until the industrial court was taken of f

he st atute books,

Howat announced that t~ o nly reason he was leaving jail now was so he
could attend the international convention of the United Mine ivorkers in
Indianapoli e , after which he would return to finish his term.
In the

42

ansas supreme c o ~rt, then, counsel for Howat and Dorchy

brought suit to have their conviction set aside, contending that their
arrest, trial, an::i conviction and sentence were in violation of the
rights guaranteed them under the laws and constitution of the United
States . 43 On the authority of its decision in State y_. Howat,109 Kan .
376, the supreme court affirmed the di strict court's co nviction of Howat
and Dorchy for violating the criminal provisions of the Kansas act.

40. Gagliardo,

41.

Copeka

.Q.Q •

cit., P• 179

Capital,

September J), 1921.

42 . Ibid., February 7, 1922.
43 . State y_. Dorchy, 112 ·an. 235.

Appeal was then taken to the United States Supreme Court . 44
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Before this appeal was taken to the Supreme Court, however,
something happened which altered the situation completely. After the
Kansas supreme court had upheld the conviction of Dorchy and Howat, an:i
before appeal was made to the bupreme Court of the United States, that
Court hao ruled that compulsory arbitration as applied to packing plant,s
violated the Federal Constitution ( Wolff Packing Company~· Court of
Industrial Relations, 262 U. S. 522) . This case will be brought up later
in connection with the dispute between the ~olff Packing Company and the
industrial court.
In the case now brought before them (Dorchy y_. Kansas, 264 U.S.
286), the Suprene Gourt held, that for the same reasons 6 iven in the
wolff case, compulsory arbitration (or wage-fixing by the industrial
court) was also unconstitutional as applied to the coal mines in Kansas .
However, the Supreme Court said vhat the question to be decided now was
whether or not Section 19 (the penal section under which Howat and Dorchy
were convicted) was invalid , and had fallen as a part of the system of

compulsory arbitrction . If this part of the statute was so closely intermingled with the compulsory ar itration features of the d.Ct that it had to
fall with the others, why naturally Howat and LJorchy couldn't be convicted
under it; for, as the Supreme Court said, "If ::iection 19 falJ.s as the
result of the decision in the Charles Wib.lff

acking Company case, the

effect is th e same as if t he section had been repealed without any

44. Dorchy ~ · h.ansas, 264 U. S . 286 .
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reservation. n

45

The Court did make the ouservation that a statue had

in part was not necessarily void in its entirety .
The court held that most of the provisions of the original act
were very intimately connected with the system of compulsory arbitration,
but whether or not Section 19 was was a question of interpretation and of
legislative intent. It went on to say that the task of detennining the
intention of the state legislature in this case, liKe the usual function
of interpreting a state statute, rested with the state court, and its
decision as to the severability- of the provision would be conclusive
upon the Supreme Court. Therefore, in order that the Kansbs supreme
court could pass on the question of whether or not Section 19 fell with
the system of compulsory arbitration, its judgment -- which had been
rendered before the Wolff Packir\g Company case --was vacated. Judgment
was reversed to allow the Kansas court to decide the point.
Section 28 of the industrial act reads as follows:
If any section or provision of this act shall be found invalid by any court, it shall be conclusively presumed that
this act -....ould have been passed by the legislature without
such invalid section or provision, and the act as a wnole shall
not be declared invalid by reason of the fact that one or more
sections or provisions may be found to be invalid by any court.
The Kansas supreme court said that , because of the pioneer character of the
legislation, the legislature had so framed the act so that any invalid provision could be eliminated without affecting the others. 46 The Kansas court

45 . Ioid., p . 289 .
46. State ~· Howat , 116 Kan. 412, 1924.
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also took exception to the Supreme Court calling the work of the industrial court conpulsory arbitration.
Justice was to be done between employe r and employee, but
protection oft.he p ublic interest was to be paramount, and
the public interest is not a subj ect. of arbitration. besides
that, the constitution and functions of tpe tribunal forbade
its classification as an arbitral rody. 4 '
As for the main question, that of deciding whether or not it was intended that the provision a gainst using official power to c all stri kes in the
industrie s named in the act should stand, even if the provisions relating
to the regulation of wages be held unconstitutional, the "·ansas supreme
court said it should remain . "To free labor-union members from tyrannical
domination by ruthl.ess labor leaders, prevent meddlesome interference
with the relation between employer ana employee, and so secure continuity
in production of coal , Section 19 was inserted in the law.
clusion drawn then , was that Section

"48

The con-

19 was to be regarded as having

the legal effect of an independent statute, making it a punishable off~nse
for an officer of a labor union, acting in his official capacity, to call
a strike of coal miners . The judgment of the district court in imposing
upon Dorc hy and Howat the penalties prescribed by the section in question
was affirmed. Two justices of the 1\.ansas court dissented, thinking that
the act as a whole should fall as a result of the decision of the United
States Supreme Court in the Charles Wolff Packing Company case.

47 . Ibid., p . 415 .
48 . Ibid ., p .

416.

49 . Ibid., P • 419- 420.

49
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As a result of l,his decision of the Kansas Slpreme court affirming
their earlier opinion in the conviction of the two union offi cials, the
case was taken back to the United States Supreme Court on appeai. 50 In
this case counsel for Dorchy and Howat held that compulsory arbitration was
unconstitutional and did not apply to coal mines in Kansas, on the basis
of the wolff Company case . Also they challenged the constitutionality of
Section 19 of the Kansas act, which had been held still valid by tne supreme
court of h.ansas.
Connsel for the st ate held that since the supreme court of Kansas
had held that Section 19 was irrlependent, the.re could be no question there
of the validity of the provisions of the act concerning the fixing of wages
and hours by the industrial court, and that t he plaintiff's in error (Howat
and Dorchy) could only challenge the constitutionality of those parts of
the act affecting them personally, in this case only tre penal s ection.
The state also held that the 1':li shmash strike had been unlawful because it
had attacked the con stitutional as well as the legal right of the fuel
company and its cust-.omers .
The Supreme Court larg ely took the saine view of the matter , arrl
ruled that sine e the l\.ansas Court had · said th e penal s ection could stand
alone , it was bourrl by this decision .

11

The only question open -; • .- t s

.

whether the statute as so construed and ~pp1 ie d is cons

t .t ' .
1 11 51
1 u~iona •

Referenc e here was being made to Section 19 standing alone as an independ-

50 . Dorch,y v. K ~ , 272 U.S. 306, 1926 .

51 . lbid. , p . 308 .
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ent statute, and whether or not it was constit utional standing alone .
The question, in other words, was not whether the legislature had the
power to prohibit strikes, but whether or not it had the power to do so
constitutionally in the ,tishmash case. 1-1.t least, that is as far as the
Supreme Court was willing to commit itself . It side-stepped the question
of the general prohibition of striking by the state, and confined itself
to judging the individual -Iishmash strike .
In discussing this strike the ...,upreme Court said that t.nere was
no trade dispute at the time between the operators and the miners; there
had been no controversy between t.he company a nd the union over wages ,
hours or conditions of labor; nor was the strike ordered as a sympathetic
one in aid of others engaged in any such controversy; the order was made
and the strike was called to co i1pel the company to pay a claim of one
Mishmash for ,$180. There was also no evidence that the claim had been
submitted to arbitration, nor of any contract requiring that it should
be . The claim was disputed and had been pending nearly two years . The

Court said that:
The r..:..g _t to carry on business-- be it called liberty or
property -- has value. To interfere with this ri ght without
just caus e is unlawful. The fact that the injury was inflicted
by a strike is sometimes a justification • .r:mt a strike may be
illegal because of its purpose , however orcterlJ tne manner in wnich
it is conducted . To collect a stale claim due to a fellow member
of the union who was formerly employed in the business is not
pernissible purpose . In the absence o f a valid agreement to the
contrary, each party to a a.isputect claim may insist that it be
determined only by a court. 'o enforce paymert by a strike is
clearly coercion. The legislature may make such action punishable
criminally, as extortion or otherwise.52

52 . Ib i d ., P• 311.
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The Court went on to say also that there was no absolute right to strike,
neither under the common law, nor the i"ourteenth Amendment. So it was determined by the Supreme Court that a strike called to force payment of a
cont estea claim was unconstitutional, leaving the broader subject to the
general prohibition of strikes unsettled. In an annotation to this case
the Supreme Court listed the purposes for which strikes could lawfully
be called. On this basis the decision of the Kansas supreme court is up-

holding the conviction was affirmed.
This brings to a close the series of cases arising in the courts
relative to the Kansas Industrial Court brought by

lexander Howat and

the other union officials of district 14 who sought to rave it declared
unconstitutional. In these cases the law was continually upheld, mainly
because the real controversial points of the new law had not been le gally
brought up for constitutional adjudication. Now it will be necessary to
bring out another series of cases, the result of whic h was to seriously
limit the industrial court as originally established. Th~se cases grew
out of a conflict between the industrial court and tne Charles , olff
Packing Company. These cases rave already been briefly alluded to during
the discussion of the Howat cases.
This case was conspicuous as being one that was carried to the
supreme court of the state, and later to that of the United States, by
an employer on the challenge as to the constitutionality of the act as
it created a wage-fixing body. A contro ~ersy arose o er wa6es and hours
of labor, and a meeting was called to take a strike vote. Instead of
voting to strike, the employees voted to submit the controversy to the
Court of Industrial Relations.

A

complaint was then filed by the workers
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with the industrial court . 53
The butcher I s union, which brought the ca se in the industrial

court, alleged that the contract under which the men had been working had
expired, and that without drawing up a new one the company had cut wages,
would not guarantee at least 40 hours of work per week, and did away with
a bonus provision of the previous contract . In answering the charge the
packing company a~nitted th~ existence of the contract that had explred,
claimed theybad carefully complied with it during its duration, said they
had offered to discuss a new one, but that the union had presented one
already drawn up for signature . 54 The company justified the wage reduction
on the g rounds that they had lost in excess of ~100,000 during 1920, and
could not , therefore , continue the former wage scale .
Neither side to the controversy wished to change the "open s!'lop"
status of the pa.eking plant . rhe industrial court thereupon proceeded to
take testimony as to the presen

cost of living as compared with the pre-

vious year, the evidence being ronf'lictin6 • It was finally decided that
there had been a slight drop in the co t of living sire e the previous year ,
so the court announced a wage sc ale slightly reduced from that one paid
during 1920. Another sorely contested point had to do with the length of
the i,.orking day, the court finally deciding that an 8-hour day should be
basic . However , a 9- hour day could be observed not to exceed 2 days in any
one week without penalty. The court presented its conclusions under ~O heads,

53 . Court of Industrial Relations V. Wolff Packing Company, 111
Kan. 501, 1922 . 54. United States Department of Labor , bureau of Labor Statistics,
Bulletin o . 322 , Washington , Government Printing Office, 1923, pp. 21- 23 .
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including those mentioned dealing with wages and hours. 55
The 1lolff Packing Company rel'us ed to obey the order thus drawn
up by the industrial court, so the state sought a writ of mandamus from
th e supreme court t o compe1the1.r
. o b e d"1.enc e . 56 The Pack1.ng
·
Company attacked the proceedings on several grounds, the minor ones need not be
gone into at this time . The attack on the constitutionality of the law,
however, was important.
In the first place the company contended that the industrial court
could not exercise t~ extraordinary power of regulating wages to be paid
by employers except in cases of emergency, and that no emergency existed
j u stifying the present interference on the part of the court. The court
dismissed this contention by saying that the petition bringing the mandamus proceedin~s sufficiently alleged that an emergency existed which
justified the irrlustrial court taking jurisdiction. It might be int er"sting to note this little sidel ght at this time however. After the industrial court had applied for the compelling order, the supr~ne court had
appointed a commissioner t.o consider the record, to take additional
evid.anc e , and r eport his conclusions to the court. The commissioner
found that the company had lost $100,000 the previous year, and that
there was no sufficient evidence of an emergency or danger to the public
from the controversy to justify action by the industrial court. 57 The

55 . 111 Kan . 501 , pp . 503- 4 °
56 . Court of Industrial rt.elations v . Charles 1.'o lff Packing Company ,
109 Kan. 629,l92L

57.

262 U.

s.

522, p . 525.
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supreme court overruled his report and ruled that the evidence did show
a sufficient emergency .
The packing co npany also contended that the industrial court law
and th~ orders sought to be enforced by it in the mandamus proceedings
violated the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Cons ti tiJ.tion in
that the law and the orders made under it deprived the defendant of its
liberty and property without due process of law, and also denied it the
equal protection of the laws. To support this contention the defendant
argued that enployees could not be governed by the orders of the industrial court; that the wages of the defendant I s employees were not affected with a public interest so as to subject such wages to regulation
by the state; that the law arrl orders made by the industrial court de-

prived the defendant arrl its employees of the freedom of contract concerning wages; and that the classification of the businesses to which the law
applied was arbitrary and un,i11st .
Here the oo nipany was principally attacking the provision in the

law which prohibited strikes, an::i that which required a company to continue its operation unless the court gave them oermission to cease
operation . The supreme court refuted their ar;uments by saying that both
labor could quit work arrl. capital could cease operation, except witn Lhe
intention in mind of violatiDe; the provisions of the act . The industrial
court was to be the judge as to whether or not such was the intention in
any case arising where a worker had quit or a business had ceased operation.
The court justified st ate r ;ulation of

he packing concern by referriflb

to the fact that public utilities had long been re ulated b_y government
1
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because of t.heir public interest, and, therefore, since the legislature
had declared the packing business to be affected with th~ same putlic
interest , it was suoject to the same reb-ulation. The charge by the
co1i pany that the wages of its employees were not affected with a public
interest was arn wered in the same way .
The supreme court baseu its contention that the industrial court
had t.he ri 0 ht to fix minimum wages and hours of labor on the United
States Supreme Court I s decision in filson v. New (243
upheld the

u. ::,. 332),

which

damson law which fixed the 8- hour day and minimum wa6 es for

railroad employees. The commerce clause, that is, toe right of congress
to regulate interstate commerc e was the basis of the decision . To this
the Aansas supreme court said that
If under the commerce clause of the Federal Constitution
cor:gress can regulate wages and hours of labor of those worKing on railroads, the state, under the police power should be
able to regulate the wages and hours 01 labor of those working
in a packing plant operating wholly Vlli. thin he state. The
powers of congress under t 1e corrnnerce clause are no greater
than the authority of the state under the police power . 58
Another analogy was made between the circumstances surrouaiing the two
cases . The court recalled that the Adamson law had been passed to avoid
a threatened tieup of the nations I railroads, also that the Kansas
Industrial Court Law had been passed for the same rea sons; that is, to
prevent sufferir:g and hardship from falling on the people .
One other important point was brought out in this case, and that
was concerning the freedom that doe s exist under the contract clause of

58. 109 Kan. 629, P• 644.
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the Constitution. In this case the court mentioned the fact that many
state l aws had been upheld which prescribed minimum wage s for women and
children, am that any such law naturally restricted the absolute freedom of contract . But , it was held , there is no absolute freedom of
contract , based also on the protection due the public by the state
from absolute freedom of action by any person or corporation . It might
be added here that the United States Supreme Court has also g one on
record since l,he ti:r1e of the imustrial court a.s s aying that abaolute
freedom of contract does not exist .

59

Here the Gourt said that freedom

of contract was a qualified and not an absolute right, and that tnere
was n o f r eedom to do as one willed or to contr~ct as one chose. Contracts
which worked a bainst the interests of the community could not be allowed.
Non- living wages worked against the public g ood and, therefore, were
subject to minimun wage laws .
On these 5 rounds, th

ansas supreme court upheld the state 's

demurrer to the se legal ob je ctions ol' the packi ng co 1pan.y to the mandamus .
Only questions of law had been decioed at this time . The case went again
before the state supr3me court

50 anc) this time questions arising out

of the evidence were disposed of . Here the court upheld the hi 6 er wabe
rate which the indiustrial court had ordered the pacKiil0 company to pay
t o its employees .

t will be recalled that in certain of the sample

cases mentioned in chapter four, t he industrial court made the statement

59 .

fest Coast riot el voiapany -:!_• Panish, 300 u. b . 379 , 1937.

60. Court of Industrial
Company, 111 Kan . 501, 1922 .

elations v . Charles .Jolff

1

acking
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that any company that could not pay a livi~ wage to its enployees and
still make a profit had no busi ne ss operating . In this case the state
supreme court went on record with the same philosophy .
The operators of a packing plant cannot, by law, be compelled to sell the finished product of their plants at a
pri ce that will not allow them a fair r eturn upon the investment , but that does not say that those operating the packing
plant cannot be compelled by law to pay a living wage to t eir
employees , notwithstanding the fact that the plant is being
operated at a loss . n i ndustry of any kirrl that cannot be
operated except at ~he s acrifice of its employees ought to
quit business . 61
In other words , the company, in this case , could not put their loss on
the employees by making them work for a wage, which in the opinion of the
industrial court , was not a living wage. As a result the supreme court
ordered the packing company to pay the schedule of wa 6 es ordered by the
industrial court, and also to establish the hours of labor which it fixed .
It was t o look elsewhere to recoup its losses .
After the rendering o' this unfavorable decision , the \folff
Packing Company appealed their case to the Uni ted States Supr eme Court .

62

This was probably the most i mportant of the cases affecting the industrial court as it was instrumental in seriously curtailing its operation.
In the Supreme Court the packing company attacked the law on practically

the same grounds they had in the K&1sas supreme court. They held that
wages paid by employers to packing house workers were ndimpressed with
a public interest or subject to state re gulation. They also contended

61 . ,Ibid.,
- p . 507 .

62 . Wol ff Packinp; Company~· Court of Industrial Relations, 262 U. ~.

522, 1923 .

lb3
that th

order of the industrial court was void because it i creased

the operating expenses of the packing compwzy- a ainst its will, notwit st nding the income o

the company was insuf icient to pay the

costs of raw material and operating expenses, includi

J

wages to their

employees a 'fected by the order of the industrial court . In reply the
state held that the business of the

olff Packini:; Company was affected

with a public interest , that an emergency existed, ana tne order made
was constitutional an

valid because of the state's ri 6 ht to protect

the welfare of the people . In this respect the state contended tnat the
doctrine of freedom of contract could not make the law unconstitutional .
The opinion of the Court was oelivered by Chief Justice
based his first attack on the law under the Fourteenth

aft. he

endment, and

it concerned the right of capital to cease operation, and the ri 6 ht of
labor to quit work. The Chief Justice mentioned that the act pennitted
an employer to go out of l:usiness only if he could show that he could
only continue on the terms fixed by the industrial court at such heavy
loss that collapse would follow. He also brought out the ri~ht of a laborer to quit , but not to combine with others to induce them to quit.
These privileges were genvrally illusory it seemed to the Chief Justice,
and the act curtailed t e right of the employer, on the one hana, and

of the employee, on the other, to contract about their affairs.
The Gourt 1 s opinion on tne freedom o

contract was that lt wasn't

absolute, was su Ject to various restraints, but that these restraints
could not be unreasona le or arbitrary . Freedom was to be the general
rule , and restraint the exception . fhen came the discussion as to whet er
or not exceptional circumstances, which coula only justify le islati ve

authority in abridging Lhe freedom of contract, existed in the present
controve rsy . The state held that such an emergency had existed, that
since the legi slature had declared the preparation of food affected
with a public interest , the state had the right w regulatE; that business
by fixing wages and terms of employment so as to insure continuous operations which were necessary to s afeguard that interest. The Court then
attacked the i:\t.Jls as laws I extt:nsion of the public interest principle to
such wide fields as preparation of r'ood , production of fuel , and the
manufacture of clothing.
The Court said that businesses to be clothea with a public int erest,
justifying some sort of state regulation, could be divided into three
classes. (1) Those which are carried on under t~ authority of a public
grant of privileges which either expressly or irnpliedly imposes the
affirmative duty of' rendering a public service demanded by any member
of the public . Such were the railroads , other common carriers arrl puulic
utilities . (2) Certain occupations, regarded as exceptioual, the public
interest attaching to which , recognized from earliest times, hQs
survived the period of arbitrary laws by Parliament or colonial lebislatures for regulating all traces and callings. ~uch are those of the
keepers of inns, cabs , and gristmills . (3) Businesses, whi ch, though
not public at their inception, may be fairly said to have risen to be
such, ana have become subject in consequence to some

0

overnment regula-

tions . They have come to hold such a peculiar relation to the public
that this ~s superimposed upon them. In the language of the cases, the
owner , by devoting his business to the public use, in e r fect grants
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the public an interest in that use , and subjects himself to public regulation and to the extent of that interest, although the property continues
to belong to its private owner and to be en~itled to protection accordingly.

63

After listing numerous cases cited under this third head, the

Court said that after examining them it was rnanifeet that the mere declaration by a legi slature that a business was affected with a puulic
interest was not oonclusive as to whether or not it was subject to regulation on any of the grounds mentioned .

11

The circumstances of its

alleged change from the status of a private business and its freedom
from regulati on into one in which the public have co'lle to have an inter-

164 S o it wasn' t the
· 1 inquiry.
·
·
est are a l ways a subject of judicia
'
principle of the public interest that the Court was attacking at all,
because it had long been recognized as valid; but it was the extent to
which the Kansas law had applied this principle which was wrong . To the
Court "public interest" meant much more than that the public welfare
was affected by continuity of operation or by the price at which a
commodity was rold or service rendered .
It has never been supposed, since the adoption oft~
Constitution, that the business of the butcher, or the baker,
the tailor , the wood chopper, the mining operator, or tne
miner was clothed with such a public interest tnat the price
of his product or his wages could be fixed by state regulation. 6 5
To be affected with a public interest, the Court was saying, the business
had to have a peculiar relationship witn the public, and the degree to

63 . Ibid .,

P•

535 .

64. Ibid .,

P•

536 .

65 . I bid ., P• 537.
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which they could be regula Led , depended upon the Y1'..ture of t

1

its elf . Cnly those rusinesses indespensable to the public , and
could char ~,e exorbitant rates or char 6 es to which th

l usiness
hich

puolic would be

powerless to oppose, were really affected with a pub.Lie lnt rest . ln
other words , those that were monopolistic in character, those

tthlL

were

not governed by competition or affe::cted by competi11u interests, were
businesses actually affected with a puulic interest anu suoJect Lo
public regulation .
If , as , in effect, contended by counsel for the st.c:1.,:,c, the
common calli ngs are clothed with a public interest by a m re
legislative declaration, which necessarily authorizes full
and comprehensive r .gulation within le islative discretion,
there must be a revolution in the relation of 5 overn11ent to
general b~1siness . 'rhis will be Egt1ning the public interest
argument 1.nto the 6 round • . . .
This could not at all be reconciled to the freedom of contract 6 uaranteed
by the Fourteenth .Ame1drnent .
It will be recalled ,hat in a 1)r evious case 67 the K· nsas supreme
court had said that the police power of the st~te was just ;...s ~reat as
t1e powers of congress under the commerce clause . It had said the industrial court had the ri~_,ht _.o fix minimum waBes of persons working
within tne state, under tr1is police power, since tne Feder. . . l Governm,nt
nad the right to fix minimum wages for rc.:dlroad workers worKin 0 in
interstate co merce , under the commerce clause. The court was referring
to

ilson v~ ,lew, in which the Supreme Court nad upneld tne

6p. Ibid ., p . 539.
b? . 109 Kan. 629, P• 644.

dainson act .
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To this, the Supreme Court now said that
The minutely detailed government supervision, including
that of their relations to i.,heir enployees, to which the railroads of the cow1try have been gradually subjected by Congress
through its p ower over interstate commerce, furnishes no precedent for regulation of the business of the plaintiff in
error (Wolff Packing ~omp~
whose classification as public
is, at the best , doubtful.

8),

The powers of the Federal Governrrent under the commerce clause were
greater, it seems, c.han the police power of any one of tne states in regulating their internal businesses .
The opinion of the Court was, then, that in so far as it pennitted
the fixing of wa 5es in packiDe, plants in h.ans ... s, the inaustrial law was
in conflict with t~ Fourteenth

endment

and

deprived the co., pany of

J. ts

property and liverty of contract witnout due process of law.
After this decision by the United Stat es Supreme Court, the state
of Kansa s brought mandamus proceedings in the Kansas supreme court once
more, this ti -ie to compel obe,lience of the packing co11pany to those }13.rts
of the order previously made not invalid under t~ Supreme Court I s decision? 9
rhe packing co mpany moved that the judgment of the KcJI1sas court ori ginally
upholding the order be reversed in its entirety, and that the industrial
court be assessed all costs incurred by the packing

ID

mpany in t a king their

c ase through the courts to its final decision.
The Kansas court rejected this, saying t hat only those provisions
of the original order relatifls to the fixi.ne, 01' wages were d eclared

68 . 262 U. S. 522, p . 543 .

69. Court of lndustrial Relations v . Charles ,lolff Packing Compa~y,
114 Kan . 304, 1923-°'
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invalid by the United States Supreme Court decision
'he Supreme Court of the United States ha s not said
that the court of i ndustrial relations act is invalid
except in so far as it attempts to give power to fix
wages . Other matters were embraced within the opi1uon
an:i judgment of this court , but t.hey do not appear to
have been determined by the bupr eme court. Strikes are
discussed, but there is nothing in the judgment of the
Court con c erning them. The judgment concerns only wages . 70
The supreme court then is sued a writ of mandamus commanding the packing
company to put into affect the parts of the order of the industrial
court not affected by t~ Supreme Court . These included the basic 8hour day award, and oL her minor points concerning the period of work
f o r vari ous c l a sses of employees , such as having

0 11e

day off per week

fo r thos e in departments operating 24 hours a day and seven days a

week .
The industrial court then brought another suit into the supreme
c ourt of the State asking for a writ of mandamus compelling the packing
company to adher e to that pa.rt of the original order which, besides
limiting the basic working day to e~ht hours, provided that all time
worked over 48 hours per week should be paid for by time and a half. The
industrial court clai ned that this wasn I t wage fixing, but. was part of
the ori ginal order dealing with hours of w~rk . 71 Tnis part of the order,
the fixing of hours of labor , ha.'d not been touched on by the Supreme
Court . rhe supreme court ordered tat the above- named provision be in-

70 . Ibi d ., p . 306 .

- 71 . Court of Industrial Relations v . Charles ,olff Packing Company,
114 Kci.I1 . 48--:;-:-- -
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eluded in the other writ compelling obeciience to those parts of the
industrial court's order not vacated by the Supreme Court.
As a result 01' these actions, the Charles vfolff Packing Company
then took their final case to the Supreme Court of the United States. 72
They wanted the whole order of the industrial murt declared null anct
void. They held that the purpose of the industrial act was compulsory
arbitration, which was unconstitutional. The state held that the fixin:;
of hours of work and conditions of labor, not having been included in
the first decision of the Supreme Court, did not fall wi tn the provisions
fixing wages . 'rhey also cont ended that, the industrial court had a valid
right to fix hours of labor and working conditions. The Supreme Court's
answer to this was as follows:
• • • the act, as construed and applied in the decisions
of the supreme court of the state, shows very plainly that
its purpose is not to regulate wages or hours of labor, either
generally or in particular classes of business, but to authorize
the state agency to fiY them where, and in so far as, they are
subjects of a controversy, the settlement of which is directed
in the interest of the public. In short, the authority to fix
them is intended to be merely a part of the system of compulsory
arbitration arrl to be exerted in attaining its object, which is
continuity of operation and production.73
Then the Court, bringing out the arguments they had formerly used in outlawing the fixing of wages by the industrial court, and using the same
principle, said that they were as applicable to this case as to the other,
and the same conclusion had to be reached in regard to the ri ght to fix
hours of labor and working conditions. Restated briefly, it said

267

72. Charles :Jolff Packing Company~· Court of Industrial Relations,
552 , 1925 .

u. s.

73 . Ibid., P • 565.
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The system of compulsory arbitration which the act establishes is intended to compel, ana if sustained will compel,
the owner and employees to continue the business on terms
which are not of their making . It will constrain them not
merely to respect the terms i f they continue the business,
but will con strain them to continue the business on those
terms . True , the terms have some qutlifications, but as
shown in the prior decision , the qualifications are rather
illusory and do not sultract much from the outy imposed.
Such a system infringes the liberty of co ntract and :dghts
of property guaranteed by the due process of law clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment . rhe established doctrine is that
this liberty may not be interfered -dth, under the guise
of protecting the public interest , by legislative action
which is arbitrary or without reasonable relation to some
purpose within the competency of the state to effect . 74
The Court th en decided t at the au thority which the industrial act
gave to the i ndustrial court to fix hours of labor was merely a feature
of the system of compulsory aruitration, and had no separate purpose.
As a part of that system, therefore, it shared the invalidity of ~he
whole. The judgment of the h.ansas court was reversed, s ayimg that it
should have refused to give effect to any part of the order drawn up
by the industrial court .
This , then, is the record of the i ndustrial court and the judicial
proceeding s growing out of it. It will be necessary now to look at what
actually had happerled to the court as a result of the adverse decisions
handed down by the highest court in the land , and what the history of
the court was after their deciding.

74. Ibid., p . 569.
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Conclusion
Just what was left of the industrial court after Lhese decisions
of the Supreme Court? First of all the criminal provisions of the statute
were not directly affected by any of the rulings, meaning that the court
could still prohibit union officials from inciting strikes enforceable by
fine ru1d imprisonment . l'he investigative provisions of the court were
also untouched b;:{ the Supreme Court.

ne court still nad the right, then,

to investigate a strike, secure evidence by compulsion if necessarJ, and
make public its findinbs. It couldn't establish minimum wages or hours
of labor now, however, and force tnt: parties to acll1~re to tncm, thus preventi!1c, strikes from taking place .
There were various o inions as t.:> ,IhetL~r or not the industrial
court was irreparably harmed by these decisions , and also various
attitudes expressed concerning the correctness of the Supreme Court's
position. ix-Governor Allen , Jonathan Davis beca;ne governor in 1923,
said he didn't think tne decision75 was a body t low to the court, . :mt
merely a matter that could be adjusted by a legislative amendment .
We always felt th~re was a little dan5 er in that part of
the law wherein we sought to establish minimum wages . . . .
But the body of the act still stands. All that will be necessary now ,jlll be a legisl J.t ive amendment to meet this one
objection. 76
This certainly doesn't sound lixe the Governor Allen

01

1920 advocating

75 . Referring to 262 u. s. 522, 1923,in whi ch Supreme Court said
industrial court could not fix mi nimum wages in meat- packing industry.
76.

Topeka Daily Capital, June 13, 1923 .
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and pushing the establishment of the court. We have seen that the framers
o.f the law were sure toat constitutionally they were on f irm ground. Now

that ground had been spaded from under them.
It has already been seen that Governor Davis advocat ed t ne repeal
of the industrial court after he crune into office and after the r endering
of t.he volff Company decision. 7 7 The general concensus of' opinion was
that the industrial court had been seriously weakened by t~ decisions.
Some thought the court could still perform much useful service in
deciding industrial cases which were brought to it by parties voluntarily
seeking help in deciding the question.

78

If parties in such cases would

agree beforehand to abide by th e decision the point would undoubtedly
carry much weight . But it has been proven time and again that that is
something hard to bring about . Since the industrial court was no longer
able to enforce its own decisions, or rave them enforced, voluntary
agreement would be the onl1 r way in which it could still have been useful
in deciding industrial cases.

Here was another viewpoint on the decisions:
The decision (in the Wolff case) should be welcomed by
labor and capital alike as a victory for true lib eralism.
Such a s saults on individualism under the gui se of puolic
welfare are becoming more and more frequent in state le 5i~lation and against then all liberals should be on guard. 7
In its roundup of editorial opinion on major issues, the Literary Digest
often summarized fairly well the general country-wide thought and opinion.

77 . Loe . cit .
78 . "The Industrial Court of K.ansas 11 , The Outlook, C1JuCIV (June 27,
1923), P • 252 °
79 . 11 The Supreme Court Admonishes Kansa.s, 11 The Independent, CX
(June 23 , 1923 ) , P • 392 .
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It reported that most editors felt the court had had its teeth effectively drawn, some thought the court was killed entirely, but most seem80
ed to a 5 ree with the decisions of the Court .
Labor leaders, of course,
rejoiced at the discomfiture of the industrial court after the decisions .
Conservative editors were pleased with the failure of one more attempt
to regulate private business . Another blow at socialismJ
Hell, just what had happened to this compulsory arbitration whi ch
we have ;ne ntioned so much throughout the paper? What had the Supreme

Court actually done to limit t,hat principle as it was applied by the
Kansas court. Re.member, the Kans as experiment was the first serious
attempt at real compulsory arbitration, or adjudication if you like,
in the United States . First, compulsory arbitration in such industries
as the production of food , clothing, and i'uel had been declared unconstitutional . They weren't essential enough to the puolic welfare to
be subjected to the regulation imposed upon then bJ the hansas law.

The Supreme Court did imply, and it has never since been seriously
questioned , that compulsory arbitration in public utilities and in
the railroad industry could be upheld. These .industries were monopolistic in character, and the only protection the public bad from
their arbitrary operation was from governmental re 6ul~tion of some
sort . Une writer did think the Supreme Court might uphold compulsory
arbitration in the coal in:iustry if a nation-wide strike were called81
which would threaten the health and welfare of all the people .

80 . "The Kansas Court Losing Its l'eeth, 11 Literary Digest , LlUCVII
June 30, 1923), PP • 13-14.
81. Edward Berman, 11 The Supreme Court and Compulsory Arbitration ,"
.American Economic Heview, AVIJI O arch, 1928), PP • . 19-44•
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..J"illiam L.

ug~ins, the chief architect of' ~he ori 6 inal indus-

trial law summarlzed the effect the Supreme Gourt decisions hao on the
court in this way. He mentioned, as ~lready stdted, that theJ aid not
a.1.'fect the administration of the industrial act as it applied to common
carriers and public utilities •
.Neither ·.~ere t11e penal provisions of the Act affectea by
ejther of the ( olff) decisions. The penal provisions wni ch
remained in full force were those which the legislature intended should prevent unreasonable i 11terference with any of
the industries included wi"thin the terms of the act , whether
by violence, by intinidation, threats against, or abuse of
other workers, or cornpiring with others persons to induce
workers to quit their employment for the purpose of hindering, delaying, L1t erfering with, or suspending the operation
of any of the industries m.rned in the Act. 82
The act still made it a misdemeanor, punishable by fine and imprisonment,
for any person wilfully doing any of the things prohibited by the act.
It was still a felony for a union official to call a strike too.

1•Ir. Huggins was also of the opinion that the United States Supreme
Court had made some important law in the two packing cases. Under this
11

law 11 coal mines, packing houses, and flour in ills were mere private

enterprises not at all affected with a public interest. "Unfortunately
for the public, the United States Supreme Court cannot unmake -..he hard
facts.

118

3 Then followed a realistic picture painted oi' the hardship and

suffering following in the wake of the

1919 coal strike in Kansas , the

necessity of calling for volunteer miners, and the need for military
protection for them . This had taught the people of !\.ansas, said

1vir.

Hl:3.-g 6ins,

_ 82 . ~filliam L . Huggins, 11 Just what Has the Supreme Court Done to
the Kansas Industrial Court? 11 American Bar Association Journal, AI
(June, 1925), p . 363.

83 . Ibid . , p . 366.
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that the coal i ndust ry
on

affected with

.:i.

public intere.,t, and a vLL hl

at that .
Regardless of what men thought , pro l:l.rld con , on Lhe slt.uaLlon, Lt

was an incontrovertible fact that the United S t ates .Supreme CourL had
thrown a body bloc k to the indus trial court . In Chapter l I

wa

il:,

mentioned that, al'ter 1922, the work on t,he industric1.l side of tI1e new
court declined until in 1925 it was pr acticall y dormant . Reasons were
given for that, one of them b eing the adverse court declslons just discussed. In 1925 the Court of Industrial RelaLio ns was abolished by an
act of the hansas legi slature, ef fe ctive March 10, 1925.e4 fhe

ov1er0

arrl duti~ still p o s s essed oy tne court were transferred to a pul, le

service con:mis sion, cons is ting of 5 members appointed o_y the ,overnor
by and with the consent of

co

the senate . rhen, in 1933 , the public s rvice

· ssion was superceaed bJ tne present ljorporation Jomrnis:;ion, a budy

prir,cipally concerned witn vhe supervision arr.. re ula ion of co,nmon
carriers arrl puo.Lic ntilities in the sta.te .

s we sc,,w durin

tne dit- -

cussion on tne legal asJects of the industrial court , rJ,e l nitect States
Suoreme vourt oid not touch the subject of compu.Lsory

rol tr·ut_u n ln

public utilities and cormnon carriers . It can orotiao y 1:,e

tnat if t. e state now
a.c · .:_ t · ,s t.ney wo

ould atte:not w exerc · :..e ::., icb Jh, e

d oe

i:.he r d.OOa.6 fr.d st rial

pneld by tne

ourt. 1 ne o

i:ild ,

Jr~n,

o er

i'L~f..:e

t-r e

Co rt, act wri.ict1 ,1ere left to it r~1 ~r

r..,

.e

: .ff

cases, .o,ever, ,ave ever· been use. ::sir.ce.

n.1.s , 'vher , is

st.or/ of tne

an.eas

1d1

_.ria]

/) r_,

. , cu;
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been seen how the strained conditions rollowing the T1vorld ifar led to
t .e formation of t 1e court, the establishment of tnat court anu the way
in which it worked, and its final handling by t~ buprerne Court . It might
be well to just say this as to why the court was no more successful, nor
longer-lived than it was . A creation like the inaustrial court, born in
times of stress l functions best in those times because it is created to
suit those peculiar needs and circumstances . After 1920 i dustrial strife
in the United States declined, the same thing being true in Kansas
especially . Therefore, there was less and less reason for the existence
of suah a tribunal as the L1dustrial court . coupled with this, the
opposition of the Supreme Court as to tne scope tne industrial court
covered Ly its pub.... ic interest principle was just to mucn !'or it.
It can I t be said t11a t the court didn 't ao some booo, and that

it. was an abject failure. It admittedly wasn 't entirely successful in
preventing all strin:es and la-..:ior aisturba.1c es, out the ones w1.ich
happened mi 6 hL have been much :-1or e destruc ui ve if the court haun I t
have enforced the anti-picketing and. indmidation features of t11e law.
Then those cases volunta~ily s ub ·tted to the industrial court undoubtedly prevented many disputes from turnin5 into strikes. The court,
however , died, as much from i 1ertia as from constit ....tional li.nitations.
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